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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
ALICE KASWAN"

One of the most important developments in environmental law
over the last three decades has been the emergence of the
environmental justice movement, a movement that has challenged
the unequal distribution of undesirable land uses in poor and
minority communities. The movement's claims for injustice are
varied and interconnected-encompassingunfair treatment, unfair
distribution, and the systemic history and patterns of inequality
that have led to current disparities. While some have suggested
that government action should address only those disparities
caused by unfair treatment, Professor Kaswan argues that
distributive inequalities deserve regulatory attention regardless of
demonstrated discriminatorytreatment.
Most existing studies suggest that undesirable land uses are
unequally distributed based upon race and class and,
consequently, that we have distributive injustice. Some authors,
however, have suggested that these disparities may not be unjust:
the differences in distribution may be explained by communities'
differing preferences for the land uses in question. Professor
Kaswan argues that this argument embodies a competing vision of
distributive justice, one she calls the "community preferences
model." Under this model, the critical issue is not the physically
equal division of allegedly undesirable land uses, but the extent to
which communities are equally satisfied with surrounding land
uses. Some advocates of this model have suggested that the market
in land use distribution works, that communities are equally
satisfied, and that government intervention to improve
distributional outcomes is therefore unnecessary and possibly
counterproductive.
Professor Kaswan argues that, even if one were to adopt the
community preferences model of distributive justice, we
nonetheless have a distributive justice problem. She reviews
relevant aspects of the siting process-objective factors, political
decisions, and the special role of public participationprovisionsand concludes that the land use siting process does not serve to
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meet community preferences equally. While advocates of the
community preferences model have argued that post-siting
housing market dynamics could rectify disparities in preference
satisfaction, since those who did not like new land uses could
move away from them and those who do like land uses could
move toward them, Professor Kaswan argues that the housing
market is neither fluid nor equitable enough to overcome the
disparitiescreated in the land use siting process. Thus, she argues
that the "market" does not achieve equity, and that government
efforts to address distributive injustice are appropriateregardless
of one's model of distributivejustice.
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INTRODUCTION

Waterfront South, a neighborhood in Camden, New Jersey, is
not lined with marinas, yachting clubs, or fancy estates. As one court
has described:
The population of Waterfront South is 2,132, forty-one
percent of whom are children. Ninety-one percent of the
residents ... are persons of color ....
The residents of
Waterfront South suffer from a disproportionately high rate
of asthma and other respiratory ailments.1
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. B.S., University of
California, Berkeley, 1984; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1991. I would like to thank Barbara
Kautz for her invaluable assistance, as well as Shanee Michaelson for her earlier
assistance. I thank John Applegate, Craig Anthony Arnold, Henry Brown, Josh Davis,
Rick Diamond, Sheila Foster, Susan Freiwald, Gerald Torres, and Tim Iglesias for their
insightful comments. I also thank my colleagues at the University of San Francisco for
their helpful direction during a Faculty Scholarship Lunch devoted to this Article.
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In 1990, the median household income of residents of
Waterfront South was $15,082, and the per capita income
was $4,709. Over 50% of the residents of Waterfront South
live at or below the federal poverty level.2
The Waterfront South neighborhood is already a popular
location for the siting of industrial facilities. It contains the
Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority, a sewage
treatment plant, the Camden County Resource Recovery
facility, a trash-to-steam plant, the Camden Cogen Power
Plant, a co-generation plant, and two United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") designated
Superfund sites. Four sites within one-half mile of [a]
proposed facility are currently being investigated by the
EPA for the possible release of hazardous substances. The
[New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection] has
identified fifteen known contaminated sites in the
Waterfront South neighborhood.3
In 1999, the St. Lawrence Cement Company selected Waterfront
South as the venue for a new cement manufacturing facility.4
According to a court reviewing the siting decision, the facility will
emit "particulate matter (dust), mercury, lead, manganese, nitrogen
oxides, carbon monoxide, sulphur oxides and volatile organic
compounds. '5 Each year, 35,000 trucks will cross the neighborhood
to make deliveries to the facility and 42,000 trucks will depart from
the neighborhood.6 Since deliveries will come from a barge, the
deliveries will be concentrated, with 500 truck deliveries per day on
7
the eighty days a year scheduled for deliveries.
The story in Waterfront South is not unique. This pattern of
disproportionately siting locally undesirable land uses, or "LULUs,"
in poor and minority8 neighborhoods is common throughout
industrial America.' Similar patterns emerge when one considers
1. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446,
451 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002).
2. Id. at 459.
3. Id. at 451.
4. Id. at 453.
5. Id. at 454.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The use of the term "minority" is not intended to be pejorative. It captures the
sense that, within our heterogeneous society, whites are the dominant majority while other
groups, particularly communities of color, experience the challenge of being in the
minority.
9. See infra notes 159-209 and accompanying text (discussing data on distribution of
industrial facilities).
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other types of "undesirable" land uses, such as halfway houses for

former prison inmates, homeless shelters, and the like."°
Beginning in the early 1980s, these conditions prompted the
emergence of the "environmental justice" movement. In particular,
minority communities and organizations began to question whether
they were being exposed to more than their fair share's worth of
environmental
harms and whether decisions distributing
environmental harms were being made fairly." Local grassroots
organizations around the country began to explore the connection
between race and exposure to undesirable environmental problems. 2
Over the last decade, these grassroots efforts have coalesced into a
broadly-based

movement

for environmental justice 3 that has

challenged environmental organizations and government agencies to
address the fairness and implications of their actions. 4

Some commentators have suggested that "distributive
injustice"-that is, evidence of disproportionate land use patterns-is
not of regulatory concern unless it can be shown that the unequal
patterns were caused by identifiably discriminatory or biased
processes.'5 Under this view, distributional disparities not caused by
10. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (discussing distribution of social
service facilities).
11. The environmental justice literature frequently refers to an African-American
community's opposition to a toxic landfill in Warren County, North Carolina, in 1982 as
the event sparking the emergence of today's environmental justice movement. See, e.g.,
Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Forewordto CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 3, 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinafter VOICES FROM
THE GRASSROOTS] (discussing importance of North Carolina event); Eileen Gauna,
Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to
Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9 (1995) [hereinafter Gauna, Obstacles and
Incentives] (same).
12. See generally VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 11 (describing several
communities of color who organized in response to local environmental problems);
UNEQUAL PROTECTION:

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR

(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter UNEQUAL PROTECTION] (same).
13. By bringing grassroots activists together, numerous conferences facilitated the
creation of a characterizable movement out of these localized actions. See Colin
Crawford, Strategiesfor EnvironmentalJustice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring
Suits, 74 B.U. L. REV. 267,271-72 nn.15-16 (describing national and regional conferences)
(1994); Deeohn Ferris & David Hahn-Baker, Environmentalistsand EnvironmentalJustice
Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 66, 67-69
(Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995) (same).
14. See Gauna, Obstacles and Incentives, supra note 11, at 11-13, nn.38-39 & 42
(discussing the movement's challenges to the environmental establishment). See generally
Alice Kaswan, EnvironmentalJustice: Bridgingthe Gap Between Environmental Laws and
"Justice," 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 263-64 [hereinafter Kaswan, Bridging the Gap]
(describing challenges to environmental groups and agencies).
15. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
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tainted processes might be regrettable, but are not the appropriate
focus of regulatory action. For example; a disparity would be worth
redressing if it were caused by an intentionally discriminatory siting
decision. The disparity would not be worthy of regulatory concern,
however, if it was not caused by a tainted decision-making process,
but was instead traceable to the operation of "market forces," such as
differences in land costs or the relative efficiency of one location over
another. Under this view, the Waterfront South siting decision
described above would be worth redressing only if caused by
intentional discrimination.
I first argue that distributive justice is a critical issue even in
contexts devoid of intentional discrimination or other process
failures.16 Without demeaning the significance of the environmental
justice movement's attention to decision-making processes and the
structural causes of disadvantage, I argue that distributive justice is an
important goal in its own right because it responds to the conditions
that people actually experience17 and because it may be more
amenable to remedy than many forms of discriminatory treatment. 8
The issue is not simply abstract: the importance one attaches to
distributive justice has a significant impact on the willingness to
develop public policies to address it. Consider, for example, a
government policy prohibiting government agencies from siting
facilities where there is already a high concentration of polluting
facilities. If an agency nonetheless located a facility in such an area, it
could be held in violation based solely on the outcome of its decision,
even if the basis for its decision was not discriminatory and there was
no bias in the decision-making process. Such a policy might prohibit
siting an industrial facility in Waterfront South, the community
described above.
Proposals of this nature have been highly
controversial, with the controversy turning to a considerable extent
on attitudes about the relative importance of purely distributive
justice. 9
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
19. For example, in 1992, two bills were introduced into Congress to protect heavilyburdened areas from greater concentrations of undesirable facilities. The Environmental
Justice Act of 1992 would have placed limits on the siting of toxic facilities in the one
hundred areas in the country experiencing the greatest health impact from toxins.
Environmental Justice Act of 1992, H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993); see Vicki Been, What's
Fairness Got to Do With It? EnvironmentalJustice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable
Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1069-71 (1993) [hereinafter Been, What's Fairness

Got to Do with It?]; Robert D. Bullard, The Legacy of American Apartheid and
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Assuming the importance of distributive justice, the second issue
I address is whether the current distribution of undesirable land uses
is distributively just. The answer to this question is contested, and
turns upon how we define, and therefore measure, distributive justice.
This Article identifies and clarifies the two most important theories at
issue, and argues that we have failed to achieve distributive justice

regardless of which theory of justice we adopt.
The most prevalent theory of distributive justice, what I call the
"equal division" model, measures justice by the degree to which
undesirable land use distributions are physically equal.20 Because
studies indicate that many poor and minority communities experience
a greater concentration of LULUs than other communities,2' we have
a distributive justice problem under this model.
Professor Lynn Blais, in her article Environmental Racism
Reconsidered, has, however, challenged the assertion that there is a
distributive justice problem through proposing what is, implicitly,

Environmental Racism, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 445, 471 (1994). Similarly, the
Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993 would have prohibited the siting of solid or
hazardous waste facilities in minority and low-income areas that were "environmentally
disadvantaged." Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993, H.R. 1924, 103d Cong. (1993).
Both of these bills failed to gain congressional approval. See Been, supra, at 1083-84;
Bullard, supra, at 471.
As another example, in the late 1990s the EPA interpreted regulations
implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to limit state and local environmental
agencies' ability to grant permits-and hence condone the siting of-polluting facilities in
minority areas already experiencing a disproportionate concentration of such facilities.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (1998) [hereinafter INTERIM
GUIDANCE], available at http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/interim.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The interpretation proved highly controversial. See, e.g.,
Chamber Seeks Minority Business Support in Feud on EPA EnvironmentalJustice Policy,
67 U.S. L.W. 2041 (July 21, 1998) (discussing business groups' opposition to EPA
interpretation); EPA Defends Release of Interim Policy on Processing of Civil Rights
Complaints, 66 U.S. L.W. 2737 (June 2, 1998) (discussing EPA's defense of its policy in
response to opposition). The revised policy, issued in 2000, did little to lessen the
controversy. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT TITLE VI GUIDANCE
FOR EPA ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS ADMINISTERING ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING
PROGRAMS

AND DRAFT

REVISED

GUIDANCE

FOR

INVESTIGATING

TITLE VI

Fed. Reg. 39,650 (June 27,
2000) [hereinafter DRAFT RECIPIENT GUIDANCE and DRAFT REVISED INVESTIGATION
GUIDANCE, respectively]; Branford C. Mank, The Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised
Investigation Guidances: Too Much Discretionfor EPA and a More Difficult Standardfor
Complainants?,30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,144 (2000).
20. See infra Section IV.A (describing distributive justice as an equal division of
undesirable land uses).
21. See infra notes 157-209 and accompanying text (reviewing studies on the
distribution of LULUs).
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS, 65
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another way of conceptualizing distributive justice.22 Under her
approach, which I characterize as the "community preferences"
23
model, disparities in the siting of LULUs are not necessarily unjust.
This model defines distributive justice according to the degree to
which the location of LULUs meets community preferences. Because
what might be undesirable to one community might be desirable to
another, a physically unequal distribution could be "just" if the
distribution satisfied host communities equally. Professor Blais
argues that the market in preferences works well enough to conclude
that, overall, disparities are generally justified by differing
preferences.24
I argue that the market in community preferences does not work,
and that the community preferences model therefore fails to provide
an "out" from the problem of distributive justice. Economic and
political markets do not function to meet community preferences
equally. In fact, the land use siting process and the dynamics of the
housing market likely skew undesirable land uses toward poor and
minority communities regardless of those communities' preferences.2"
The distributive justice problem does not evaporate through applying
a community preferences model; whether we measure justice by it or
by the equal division model, we encounter significant inequities
deserving serious attention.
The choice of model-equal division versus community
preferences-and the assessment of whether justice is achieved under
each model, have real-world implications for public policy. Under the
equal division model, evidence of disparities provides a strong basis
for seriously considering government policies to address unfair
concentrations of LULUs. But if one instead adopts the community
preferences model and assumes that it provides a satisfactory
explanation for existing disparities, then government efforts to
equalize the siting of LULUs become unnecessary: there is no
distributive justice problem to remedy. Moreover, under this theory,
government efforts imposing across-the-board distributional edicts
could be counterproductive. If one assumes that the market in
22. Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 80-83
(1996).
23. See id. at 80.
24. See id. at 82-83.
25. See infra Sections VI.C-VI.E (analyzing how the land use siting process leads to
distributions that satisfy the preferences of poor and minority communities less than those
of other communities) and Section VII.B (analyzing how post-siting housing market
dynamics are unlikely to rectify skewed distributions resulting from the land use siting
process and may exacerbate disparities in preference satisfaction).
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preferences works, government efforts to equalize distributions would
interfere with the market's ability to match differing community
preferences, leaving communities equally burdened, but unequally
satisfied. Under this model, public policies to equalize siting would
be an unnecessary and counterproductive intrusion into neutral
agency actions.
Since the community preferences model threatens to erase the
distributive justice problem, it is important to determine whether its
underlying assumptions are accurate. Otherwise, it risks lulling us
into complacency about distributive injustice and thwarting efforts to
address it.
In sum, the analysis in this Article has four primary goals: (1) to
argue for the importance of addressing distributive justice in its own
right; (2) to illuminate the relevant theories of distributive justice
applicable in the land use context; (3) to demonstrate that we have
failed to achieve distributive justice, whether one adopts the equal
division or the community preferences model; and (4) to demonstrate
more broadly the fallacy of assuming that "the market" has the
capacity to resolve significant public policy issues, such as the
inequitable siting of locally undesirable land uses. This Article does
not attempt to propose specific public policy initiatives. Instead, the
Article addresses the fundamental questions about the importance
and nature of distributive justice that must undergird future policy
development.
Part I provides a brief introduction to the environmental justice
movement and then identifies its primary claims: "distributive,"
"political," and "social" justice. Part I then explores the various
causes of distributive injustice, ranging from the invidious to the
innocent. It concludes by observing why the issue of distributive
justice necessarily implicates racial and economic justice. Part II
addresses the importance of distributive justice as a focal point for
policy attention, even in the absence of intentional discrimination or
identified process failures. Part III explores general theories of
distributive justice and analyzes how they lead to the particular
models that are relevant in the land use context.
Part IV introduces the first model of distributive justice, the
equal division model, and then concludes that, notwithstanding
certain methodological controversies, we have a distributive justice
problem under this model.
Part V introduces the community preferences model of
distributive justice. This model has been used to challenge the
assumption that an unequal division of LULUs is unjust, and posits
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that unequal distributions may be justified by differences in
community preferences. The model itself is controversial. However,
this Article accepts the model on its own terms. Part V then explains
the methodology for determining whether preferences are equally
met. Since it is impossible to determine the extent to which
community preferences are met through direct empirical analysis, it is
necessary to analyze the likelihood that they are met by exploring the
factors most likely to determine existing land use distributions: land
use siting processes and post-siting housing market dynamics. Hence
the apparent irony: an article on distributionthat thoroughly explores
land use processes. The irony is resolved, however, by observing that
I generally evaluate processes not for their own sake,26 but to
determine the likelihood that the resulting land use distributions are
likely to satisfy preferences equally.
Part VI evaluates land use siting processes to determine whether
they are likely to have led to distributions of land uses that satisfy
community preferences equally. It analyzes objective factors (such as
market forces and regulatory requirements), political processes
expressed through general zoning and individualized siting decisions,
and the special role of public participation provisions. It concludes
that siting decisions often fail to reflect equally the preferences of
facilities' neighbors, and instead are often skewed against the
preferences of minority and low-income residents.
Part VII addresses the contention that, even if land use siting
processes do not meet community preferences equally, post-siting
dynamics in the housing market could rectify such failures. Residents
who did not like the LULUs could move away; residents who wanted
to live near them could move closer. Part VII concludes that postsiting housing market dynamics are not likely to result in distributions
that match neighborhood preferences equally. Differences in income
and housing discrimination mean that some will be better able to
move toward or away from their preferred land uses than others,
thereby deepening distributional disparities. The "market" does not
lead to equity.
The Article concludes that advocates of the community
preferences model have incorrectly assumed a functioning private
preferences market in land use siting and in the post-siting housing

26. Because issues of political and social justice beg for attention in any discussion of
land use processes and housing markets, I briefly highlight these dimensions as well. See
Section VI.F ("The Land Use Siting Process and Political Justice") and Section VII.C
("The Housing Market and Political Justice").
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market. The community preferences model's misplaced faith in the
market should not lead us to dismiss important governmental efforts
to address distributive justice.
This Article is a starting point. Important questions remain, such
as the appropriate model for distributive justice, the weight to be
given distributive justice when it competes with other social policies,
what government efforts would be likely to succeed given the
complex causes of distributive inequities, and the specific goals and
structure of government initiatives to achieve distributive justice.
These issues are, however, subjects for future scholarship.
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
AND ITS CLAIMS FOR JUSTICE

A.

The EnvironmentalJustice Movement's Impact

Since the 1980s, the rise of the environmental justice movement
has begun to impact environmental and land use policy. As the
movement challenged the fairness of environmental impacts and
decision-making, academics, government agencies, and others
undertook systematic studies that suggested that LULU distributions
were correlated with race and income.27 These studies and the
movement's gathering strength resulted in various environmental
justice initiatives in the 1990s. The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") established the Environmental Equity Workgroup, which
analyzed existing evidence on the distribution of environmental risks
and in 1992 published a study called "Environmental Equity:
Reducing Risk for All Communities. '28 In February 1994, President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, which requires federal
agencies to consider the implications of federal decisions on the poor
and on minorities and which urges federal agencies to develop
mechanisms for ensuring the participation of all groups in decisionmaking processes affecting them. 29 The EPA, in conformance with
the Executive Order, has issued several guidance documents
indicating how it will take environmental justice issues into
consideration." Pursuant to the Executive Order, other federal
27. See infra notes 157-209 (discussing studies on the distribution of LULUs).
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR
ALL COMMUNITIES (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT].
29. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995), reprintedas amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (2000).
30. See supra note 19 (discussing guidance interpreting Title VI to apply to
environmental permitting decisions). In addition, in 1998, the EPA issued a guidance
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agencies have, to varying degrees, integrated environmental justice
concerns into their programs."
The federal government has not acted alone. Various states have
enacted or are considering legislative proposals to control the siting of
undesirable environmental land uses.32 In addition to government
actions, a number of mainstream environmental groups have
responded to the movement with greater attention to environmental
justice issues.33 Although opinions differ as to the sincerity and depth

document on incorporating environmental justice concerns into the environmental review
processes associated with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), which
requires Environmental Impact Statements for all major federal actions significantly
affecting the environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000) (establishing environmental
impact statement requirement); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA'S NEPA COMPLIANCE
ANALYSIS (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/ej/
ej-guidance-nepa-epa0498.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
guidance document explains in detail how agencies should go about considering the
impacts of federal projects on poor and minority communities. See id.
31. See generally Denis Binder et al., A Survey of Federal Agency Response to
President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12,898 on Environmental Justice, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11,133 (2001) (reviewing numerous agencies' implementation of Executive Order
No. 12,898). For example, to the extent federal agencies are subject to Environmental
Impact Statement requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act, they have
included environmental justice concerns in their analyses. See id. at 11,137-38. Their
ability to do so has been facilitated by a guidance document on the subject issued by the
Council on Environmental Quality for use by all federal agencies. See Council on
Environmental Quality, Environmental Justice:
Guidance Under the National
Environmental Policy Act, (1997), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/ej/justice.
pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Many agencies have taken steps to
improve outreach to and public participation by low-income and minority communities.
See Binder et al., supra, at 11,138-39. Otherwise, the ways in which federal agencies have
integrated environmental justice have varied considerably, depending upon each agency's
unique responsibilities. For example, the EPA has distributed grant money to help
communities monitor and reduce pollution, id. at 11,142, the Department of Agriculture
has focused on natural resource issues in poor and minority urban settings and developed
programs to train migrant workers about pesticide dangers, see id. at 11,143, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development has been involved in urban
revitalization and lead poisoning, id. at 11,144-45.
32. See Chuck D. Barlow, State Environmental Justice Programs and Related
Authorities, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES
TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 140, 156 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999)
[hereinafter THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE] (providing an overview and
analysis of state environmental justice programs). As of 1999, five states had their own
environmental justice policies, four states had environmental justice policies incorporated
into agreements with the U.S. EPA, and five states had policies under development. See
id. at 141-42.
33. See Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 14, at 264 (discussing environmental
groups' responses to the environmental justice challenge).
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of these efforts,34 environmental justice issues play a much greater
role in debates about environmental policy than was evident just a
decade ago. Critical issues remain, however, as to the appropriate

nature and scope of environmental justice initiatives.
B.

The EnvironmentalJustice Movement's Claimsfor "Justice"

At its core, the environmental justice movement raises two
distinct types of claims for justice: distributive justice and political
justice.35 To provide context for this Article's subsequent focus on
distributive justice, this Section sketches the basic parameters of each
form and introduces one broader category: "social justice."3 6 It also
analyzes the degree to which distributive injustices are, and are not,
likely to be caused by political or social injustices. The primary focus
is on claims for justice raised in the context of land use siting
decisions.
1. Distributive Justice
Claims for "distributive" justice focus on whether communities
bear more than their fair share of LULUs. 3. While all communities
34. See id. at 265 & n.215 (noting that some in the civil rights movement doubt the
ability of mainstream environmental groups to respond fully to the needs and concerns of
communities of color).
35. See Been, What's FairnessGot to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1028-55 (discussing
distributive conceptions of environmental justice), 1060-68 (discussing process-oriented
conceptions of environmental justice); Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up:
Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the
EnvironmentalJustice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 788-98 (1998) [hereinafter Foster,
Justice From the Ground Up] (discussing and distinguishing distributive and process
theories of justice); Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 14, at 230-39 (defining and
discussing distributive and political justice).
36. One other type of claim made in the environmental justice context is "corrective
justice," a claim that has focused on whether the legal system provides adequate remedies
for environmental harms once they have occurred. See Robert Kuehn, A Taxonomy of
Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,681, 10,693-94 (2000) (discussing
"environmental justice as corrective justice"). Rather than focusing on siting processes or
outcomes, corrective justice focuses on responses to existing circumstances, and addresses
such issues as the equity of environmental enforcement actions and common law remedies
for environmental harms. Id. at 10,693-98.
Theoretically, the idea of corrective justice could be used more broadly than it has
been so far. One could argue that, to the extent studies show more LULUs in some
neighborhoods than others, then corrective justice requires reparations or other
compensation. This Article primarily focuses on justifying efforts to increase the fairness
of future siting decisions, but I acknowledge that the principles raised could be relevant to
a broader conception of corrective justice.
37. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 154 (1961) (observing that claims for
justice are essentially claims for fairness, and that where the issue is the distribution of
burdens or benefits to classes of individuals, "what is typically fair or unfair is a 'share' ").
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must bear some of the burdens of industrial society, the critical
question is whether these burdens are distributed equitably. The
environmental justice movement raises both narrow and broad claims
of distributive justice. When individual local communities argue that
they are subject to more than their respective fair shares of LULUs,
they are raising "narrow" claims regarding their particular
circumstances. 8 For example, if one community is subject to all of
the waste disposal facilities for an entire metropolitan area, then that

community has a claim of distributive injustice in the narrow sense.
But many in the environmental justice movement make the broader

claim that, overall, more LULUs are located in poor and minority
neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods.39 Although both narrow
and broad claims are critical parts of the environmental justice
movement, the broader claim is the primary focus of this Article.
It is important to note that distributive justice is concerned with
outcomes, not with the causes of those outcomes. ° Thus, if the
distribution of waste disposal facilities in an area is highly skewed, the
community has a claim of distributive injustice regardless of whether
the disparity was caused by intentional discrimination or, instead, by
"objective" siting criteria bearing no relation to the community's
demographics. Similarly, looking at the distribution of LULUs more
broadly, unequal distributions are of concern regardless of whether
they were determined by discriminatory processes or ostensibly
neutral market factors.
38. See, e.g., Robert W. Collin & William Harris, Sr., Race and Waste in Two Virginia
Communities, in VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 11, at 93, 95-98 (describing
African-American opposition to concentration of waste facilities in King and Queen
County, Virginia); Foster, Justice From the Ground Up, supra note 35, 779-88 (describing
an African-American community's opposition to a waste facility in light of existing
concentration); Vernice D. Miller, Planning, Power, and Politics: A Case Study of the
Land Use and Siting History of the North River Water Pollution Control Plant, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 707, 710-11 (1994) (describing the siting of a sewage plant in
Harlem).
39. See, e.g., LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R.

ENVIRONMENTAL

RACISM

AND

THE

RISE

FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:

OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL

JUSTICE

MOVEMENT 54 (2001) (observing pattern of distributive inequities); Robert D. Bullard,
Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the EnvironmentalJustice Movement, in VOICES
FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 11, at 15, 15 (arguing that, overall, communities of
color are subject to worse environmental conditions than other communities).
40. See Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuitof ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: One View of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 962-63 (1973) [hereinafter Michelman,
Constitutional Welfare Rights] (stating that distributive justice is "an outcome-oriented
appraisal of the pattern and makeup of distributive 'shares' . . ., as distinguished from
concern for the correctness of the processes themselves or the purity of their application");
see also Kuehn, supra note 36, at 10,684 (stating that the focus of distributive justice "is on
fairly distributed outcomes, rather than on the process for arriving at such outcomes").
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2. Political Justice

The other central claim the environmental justice movement
makes is one I have characterized as a claim for "political justice."'"
A claim for political justice looks at the fairness of decision-making
processes rather than the discrete distributional outcome of those

processes. 42 As H.L.A. Hart has stated, "a choice, made without prior
consideration of the interests of all sections of the community would
be open to criticism as merely partisan and unjust. ' 43 If the interests
of some are given more weight than the interests of others, then we
have an instance of political injustice." For example, if a community
were selected as a site for a waste disposal facility because its interests
were not treated with the same respect as those of others, then that
community has a claim of political injustice. More pointedly, if the
community were selected as a site because of intentional racial
discrimination, that claim would implicate political injustice.
Although the distributional outcome of a decision-making
process may be relevant to assessing its fairness,45 the central inquiry
under political justice concerns the process rather than the outcome.
When evaluating discrete decisions, the standard for political justice is
fair treatment, without any guarantee of a fair outcome.46 Here, too,
41. See Kaswan, Bridgingthe Gap, supra note 14, at 233-34.
42. It should be noted that, throughout this Article, unless indicated otherwise, I use
the term "discrimination" to refer to any decision-making process that violates political
justice as described, whether or not it relates to racial discrimination. This is not to
minimize the particular importance of racial discrimination, but to recognize that the
arguments about political justice include but go beyond issues of racial prejudice.
Furthermore, I reserve the use of the term "discrimination" to situations of political
injustice. In other words, if a decision were made fairly but nonetheless resulted in a
distributive disparity, I would use the term "distributive injustice" but not
"discrimination." This is not to minimize the importance and significance of distributional
disparities, but simply to ensure that the reader knows when I am referring to political
versus distributive justice.
43. HART, supra note 37, at 163.
44. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977) (stating that
government must treat its citizens with equal concern and respect); see also Been, What's
Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1063-64 (quoting DWORKIN, supra, at 273).
45. For example, under an Equal Protection Clause analysis, the Supreme Court has
made clear that the disparate impact of a decision is an important type of circumstantial
evidence for proving intentional discrimination. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
46. A community could be treated fairly, but could, for a variety of reasons,
nonetheless be subjected to a burden that is greater than that of others. In such an
instance the community would have a claim rooted in distributive justice but not in
political justice. Fair treatment does not guarantee a particular distributional outcome.
See DWORKIN, supra note 44, at 273 (observing that a group could be treated fairly but
nonetheless receive a distributional burden); Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 14, at
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the environmental justice movement makes narrow and broad claims.
In a particular context, it might claim that a particular siting decision
was motivated by invidious factors.47 More broadly, those in the

movement argue that there is systemic discrimination in decisionmaking institutions and structures.48
Many have used the term "procedural justice" to describe what I
term "political justice. '49 This Article uses the term "political justice"
rather than "procedural justice" because the issue goes beyond the
question of procedure to the substance of the deliberative process. 0
If the issue is framed as one of "procedural justice," then decisionmakers might argue that they have solved the "fair treatment"
problem through the creation of procedures that ensure participation
of all groups in decision-making processes. It is not clear, however,
that procedural requirements enhancing public participation will
necessarily lead to substantive decisions that are more responsive to
public opinion.51
While enhancing participation procedures to
equalize opportunities is an important step in creating the
preconditions for political justice, it provides no guarantee that the
240; see also infra note 121 and accompanying text (describing lottery as fair process that
could lead to unfair outcome).
47. See, e.g., Collin & Harris, supra note 38, at 95-98 (describing racial bias in siting a
landfill in a black community in King and Queen County, Virginia).
48. See, e.g., Chavis, supra note 11, at 3 (describing myriad forms of "environmental
racism").
49. See, e.g.,
JUSTICE:

KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE

35-37 (2d ed. 2000) (using the term "procedural justice" to describe theories based upon
how people are treated); Kuehn, supra note 36, at 10,688-89 (categorizing theory of justice
based on a right to equal concern and respect in "political decision[s]" as "procedural
justice").
50. In other areas of the law, the term "procedure" does not have an explicitly
substantive component. For example, procedural due process doctrine focuses on the
government's procedures for making decisions that affect protected interests. See
generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (observing that the government must
use fair procedures whenever it deprives individuals of "liberty" or "property" within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment). The
doctrine does not impose any requirements on the substance of a governmental decision.
Similarly, under NEPA, a governmental agency must adopt procedures for assessing and
considering the environmental effects of its decisions, but the statute does not impose any
substantive requirement that the agency give weight to those effects. See Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam) (stating that
NEPA "imposes upon agencies duties that are 'essentially procedural[,J' " that NEPA
does not require that environmental consequences be given substantive weight in the
agency's final decision, and that the Department of Housing and Urban Development had
met NEPA's requirements by demonstrating that it had procedurally "considered"
environmental consequences).
51. See infra Section VI.E and accompanying text (discussing role of public
participation provisions).
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substantive decision will embody political justice. One must, of
course, be mindful of the risk of creating a false dichotomy between
"substance" and "procedure." Clearly, the procedures agencies use
may affect the substance of their ultimate decisions, and this hope is
one of the motivating forces behind the creation of improved
procedural requirements.52 Nonetheless, a focus on procedure is one
step removed from establishing explicit expectations for the
substantive respect that various groups' interests should be accorded
in decision-making processes.
3. Social Justice
Distributive and political justice mark the basic categories of
justice at issue in the environmental justice movement. Under the
rubric of "social justice," environmental justice claims look beyond
immediate siting processes and outcomes to consider the wide web of
political, economic, and social forces that influence the distribution of
LULUs.5 3 This inquiry focuses on such issues as inequities in wealth,
historic and present zoning practices, implicitly or explicitly
discriminatory decision-making structures that indirectly affect siting
decisions, housing discrimination, and employment discrimination.
The "social justice" rubric is useful because it indicates a broadlyAt base, however, it combines elements of
focused inquiry.
distributive and political justice and does not present a fundamentally
different category of justice.
None of these claims for justice-distributive, political, or
social-are raised in a vacuum. Many communities raise all of them.54
Speaking narrowly, siting decisions are challenged because they add
to the disproportionate burden a community must bear and because
the bases for the siting decisions are believed to be discriminatory. 5

52. See Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 431, 452-55 (1994) (suggesting that improved community participation

procedures would make administrative agencies more responsive to poor and minority
communities).
53. See, e.g., Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 35, at 791-92 (observing
that, to understand environmental justice, one must look beyond the "atomistic
conception of agency" and consider the full web of "economic and social forces" that
contribute to environmental injustice); Kuehn, supra note 36, at 10,698-99 (describing one
form of environmental justice as social justice).
54. See MANASTER, supra note 49, at 159 (noting the multiple and overlapping claims
of distributive and procedural justice made by communities opposing siting decisions).
55. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 38, at 714-15 (describing West Harlem community's
disparate environmental burden and the discriminatory processes that led to it).
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Speaking broadly, those in the movement decry inequalities in
national distributions and the widespread racism, power disparities,
and institutional biases that are believed to cause them.56
C. The Causes of DistributiveInjustice
The extent to which distributional disparities are caused by
political and social injustice is highly contested.17 Although I argue
that the presence of distributional disparities is sufficient to trigger
regulatory concern regardless of cause, the causes are not irrelevant.
Where distributive injustice is linked to political or more general
social injustice, it presents multiple bases for concern. It is thus
worthwhile to at least sketch the possible relationships. 8
In some circumstances, distributive injustice could be caused by
political injustice in discrete siting decisions. Historic and current
discrimination in siting LULUs would likely lead to a concentration
of LULUs in disfavored communities.5 9 Theoretically, these
distributional disparities could be erased by post-siting housing
dynamics: those who did not like certain land uses could move away;
those who liked them could move closer.6"

Even if this were true,

however, there would be some period of time during which disparities
would exist. As elaborated below, moreover, such post-siting housing
market dynamics are not, in fact, likely to equalize the demographics
surrounding LULUs.6" Thus, past and present discrimination in siting
processes are likely to lead to distributional disparities.
In other circumstances, siting disparities might not be caused by
political injustice in discrete decisions, but might nonetheless be a
product of the broader form of social injustice discussed above.
Historic or present zoning laws might concentrate undesirable land
56. Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note
11, at 7, 7-13 (describing inequitable distributions and their pervasive historical, political,
and institutional causes).
57. See Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 35, at 790-92 (observing that
evidence of distributional injustice prompts a difficult and contested inquiry into
causation).
58. See Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 14, at 239-42 (discussing
interrelationships between distributive and political justice). Some understanding of
causation may be necessary to design remedies that will be effective in the long term,
although that is not the focus of this Article.
59. See id. at 239 (arguing that political injustice is likely to lead to distributional
injustice).
60. See infra notes 477-89 and accompanying text (discussing post-siting housing
market dynamics).
61. See infra notes 498-510 and accompanying text (discussing post-siting housing
mobility).
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uses in certain neighborhoods.62 Alternatively, social injustice may
have led to disparities after an initially neutral siting decision. If at
the time of an initial decision, an area had been unpopulated, or was

white and affluent, then the siting decision itself was probably not
politically unjust.63 But broader social injustices, like poverty and
housing discrimination, could have led to a subsequent concentration
of poor and minority residents, since they would be less able to flee
undesired LULUs, or might be attracted to lower-valued housing in
areas with LULUs.6

Social injustice is also a factor in disparities that arise from
certain market forces, like land values. Proponents of undesirable
land uses are drawn to cheaper land, land that is often located in poor
and minority neighborhoods.6 5 In such cases, there is no political

injustice in the discrete siting decision. But the problem of social
injustice is evident. Land values in minority neighborhoods are often
cheaper than in comparable non-minority neighborhoods, suggesting
that the difference in valuation is a product of lingering
discrimination.66 Thus, even if certain distributional disparities are
not attributable to political injustice in discrete siting decisions, they

may nonetheless be attributable to broader forms of social injustice.67
Finally, it is possible for distributive disparities to arise without

implicating either political injustice in a siting decision or broader
issues of social justice. A community could be treated with the same
concern and respect as all other communities, but nonetheless be
selected for a disproportionate share of LULUs due to some

62. See infra notes 336-401 and accompanying text (discussing role of zoning
provisions in creating unequal LULU distributions).
63. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1014 (remarking
that "market forces" operating after the initial siting decision may have caused a currently
disproportionate outcome); Richard A. Samp, Fairnessfor Sale in the Marketplace, 9 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 503, 505 (1994) (pointing out the fallacy of studies that
"draw conclusions regarding the reasons for a siting decision from the composition of the
current population" (emphasis added)).
64. See Bullard, supra note 39, at 21-22 (stating that "racial barriers" make it difficult
for minorities to relocate); Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 35, at 793-96
(describing housing market theory and observing that market forces can themselves be
racist); Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 14, at 241-42 (same); Charles P. Lord,
EnvironmentalJustice Law and the ChallengesFacing Urban Communities, 14 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 721, 728 (1995) (discussing role of discrimination in reducing minority housing
mobility).
65. See infra notes 322-24 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 471-73 and accompanying text.
67. See Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 35, at 791-98 (discussing
causation, role of market forces in creating unjust distributions, and potential racism
inherent in the housing market).
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objective factor that does not implicate political or social justice.68
For example, geological features might explain a concentration of
waste disposal facilities. In such an instance, a distributional disparity
in disposal facilities would have been caused by the objective factor of
stable geological formations, not by the siting agency's failure to treat
the waste-site beleaguered community with less fairness and respect
than others. In this situation, we could identify a distributional
injustice, but it would not be linked to a political or social injustice.
(Arguably, however, if decision-makers know their decision will
result in an unintended disparate impact, but fail to take that impact
into consideration, their decision demonstrates a lack of respect for
the affected community that does suggest political injustice.69 )

The core of my thesis is that distributional injustice is a matter of
concern regardless of its cause: it is a concern in all of the situations
described above, whether the product of outright discrimination or
utterly neutral factors. Nonetheless, this sketch of possible causes of
distributive justice suggests that, in many instances, distributive
injustice presents a concern not just in its own right, but because it
implicates other forms of injustice as well.
D. DistributiveJustice and Its Relation to Racial and Economic
Justice
Theoretically, a problem of distributive justice exists whenever
any individual or group is subjected to an "unfair" proportion of
LULUs. On its own terms, the concept of distributive justice does
not implicate race or class. If the population were completely
integrated by race, class, and other demographic features, then the
question would simply be whether Neighborhood A had more and/or
worse LULUs than Neighborhood B. Under these circumstances, the
question of distributive justice might be important, but it would not
implicate the questions of racial and economic justice that are critical
to the environmental justice movement.

68. See DWORKIN, supra note 44, at 273 (observing that a group could be treated
fairly but nonetheless receive a distributional burden); Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra
note 14, at 240 (same).
69. See Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 839, 840 (1992) (noting that environmental regulations could have a racial
impact and that "the willful ignorance of that impact may itself be racist even if the
intention behind the rule had no racial animus at all").
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But patterns of residential living in the United States are highly
segregated by race and class.7" Neighborhood A is likely to have a
completely different make-up from Neighborhood B. Economic
segregation is widespread, and particularly evident in the sharp lines
between wealthy suburbs and poor inner cities.71 Although levels of
racial segregation for African-Americans have been slowly decreasing
since 1970,72 a recent Brookings Institute study suggests, based on
2000 census figures, that "the large number of American metropolitan
areas with extremely high levels of segregation remains quite
striking."73 For African Americans, the most segregated group in the
United States,74 the national average of a key segregation index is in
the "hypersegregated" range,75 and segregation is significantly above

70. See generally CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE:

RACE, SPACE AND

AUDACIOUS JUDGES 4-8 (1996) (describing racial and class "spatial polarization" as a
consequence of post-World War II suburbanization that excluded minorities). Professor
Haar notes that race and class are also correlated: African Americans and Hispanic
Americans frequently have less employment and lower incomes than whites. Id. at 7; see
also RACE AND POLITICS: NEW CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES FOR BLACK ACTIVISM 6
(James Jennings ed., 1997) [hereinafter RACE AND POLITICS] (describing high rates of
poverty among blacks and black-white segregation). As one author has noted, "[i]n terms
of income, occupation, wealth, and other indicators, blacks still lag well behind the
majority white population." Billy J. Tidwell, Parity Progress and Prospects: Racial
Inequalities in Economic Well-Being, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 2000 287, 288
(2000).
71. See HAAR, supra note 70, at 5 (describing the striking "spatial polarization of poor
and affluent"); Robert L. Smith & Dave Davis, Gap Between Haves, Have-Nots Measured
in Miles, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 15, 2002, at Al (describing increasing economic
isolation between rich and poor in major cities).
72. Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, Racial Segregation in the 2000 Census:
Promising News 3 (Brookings Inst., Ctr. on Urban & Metropolitan Policy, 2001); see also
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE

UNITED STATES: 1980-2000 59 (Aug. 2002).
73. Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 72, at 4 (discussing trends in African-American
segregation).
74. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 72, at 4 (noting that "residential
segregation was ...higher for African Americans than for the other groups," including
Hispanics or Latinos, Asians and Pacific Islanders, and American Indians and Alaskan
Natives).
75. Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 72, at 5. Based on 2000 census figures, the national
dissimilarity index was 0.652. Id. A level above 0.6 is considered hypersegregated. Id. at
3. The dissimilarity index measures how many African-American residents would have to
move from their existing census tracts to obtain an even distribution in the metropolitan
area. Id. For example, if the index is 0.6, then 60% of the African-American residents
would have to move to obtain an even distribution. See id.; see also U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 72, at 60 tbl.5-1 (indicating that average dissimilarity index for
African Americans in 2000 was 0.640).
Of the 291 metropolitan areas analyzed in the Brookings Institute study, 74 were
"hypersegregated," with dissimilarity indices greater than 0.6. Glaeser & Vigdor, supra
note 72 at 4. One hundred sixty were "partially segregated," with dissimilarity indices
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this national average in the nations' most populous areas.76 The slow
decreases in segregation over the last three decades77 have been
achieved through the integration of formerly all-white census tracts,
not through the integration of heavily African-American census
tracts,7" and the decreases in segregation have been smallest in the
areas with the greatest African-American populations79 and the

greatest amount of historic segregation. 0 Almost a third of the
nation's African Americans currently live in neighborhoods that are
80% African-American or more.8
Levels of segregation for Latinos are significant, but slightly
lower than those for African Americans.82 In the Northeast, Latino
segregation has reached "hypersegregation" levels.83 As with African
Americans, the highest levels of segregation exist in those regions
with the highest percentages of Latinos. 84 In addition, while the levels
of African-American segregation have been slowly decreasing over
the last thirty years, 5 key aspects of Latino segregation have been

between 0.4 and 0.6. Id. Only eighty-three metropolitan areas were considered "less
segregated," with indices below 0.4. Id.
76. Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 72, at 7; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note
72, at 59 (stating that levels of segregation for African Americans are correlated with
metropolitan area population size, particularly for large areas with a population of one
million or more).
77. See Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 72, at 3-4 (describing decreases in segregation
from 1970 to 2000).
78. Id. at 5. The number of census tracts whose percentage of African Americans
exceeds eighty percent did not change from 1990 to 2000. Id.
79. Id. at 7. In metropolitan areas "that were more than 25 percent black in 1990,
segregation declined least, by 2.8 percentage points." Id. Segregation decreased most in
areas where African Americans were less than 5% of the population. Id.; see also U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 72, at 63 (noting that segregation is greater in areas with
higher percentages of blacks).
80. Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 72, at 5 (noting that the regions with the lowest
historic levels of segregation had greater decreases in segregation); id. at 8 (noting that
large metropolitan areas with substantial segregation have changed the least); see also U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 72, at 72 (noting that "the large metropolitan areas that had
been the most segregated at the beginning of the period [1990] remained at or near the top
of the list [in 2000]"). The U.S. Census Bureau study on segregation also notes that "[tihe
top ten most segregated large metropolitan areas were in the older Northeast-Midwest
'Rust Belt' ..... " Id.
81. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 72, at 72. Many African Americans have left
such virtually all-black areas, however, as demonstrated by the decrease in the percentage
of people living in these areas from 1960, when almost half lived in census tracts that were
eighty percent African-American. Id.
82. See id. at 78 tbl.6-1 (showing national dissimilarity index of 0.509 in 2000).
83. Id. at 84 tbl.6-2 (showing dissimilarity index for the Northeast region of 0.615).
84. Id. at 77.
85. See supra note 77.
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neighborhoods differ greatly in their demographic make-up.
To the extent that disparities in distribution are correlated with
differences in race or income, the issue of distributive justice
implicates fundamental notions about equity in our society that would
not arise in a more integrated world. Although any inequity deserves
concern, inequities that stem from and in turn create the pernicious
effects of segregation change what could be an abstract question of
distributive justice into one that is necessarily related to broader
issues of racial and economic justice.
II. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distributional inequities are frequently discounted unless and

until one demonstrates that they were caused by discrimination-by
political injustice. 87 As one author has noted, in light of the difficulty
86. The dissimilarity index increased 1.5% from 1980 to 2000. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 72, at 78 tbl.6-1 (showing an increase in the dissimilarity index from
0.502 in 1980 to 0.509 in 2000). The isolation index, which measures the extent to which
those in a census tract are more likely to be of the same race, see Glaeser & Vigdor, supra
note 72, at 3 (explaining the isolation index), increased 21.5% from 1980 to 2000. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 72, at 78 tbl.6-1 (showing an increase in the isolation index
from 0.454 in 1980 to 0.552 in 2000).
87. See THOMAS LAMBERT ET AL., A CRITIQUE OF "ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" 78 (1996) (arguing that only discriminatory siting should be illegal); Daniel Kevin,
A Critique of
"Environmental Racism" and Locally Undesirable Land Uses:
Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 138-39 (1997)
(arguing that "disparate impacts or unequal results should be considered disproportionate
only when other, non-racial factors do not explain siting"); Lawrence J. Straw, Jr.,
EnvironmentalJustice: Racial Gerrymanderingfor Environmental Siting Decisions, 14 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 665, 671, 679-80 (1995) (critiquing environmental justice advocates who argue
that disparate impacts should be addressed even if unaccompanied by discriminatory
intent); cf Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private DisparateImpact Suits, 34 GA.
L. REV. 1155, 1167 (2000) (arguing that private litigants should not be given a cause of
action against the disparate impacts of environmental permitting decisions and that the
decision as to whether a disparate impact is problematic should be left to environmental
agencies). Professor Vicki Been has suggested that evidence of distributional disparities is
"flawed" because the studies do not establish that siting processes or intentional
discrimination caused the distributional disparities. Been, What's FairnessGot to Do with
It?, supra note 19, at 1014. She has, however, observed that proposals to make future
siting decisions fairer are justified notwithstanding the absence of proof that prior
decisions were unfair. Id. at 1016-18.
More broadly, Professor Michelman has noted that "the mainstream of our legal
tradition has largely bypassed the outcome-appraising sort of distributional concern."
Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 40, at 963. Although there has been
some opening to distributional concerns since Professor Michelman wrote almost thirty
years ago, particularly in the context of civil rights laws pertaining to employment,
housing, and disability rights, see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17
(2000); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act
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of proving that a given distributional injustice was caused by direct
political injustice by siting authorities, "critics have easily scrutinized
the distributive paradigm of environmental injustice with causation
objections. '88 Some of these critics thus imply that, if the disparity
was not caused by a racist or otherwise discriminatory siting decision,
then the disparity is not problematic.89 For example, if an area is
subject to a disproportionate burden due not to discrimination, but to

lower property values that attract industry, then "such is life;" we
have not implicated "justice."9 The argument echoes constitutional
equal protection jurisprudence, under which the disparate impact of a
government action is not relevant unless it can be linked to an intent
to discriminate.9 In the philosophical tradition, the view against
addressing distributive justice is expressed most forcefully by Robert
Nozick, who argued that efforts to achieve justice should not attempt
to achieve particular distributional goals.92 He argued that "whether
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000), his statement remains an accurate description
of many areas of the law. As discussed infra notes 91, 103 and accompanying text, equal
protection law remains intent and not impact focused. Although the Supreme Court has
upheld Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate effects by state and local agencies
receiving federal funds, see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001) (citing
Supreme Court cases upholding Title VI disparate impact regulations and accepting such
regulations as valid for the purposes of the case), they have not recognized a private right
of action to enforce the regulations. See id. at 293.
88. Foster, Justicefrom the Ground Up, supra note 35, at 791. It should be noted that
Professor Foster does not share this objection.
89. These critics are, to some extent, responding to environmental justice advocates
who have implied that most or all distributional inequities are caused by racism. See, e.g.,
COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 23
(1987) [hereinafter COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE] (arguing that factors related to race

are likely to have played a role in the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities).
But in questioning the likelihood that a distributional outcome was caused by racism, the
critics go further to imply that a distributional outcome that was not created by racism
does not present a public policy issue.
90. See Straw, supra note 87, at 675-77 (arguing that siting processes are not unjust
because they are driven by economic factors such as real estate costs). See generally COLE
& FOSTER, supra note 39, at 61 (observing that those who argue that current distributions
result from market dynamics believe that "this fact renders the outcomes somehow more
benign").
91. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977) (holding that disparate impact can provide evidence of discriminatory intent, but
that disparate impact alone will not suffice to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause is violated only by proof of discriminatory intent, not by evidence of
disparate impact).
92. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 167-74 (1974). Professor
Nozick believes that "end-state patterned" theories of justice-theories designed to
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a distribution is just depends upon how it came about. 9 3 Process, not
distributional outcome, should be the touchstone.
I argue that distributive justice is of critical independent
significance. By focusing on distributive justice, one concentrates on
what is experienced, regardless of cause. If inner-city AfricanAmerican children are exposed to far more air pollutants than
children in other neighborhoods, then that problem is one worth
considering. The absence of a racist motive does not change the
troubling distributional disparity. As Alan Freeman has stated in the
Equal Protection Clause context, an exclusive focus on affixing blame
directs attention to the "perpetrator" without sufficiently considering
the conditions experienced by the "victim."94 For the communities
experiencing harmful and debilitating disparate impacts, it is
problematic to argue that those impacts are not worthy of attention
without an identified discriminatory cause,9 5 or that the primary
significance of the impacts is in what they tell us about their cause. A
preoccupation with assessing why an inequity has arisen should not
impede the effort to remove the disparity.
Distribution has also been recognized as an important aspect of
justice by political philosophers. John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is
a pivotal work articulating a conception of justice that includes a
achieve certain outcomes-will inevitably interfere with individual liberty, the paramount
virtue. Id. at 163.
93. Id. at 153.
94. Alan David Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1053-54 (1978). Professor Freeman argues that the Supreme Court's focus on
discriminatory intent embodies the "perpetrator perspective," while an approach that gave
a more significant role to disparate impacts would embody a "victim perspective." Id. at
1052-57.
95. Writers in the Equal Protection Clause context frequently argue that
discriminatory impacts deserve redress. See Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 146-56 (1976) (arguing that the Equal Protection
Clause's underlying concerns about the effect of state action on blacks would be better
met by considering whether state action disadvantages the status of vulnerable groups
than by focusing on whether particular state actors discriminated); Freeman, supra note 94
(urging greater consideration of impacts in order to address the negative experiences of
the victims of discrimination); Kenneth Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) (critiquing the Supreme Court's focus
on discriminatory intent and its relegation of discriminatory impacts to a subsidiary role);
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129-46 (1997) (observing the extent to

which the Equal Protection Clause "intent" test fails to address many pervasive forms of
racial and gender inequality); cf Theodore Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit
Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 50-57 (1977)
(proposing an Equal Protection test that would provide a greater role for disparate
impacts than that permitted by the Supreme Court).
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strong distributive component.9 6 He argues that "[t]he justice of a
social scheme depends essentially on how fundamental rights and
duties are assigned and on the economic opportunities and social
conditions in various sectors of society."97 His reference to the
distribution of "social conditions" clearly implicates the type of
concerns raised by the environmental justice movement. Other
formulations of the importance of distribution to justice abound.
Professor Nicholas Rescher states that "justice consists in realizing to
the greatest possible extent a distribution that renders to each a 'fair
share' of the good (or evil) at issue."98 Professors John Arthur and
William Shaw have stated that the "issue which lies at the heart of all
philosophizing about society [is]: What constitutes a just distribution
of the benefits and burdens of economic life?" 99

A focus on

distribution thus resonates with significant philosophical theories on
the nature of justice.
Moreover, at least in the short-term, the distributional dimension
of an environmental justice conflict may be more amenable to
improvement than the political dimension. In some instances,
distributional injustice may arise without political injustice. Recall
the example of waste disposal sites clustered in an area that is
geologically suitable. In that case, there is no "political injustice" to
remedy; those affected would be best served by a siting process or
remedy that simply protected communities from such disparate
consequences. Or some decision-makers, such as environmental
permitting officials, may have operated under statutory directives that
were blind to potential distributional consequences.10 They cannot
be blamed for intentional discrimination. 01 Therefore, rules that
96.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE

(1971); see Michelman, Constitutional

Welfare Rights, supra note 40, at 964 (noting that Rawls, unlike process-oriented theorists,
demonstrates that there are generally shared principles of outcome-oriented notions of
distributive-share justice).
97. RAWLS, supra note 96, at 7. The contours of Rawls's theory of distributive justice
will be articulated further below, where I address the possible formulations of theories of
distributive justice. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
98. NICHOLAS RESCHER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF
THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION 6 (1966).
99. JOHN ARTHUR & WILLIAM H. SHAW, JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION 2

(1978).
100. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 787-92 (1993) (describing
environmental laws' focus on aggregate, rather than distributional, effects).
101. See Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal Meaning of a Social
Movement, 15 J.L. & COM. 597, 602-05 (1996) (arguing that causes of environmentally
disproportionate impacts are likely to be highly complex and are not necessarily
attributable to racism).
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require them to take distribution into account in the permitting
process, and hold the government liable for the failure to do so, might
better address distributional disparities that are not caused by
intentional wrongdoing. Nor are the environmental statutes facially
discriminatory. Thus, remedies based upon distributive inequities
would provide protection against detrimental disparities that occur
even in the absence of political or clear social injustice.
In those cases where distributional injustice is attributable to
political injustice, that injustice may be very difficult to remedy. It
could be the consequence of historical rather than present
discrimination, such as the legacy of discriminatory zoning and
residential housing patterns that have left their mark for
generations."°2 To the extent present discrimination is suspected, the
"intent" requirement makes legal redress very difficult to obtain
under modern interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause.0 3
Discrimination is rarely explicit,'0° and the multiplicity of factors that
could plausibly influence a siting process, such as land costs, site
characteristics, or other logistical factors, provide many opportunities
for decision-makers to explain what might have been a discriminatory
decision on nondiscriminatory grounds. 05 Discrimination is not only
rarely explicit, some contend that it is often unconscious-the product
of repeated but unexamined social practices and deeply ingrained
cultural assumptions.106 If current legal rules require a demonstration
of discriminatory intent to address political injustice, that intent will
be hard to find, and justice difficult to achieve. While the political
and social injustices that cause some distributional disparities should
102. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text (discussing existing segregation);
infra notes 389-400 (discussing the history of discriminatory zoning and land use
practices).
103. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Gristfor the Equal Protection Mill, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 387, 464-81 (1999) (discussing application of the Equal Protection Clause
to environmental siting cases).
104. See generally Siegel, supra note 95, at 1135-36, 1141-43 (observing that decisionmakers rarely discriminate explicitly, making discrimination harder to detect).
105. See infra notes 285-95 (discussing objective criteria used in siting decisions). At
this stage in the argument, I am assuming that the criteria themselves are legitimate, but
that they are being used to hide an illegitimate purpose. For example, a siting decision
may be justified based upon a logistical consideration that is not, in fact, of importance to
the siting entity. The fact that some of these criteria, even when legitimately used, may
have troubling distributional impacts is a separate issue discussed infra, notes 318-33 and
accompanying text.
106. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 339-44 (1987); lan F. Haney Lopez,
Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination,109
YALE. L.J. 1717, 1806-09 (2000).
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be addressed where possible, the difficulty of doing so suggests that
communities could be better off if they had direct mechanisms for
improving distributional disparities.
Professor Sheila Foster has cautioned that inquiries into the
nature of environmental justice should not be limited to distributional
analyses, but should instead look behind the distributions to
determine the range of political, social, and economic factors that
have led to the disparities.1" 7 She argues that focusing on distributive
justice "often obscures our consideration of the social structure and
institutional context that play a role in determining the patterns of
distribution.' '1°8 Professor Foster acknowledges the relevance of
distributive patterns, but sees them as a starting point for a more indepth consideration of the "social processes underlying distributional
patterns." 109
I agree with Professor Foster that a full understanding of the
nature of environmental justice requires consideration of the intricate
linkages between distributions and their social, political, and
economic causes. I simply have a different focus from Professor
Foster. My focus is not on what is necessary to understand the full
nature of environmental injustice; that indeed requires a full inquiry
into political and social forces. Instead, my focus is on what
information is necessary to trigger the need for a remedy. My
argument is simply that information about distributional disparities
alone is a sufficient predicate to regulatory action; a community
should not have to demonstrate any sort of suspect causation before
being entitled to attention.
Writing in political philosophy, Professor Iris Marion Young has
suggested a deeper critique of a focus on distributive justice. Like
Professor Foster, she argues that focusing on distributive justice could
fail to address the deeper social problems that cause disparities to
arise 10 because it presupposes rather than scrutinizes institutional
structures and processes.1 1 '
Ultimately, a primary focus on
distribution could implicitly support unjust institutions, since it takes
107. Professor Foster critiques the tendency of environmental justice studies to analyze
only distributional facts, as though those facts speak for themselves, without a deeper
inquiry into the nature and cause of the results. Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra
note 35, at 788-807. As a result, these studies are vulnerable to criticism for failing to
establish causation, id. at 791-96, and, in turn, failing to provide a basis for a normative
understanding of the processes that lead to distributive disparities. Id. at 796-98.
108. Id. at 790.
109. Id. at 791.
110. See IRIS YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 16 (1990).

111. Id. at 22-23.
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them as given.' 2 Her concern is not just with the study of
discrimination, however, but the development of distributionallybased remedies. For example, affirmative action efforts tend to focus
on distributions: who gets employment or opportunities for higher
education. That focus fails to address such critical underlying
structural issues as who decides who is "qualified" for employment
and why some have the means to attain these qualifications while
others do not.1 3 A focus on distribution is ultimately depoliticizing,
Professor Young argues, because potential challenges to the existing
systems of power and control become rechanneled into distributive
"solutions" that dissipate the thrust of critical social movements.)14
Professor Young does not argue that distributive justice is
irrelevant, 5 but she does argue that issues of political and social
justice should be the primary focus.
Professor Young's concern that a preoccupation with distributive
justice could lead to a failure to question and challenge unjust social
If the
and institutional structures is an important caution.
environmental justice movement were reduced to simply counting
how many facilities end up here and there, then critical aspects of the
movement would indeed be lost. Many environmental justice leaders
are not simply challenging the number of facilities to which they are
subject, but also the fairness of decision-making and underlying
power structures.1 6 Challenging environmental decisions is one step
in a broader engagement over the nature of economic and political
power. The goal of sustained challenge is a greater political voice-a
voice that may transcend particular disputes over particular
facilities." 7 It is also important to identify the widespread inequities
112. Id. at 198.
113. Id. at 199-200.
114. Id. at 70-72, 89-90. Professor Young describes the history of industry-labor
accords in this vein: industry and labor came to agreements about how to distribute
economic rewards, but did not address underlying issues of power and control. Id. at 7072.
115. Id. at 16, 19, 37, 91.
116. See Foster, Justice from the Ground Up, supra note 35, at 778 (observing that
decision-making structures, social structures, and institutional contexts are critical to
environmental racism claims); Charles Jordan & Donald Snow, Diversification, Minorities,
and the Mainstream Environmental Movement, in VOICES FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL

MOVEMENT: PERSPECTIVES FOR A NEW ERA 71, 90 (Donald Snow ed., 1991) (stating
that the fundamental issue in environmental justice disputes are "[w]ho shall choose, and
how shall the choices be made?").
117. Professor Robert Bullard has stated that grassroots environmental "leaders are
demanding a shared role in the decision-making processes that affect their communities.
They want participatory democracy to work for them." Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to
UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, at xvii; see also YOUNG, supra note 110, at 34, 91-
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that may lie behind current land use distributions. Furthermore,
addressing political and social processes will also likely improve
distributive justice given their role in causing disparities.
Nonetheless, given the difficulty of devising effective remedies for
many past and present forms of political and social injustices,1 8 and
the real world consequences of distributional inequities, I argue that
it is appropriate for the movement to direct at least some of its efforts
toward distribution-focused remedies.
I conclude this Section on the "importance of distributive
justice" with a significant qualification about how distributive justice
fits into the broader picture. Notwithstanding the critical importance
I attribute to distributive justice, I recognize that it may not be the
only factor that is ultimately relevant in the context of facility siting." 9
It is possible that the outcome of a siting decision could be
distributively unjust, but, nonetheless, be justified overall. For
example, there may be very important reasons, such as safety
considerations, why a facility needs to be placed in an area that is
already subject to a disproportionate number of other facilities. I
argue that distributive justice should be an important factor, but
recognize that it cannot always be the sole factor that determines
facility siting.
Nonetheless, the presence of a worthwhile overriding
justification for a distributively unjust outcome does not erase the
distributional injustice. We do not have "justice" simply because we
can explain the disparity. In such situations, distributional injustice
must be recognized as a tradeoff, even if ultimately an acceptable
tradeoff; it is not erased by the existence of other justifications for the
distributively unjust outcome. Determining how distributive justice
should be balanced with other goals presents one of the major
challenges that specific policy initiatives will have to address. 120

93 (suggesting a model of justice grounded in full public participation and meaningful
democracy).
118. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (describing obstacles to effective
remedies for addressing political and social injustice).
119. See generally Christopher Ake, Justice as Equality, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 69, 71
(1975) (suggesting that justice is one virtue among others, and that people may deem it
socially ideal "to balance the claims or demands of justice against those of other social
virtues").
120. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1038-39 (noting
that distributional goals must be weighed against other siting factors); Lambert, supra note
87, at 1173-74 (arguing that "some disparity-causing decisions are, on balance, 'good'
because they are necessary to attain other worthy objectives .... As in all of life, tradeoffs
are ubiquitous").
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III. CONCEPTIONS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
To this point, I have primarily conceptualized distributive justice
in comparison with political justice. In this Section, I focus on
distributive justice itself, and consider how theories of justice in the
LULU context relate to and emerge from broader concepts of
distributive justice."'

Most distributive theories' of justice are inherently
22
consequentialist; in other words, they focus on outcomes.
Utilitarianism is the quintessential consequentialist theory.
According to classic utilitarianism, the best distribution is that which
will lead to "the greatest good for the greatest number.' 23 As many
critics of utilitarianism have noted, however, this theory does not
provide a satisfying answer to the question of how goods (or bads)
ought to be distributed among people. For example, the greatest
amount of good (e.g., the highest possible Gross National Product)
might be achieved by distributing a great deal of wealth to many, but
leaving some in dire poverty. 124 Given its potential for serious
121. Some theories that are characterized as theories of "distributive justice" are, in
fact, focused on the process by which the distribution was achieved. In other words, for
some, if the process is just, then the resulting distribution is just, even if it is in practical
terms unequal. See NOZICK, supra note 92, at 153 (arguing that a distribution is just if it
arises from a just means (assuming, as he does, an originally just distribution)). For
example, Professor Vicki Been identifies certain types of siting proposals as those
intended to achieve an "equal dispersion" (in contrast to process-based proposals), and
includes a lottery as a type of "equal dispersion" theory. See Been, What's Fairness Got to
Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1030. Under a lottery theory-a lottery for "bads" rather
than "goods"-each community would have an equal chance of being selected as a site for
a LULU. Id. Since this theory rests on the fairness of the process by which communities
are selected for LULUs rather than on the fairness of what communities ultimately
experience, I would argue that it is rooted in conceptions of political rather than
distributive justice. My goal, however, is to disengage political and distributive justice so
as to promote a focus on distributive justice in its own right. I would argue that a just
process is a just process; that a process is just does not answer the question of whether the
resulting distribution is just. See ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99, at 4 (noting that a fair
procedure could nonetheless lead to an unjust result).
Not all theorists treat lotteries as theories of distributive justice. Some have
identified them as models for procedural, not distributional justice. See PETER S. WENZ,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 234-35 (1988).

122. See ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99, at 9 (describing consequentialist theories of
distributive

justice); ANDREW DOBSON, JUSTICE AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
CONCEPTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE

JUSTICE 70 (1998) (noting that consequentialist theories of justice assess the outcome of
procedures by a standard that is external to the procedures used).
123. See RESCHER, supra note 98, at 8; ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99, at 7. This
formulation of utilitarianism is often attributed to the 19th century philosopher Jeremy
Bentham. See ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99, at 100.
124. See RESCHER, supra note 98, at 25-27; ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99, at 7.
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inequality, the potential for some to suffer for the greater good,
Rawls deems the "principle of utility ... to be inconsistent with the

idea of reciprocity implicit in the notion of a well-ordered society.' 1 25
Our search for a compelling theory of distributive justice thus goes
beyond utilitarianism to find a theory that resonates more strongly
with notions of fairness.
The potential for undesirable inequality in a utilitarian
distribution leads us to a theory of equality as another potential basis
for evaluating whether a distribution is just. 126 Isaiah Berlin has
stated:
no reason need to be given for ... an equal distribution of
benefits-for that is 'natural'-self-evidently right and just,
and needs no justification ....
The assumption is that
equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so .... 127

Mr. Berlin's comment is applicable to the distribution of harms, not
just benefits. The critical question then becomes: what does equality
mean? It quickly becomes clear that strict equality as such is not

necessarily consistent with distributive justice, since it is arguably
unjust to treat people in the same way if they are different. 28 Instead,
the concept can be articulated as: "People who are alike in all
relevant respects deserve the same things. "129
The next critical issue becomes, if equality requires that we treat

different people differently, and like people alike, then what
differences matter, and how much?
A number of factors are
frequently mentioned. For example, a theory of justice might

distribute goods on the basis of need. 3 Another set of factors turns
on the issue of "desert": of distribution accomplished in proportion
125. RAWLS, supra note 96, at 14.
126. See Aristotle, The Varieties of Justice, in JAMES P. STERBA, JUSTICE:
ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 14, 18 (1980) (excerpt from a translation of
Aristotle's NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS stating that "what is unjust is unequal, what is just is
equal"); Ake, supra note 119, at 71 (arguing that justice in society is best understood as
"equality of the overall level of benefits and burdens of each member of that society").
127. Isaiah Berlin, Equality as an Ideal, reprinted in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 128,
131 (Frederick A. Olafson ed., 1961), quoted in NOZICK, supra note 92, at 347 n.41.
128. See RESCHER, supra note 98, at 74-75; see also Aristotle, supra note 126, at 18
(stating that "[i]f the persons are not equal, they will not have equal shares; it is when
equals... [have] unequal shares, or persons who are not equal [have] equal shares, that
quarrels and complaints arise").
129. WENZ, supra note 121, at 23; see also ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99, at 3
(observing that "[i]njustice in one sense of unfairness occurs when like cases are not
treated in the same fashion").
130. See ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99, at 6-7; RESCHER, supra note 98, at 73, 7576. The socialist/Marxist principle of "to each according to need" arguably resonates with
this theory of distributive justice. See id. at 223.
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to what people receiving the goods (or bads) deserve."' Factors
implicating "desert" include: one's innate ability; the level of effort
expended; the actual achievements attained; and moral merit.
Philosophers differ over the appropriate role of these factors: which
are defensible and which not;'

how much weight they should have

relative to one another; and how one should measure and compare
within and across categories.'33 As the discussion below makes clear,
however, these thorny dilemmas need not be resolved where the
distribution of LULUs is at issue.
In the context of siting LULUs, I argue that none of these factors

justify a deviation from a general principle of equal distribution. In
explaining the operation of "desert-based" factors, most theorists
assume the distribution of "goods"-who deserves to have more
money, more things, or more jobs. These factors are less compelling
where the distribution of a "bad," like a LULU, rather than a "good,"
is at stake. No community "deserves" a LULU due to some defect in
ability, effort, achievement, or moral standing.'3 4 Principles related to
131. See ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99, at 4, 135-38 (discussing theories of
distributive justice based on "desert"); RESCHER, supra note 98, at 53-55 (arguing that
justice requires that goods go to the most deserving); WENZ, supra note 121, at 22
(defining distributive justice in terms of what people "deserve"); Aristotle, supra note 126,
at 18 (stating that "[e]verybody agrees that just distribution must be in accordance with
merit of some sort").
132. Such controversies include, but are not limited to: (1) Is need, independent of
"desert," a sufficient justification for distribution?, see ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 99,
at 6-7; RESCHER, supra note 98, at 76; (2) Is it just to distribute based on innate ability
since it is a matter of chance and bears no relation to effort or achievement?, see ARTHUR
& SHAW, supra note 99, at 136; RAWLS, supra note 96, at 73-74 (observing that a
distribution based on natural ability would be based upon a "natural" lottery and
therefore arbitrary from a moral perspective); RESCHER, supra note 98, at 76-77 (noting
that it is unjust to base distribution on innate ability without considering how it is used);
(3) Should distribution be based on effort if unaccompanied by actual achievement?, see
id. at 77-78; and (4) Is it just to distribute based on achievement if that achievement did
not reflect effort or need?, see id. at 79. Clearly, these principles are not mutually
exclusive. Professor Rescher argues that all of these factors (among others) must be
considered in assessing the legitimacy of a claim for a particular distribution, and that no
single factor is sufficient. See id. at 81-83.
133. How does one evaluate one need versus another need? See ARTHUR & SHAW,
supra note 99, at 6-7. How does one compare different types of effort: for example, how
does one compare physical versus mental effort, or consider hours worked versus the
degree of hardship? See id. at 136-37. How does one compare and measure relative
"achievement"? Id. How does one define moral worth? Id. at 137.
134. It is conceivable that one could argue that, to the extent LULUs are more often
placed in poor neighborhoods, the poor deserve more LULUs and the rich deserve to be
free of LULUs. The rich have earned their money and power and the poor, through their
own inadequacy, have failed to earn money and power. Thus, the poor "deserve" LULUs
as one of the consequences of their self-created poverty. Poverty is rarely, however, a selfimposed condition, and disparities in LULUs traceable to poverty are therefore not
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"just deserts" therefore do not justify inequalities in distribution in
the LULU context, however much these principles might be
applicable in other contexts.
The role of community need as a justification for differing
distributions is somewhat more complex, but ultimately similar. As
indicated above, at this stage in the analysis we are assuming that
LULUs are generally considered "bads." A community would not
have a "need" for something that is considered a "bad."' 35 Thus, so
long as LULUs are treated as "bads," community need does not
present a factor justifying an unequal distribution of LULUs. (The
preference theory of distributive justice, discussed further below ,136
addresses the possibility that a community would find a LULU a
good, not a bad.)
The factors of need and desert focus on the recipients of a given
distribution. Other factors that could justify unequal distributions
turn on extrinsic societal considerations unrelated to the person or
persons receiving the distribution. 137 The most important of these
echoes in the utilitarian theory discussed above: distributions should
serve the common good. 38 While I argue that the classic utilitarian
conception of the greatest good for the greatest number is an
unsatisfying theory of distributive justice, there are other
formulations along these lines that are more compelling. John
139
Rawls's famous "difference principle" falls into this category.
Unlike the traditional utilitarians, Rawls uses equality as a starting
point for conceptualizing distributive justice. He justifies inequalities
under limited circumstances, however, if they will result "in
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least
"deserved." I take as given that poverty is generally a consequence of historic and present
social and economic factors over which individuals have only limited control.
135. Under standard theories of distributive justice, the "need" factor is intrinsic-it
focuses on the need experienced by those to whom the good or bad is distributed-here,
the relevant community. The issue of whether "societal" needs justify an unequal
distribution of LULUs is an extrinsic factor. This type of factor is discussed below. See
infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
136. See infra Section IV.A.
137. See RESCHER, supra note 98, at 80-81 (noting difference between factors
associated with extrinsic and intrinsic claims for justice).
138. Id. at 80. Another factor suggests that income, goods, and services should be
distributed in whatever way the market dictates. Id. at 80-81. This factor, standing alone,
fails to present a moral basis for an unequal distribution. If the argument is that the
market serves to distribute goods pursuant to need or desert, then those reasons provide
the justification for the inequality, not the market itself; the market is simply a vehicle for
achieving a distribution that otherwise has a moral basis.
139. See RAWLS, supra note 96, at 76-80 (defining and elaborating the difference
principle).
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advantaged members of society."' 4 ° While Rawls does justify
inequality on behalf of the general welfare, he differs from classic
utilitarianism because he would not accept a distribution that 141
allows
some to endure a greater disadvantage for the benefit of others.
The difference principle could be applied to LULU siting both
narrowly and broadly. Applied narrowly and directly, the issue would
be whether the inequality of imposing more LULUs on poor and
minority areas would be justified because it assists "the least
advantaged." Assuming that LULUs are "bads," not "goods," such
inequality would clearly violate the difference principle because it
worsens rather than betters the condition of these less advantaged
communities.
The difference principle is also violated if one attempts to apply
it more broadly. One could argue that siting LULUs in poor
neighborhoods helps society at large because such areas are
presumptively the cheapest, and therefore economically efficient.
But in order to satisfy the difference principle, one must be able to
show not only that there is a general benefit to society, but that no
one is made worse off in the process, particularly the least
advantaged. It is highly implausible that any societal efficiency gain
from siting a LULU on cheap land would trickle down and benefit
the impacted community enough to offset the negative impact of the
LULU. 142 (Again, the presumption here is that the LULU is a "bad"
that is not desirable to the impacted community.) Thus, the inequality
of siting LULUs in poor neighborhoods is not justified under the
difference principle because, even if it has some benefits for society
overall, those benefits are not likely to compensate the impacted
communities for the LULU's net negative impact.
Where LULUs are at issue, concepts of "need," "desert," and
theories like Rawls's difference principle do not justify deviations
from equality as a distributional goal. Equality is therefore a guiding
140. Id. at 14-15; see also id. at 62 (noting, under his "general conception" of justice,
that "[a]ll social values ... are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of
any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage"); id. at 83 ("[s]ocial and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are ... to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged").
141. Id. at 64-65; see also id. at 77 (noting that utilitarians are indifferent to how the
sum of benefits are distributed among people). He states that "the difference principle is a
strongly egalitarian conception in the sense that unless there is a distribution that makes
both persons better off... an equal distribution is to be preferred." Id. at 76.
142. Cf. RACE AND POLITICS, supra note 70, at 8-9 (arguing, generally, that a "supplyside" approach to economic development policy that caters to corporations in the hopes
that economic benefits will "trickle down" to poor communities has failed to improve
blacks' living conditions).
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principle in determining whether the distribution of LULUs is just. It
should be emphasized that I speak here only of distributive justice.
As indicated above, there may, at times, be justifications for siting
facilities unequally. 143

But that does not make the outcome

distributively just; distributive injustice must be viewed as a real
tradeoff, however acceptable a tradeoff we may find it.
Assuming that equality is the relevant touchstone for
determining distributive justice, the question remains: how does one

define equality in the LULU siting context? I argue that there are
two, sometimes competing, theories of distributive justice that are

both based upon equality but define the term differently: the "equal
division" model and the "community preferences" model.'" I sketch
each theory briefly here, to be developed further in the following
Sections.
The most common assumption about what we mean by
distributive justice is that of a physically equal distribution of

undesirable land uses. 145 The assumption is that if there are more
LULUs in some neighborhoods than others, then the distribution is
not equal.
The community preferences model has been raised to challenge
the assumption that the unequal division of land uses is necessarily
unjust. This alternative model of distributive justice flows from the
theory of distributive justice developed above: strict physical equality
might not be the appropriate measure if there are relevant
differences. Professor Lynn Blais has suggested that one such
143. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
144. A third theory is plausible. One could argue that LULUs should be distributed in
proportion to the degree communities benefit from the activities causing LULUs. In other
words, those who experience industrial society's benefits should experience its burdens in
equal proportion. Physical inequality in distribution would be justified if differing
communities "deserved" differing numbers of LULUs to bring their burdens into
proportion with the benefits they enjoy, and avoid imposing burdens on those who do not
experience compensating benefits. Professor Bullard has implicitly suggested such a
theory in his discussion of the distribution of hazardous waste facilities, where he observes
that "[clommunities that host hazardous waste disposal facilities (importers) receive fewer
economic benefits (jobs) than do communities that generate the waste (exporters). The
people who benefit the most bear the least burden." Bullard, supra note 56, at 11; see also
Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination,41
U. KAN. L. REv. 271, 273 (1992) (observing that "minorities pay the pollution costs of
industrial production, while the benefits accrue to society in general").
While intriguing, and a model worthy of consideration in developing specific
policies to address distributive justice, for simplicity's sake this Article will focus on the
two more predominant theories discussed in the text.
145. See, e.g., Kuehn, supra note 36, at 10,683-84 (describing distributive justice in
terms of an equal distribution of land uses).
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difference is communities' relative preferences for land uses
commonly referred to as "undesirable." '46 Under the community
preferences model, the relevant barometer for determining equality
would be whether people's preferences are met equally, not whether
LULUs are equally divided. Where there are different preferences,
there should be different distributions. Thus, what might be
considered distributively unjust under the equal division model would
not necessarily be considered distributively unjust under the
community preferences model.
IV. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE UNDER THE EQUAL DIVISION MODEL

A.

DistributiveJustice as an Equal Division of LULUs
The conception of distributive justice that most readily comes to
mind is of an equal division of LULUs. Considered narrowly,
distributional injustice would exist wherever a particular community
was subject to more or worse LULUs than other communities.147
Thus, a community could argue that it is unfairly subject to more
industrial uses than other neighborhoods. Similarly, a community
could argue that, even though other communities contain some
LULUs, it hosts LULUs having more adverse impacts than the
LULUs located in other communities.
Considered broadly,
distributive injustice would exist if more and worse LULUs are
located in poor and minority neighborhoods. The idea of equal
division often, although not necessarily, assumes that LULUs have
objective burdens that will be viewed by everyone in the same way.148
If everyone evaluates the benefits and burdens of various land uses in
the same way, then distributive justice would be achieved by equal
distribution.
As Professor Vicki Been has made clear, the problems with
measuring fairness pursuant to this theory and devising efforts to

146. See Blais, supra note 22, at 81.
147. Cf Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1028-30 (describing
the "fairness as equal division" theory). Professor Been's analysis is organized around the
theories of fairness associated with types of siting proposals, rather than the concept of
distributive justice on its own terms.
148. Even if people had differing preferences, some might argue that those differences
are borne of self-destructive impulses or imperfect information that justify overriding
them. The equal division model might thus be deemed appropriate even if differing
preferences were acknowledged.
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satisfy the theory are formidable.149 It is difficult, for example, to craft

an objective measure for comparing the relative harm from different
types of LULUs. 5° Furthermore, the issue of how to define the
identity or boundaries of a "neighborhood" being affected by LULUs
is complicated and contested.151 These definitional challenges do not,
however, impugn the coherence of the theory itself as a model for
conceptualizing a "just" distribution."i 2

Some would argue that the equal division model of justice could
be satisfied without actually equalizing the distribution of LULUs;
instead, communities enduring a disproportionate burden could be
compensated.' 53 The compensation could be in the form of money, or
could involve community benefits like health facilities or recreational
centers. 5 4 Under this theory, the LULUs might not be evenly

dispersed, but the communities having more LULUs would have the
disparity equalized by compensating benefits.
Because each
community is being equalized, though by differing means, this theory
falls under an "equal division" theory. However, the compensation
model presents numerous ethical and practical difficulties not raised

149. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1032-39
(describing many of the practical obstacles that would stand in the way of assessing the
equality of a dispersion and attempting to design a program to equalize dispersions).
150. Id. at 1033-34.
151. See id. at 1034-35; Kenneth Warren, Evidentiary Issues: ProvingIntent and Effect
and Defining the Affected Community, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra
note 32, at 397, 410-19. See generally Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in
Environmental Equity: How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
633 (1994) (detailing issues in measuring environmental equity statistically); John A.
Fahsbender, Note, An Analytic Approach to Defining the Affected Neighborhood in the
Environmental Justice Context, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 120 (1996) (describing the
sometimes competing factors that are relevant to identifying the definition of "affected"
neighborhoods).
152. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1033 (noting that
definitional problems do not discredit the theory itself, but show problems that must be
resolved to implement it); cf. John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1256-57 (1970) (arguing that his criticism of a
disparate impact test in equal protection law is not based on the definitional and
measurement difficulties associated with such a test). This Article is designed to analyze
the nature of and need for distributive justice; these definitional debates belong to
subsequent efforts to develop specific policy proposals.
153. See, e.g., Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1031
(describing compensation proposals); Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner,
EnvironmentalInequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195,
214-28 (1997) (proposing compensation).
154. See Lambert & Boerner, supra note 153, at 214 (identifying such possible forms of
compensation as payments to affected landowners, payments to local government entities,
healthcare or education grants, and recreational options).
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by the pure equal-division-of-LULUs' model.155 Any future efforts to
develop specific policies to pursue distributive justice under the equal
division model will have to confront the issue of whether, and to what

extent, compensation is an appropriate mechanism.
B.

Evidence of DistributiveInjustice Under the Equal Division
Model

This Section considers the environmental justice movement's
"broad" claim of distributive injustice: that, overall, LULUs have not
been distributed evenly among demographic groups, and are instead
more heavily concentrated in poor and minority communities.156

There is some evidence that social service LULUs are
disproportionately located. Services for the homeless, group homes
for the mentally disabled, and community correctional facilities, like
halfway houses, tend to be clustered in minority and low-income

communities.157 Moreover, the more undesirable the social service,
the greater the concentration in poor or minority neighborhoods. For
example, halfway houses are correlated with higher percentages of
minorities and the poor than homes for the developmentally
disabled.'58

Most of the studies in the environmental justice context have
concerned polluting LULUs. 159 A recent book, Environmental
Injustice in the United States: Myths and Realities, summarizes an

155. Professor Been summarizes many of the primary concerns. It is not clear that
increased health risks can or should be compensated by money payments or their
equivalent. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1040-46. In
addition, the attractiveness of compensation, and associated LULUs, may be a function of
underlying wealth disparities. Id. at 1041. Poorer communities may also have less
information with which to make informed decisions about the tradeoffs between the
LULU and the proffered compensation. Id. As poor communities, they will also have
fewer resources to engage effectively in the negotiations that lead to compensation.
156. This Article frequently refers to disparities impacting "poor and minority
neighborhoods" collectively, rather than differentiating impacts on the poor versus
impacts on minorities. Not all studies differentiate the role of class versus the role of
race-although where such data are separately analyzed, it is included. More generally,
however, while the respective roles of race and class are important in some contexts, it is
not significant for the purposes of this general essay on distributive justice.
157. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It?, supra note 19, at 1013-14 (citing a
New York City study on homeless shelters and general studies on the mentally disabled
and halfway houses).
158. Id. at 1014.
159. Good compilations of these studies can be found in COLE & FOSTER, supra note
39, at 167-83; CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW POLICY & REGULATION 56 (2002).
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extensive review of the existing literature. 160 The authors note that
many case studies in particular regions have identified localized
distributional disparities, with some studies focusing on impacts to
communities of color and others focusing on impacts to low-income
communities. 6 ' The authors also review more quantitative statistical
analyses of distributional outcomes. They observe that pre-1992
studies:
generally determined that race (either in the presence or
absence of a control for social class) was associated with
higher rates of exposure to environmental hazards for a
variety of geographic areas, such as regions, counties,
[Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas], or ZIP codes, and
for a variety of environmental harms, such as air pollution,
61 2
solid waste, pesticides, hazardous waste, and toxins ....
Other reviewers of this literature have likewise concluded that it
reveals widespread inequities.163
Myths and Realities states that post-1992 studies generally

confirmed the trend of earlier studies.M Those that considered the

160. JAMES P. LESTER, DAVID W. ALLEN & KELLY M. HILL, ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: MYTHS AND REALITIES (2001) [hereinafter MYTHS
AND REALITIES].
161. Id. at 9-20. While these case studies provide an important step in the research
process, the authors note the difficulty of generalizing beyond the particular case being
studied. Id. at 17.
162. Id. at 13.
163. For example, Luke Cole observes that "the poor suffer disproportionately from
environmental hazards." Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 622 (1992)
[hereinafter Cole, Empowerment as the Key]. He points to an extensive array of local and
national studies correlating income levels with such environmental harms as toxics
production and disposal, solid waste, air pollution, and lead poisoning, among others. Id.
at 622-24. Cole also observes that "people of color are exposed to more environmental
dangers than white people," id. at 624, and points to an extensive array of local and
national studies correlating race with the same types of harms analyzed in the income
studies. Id. at 624-28. Professor Been similarly points to an array of studies indicating
that poor and minority communities are more likely to be subject to toxics than others.
Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1009-14. In 1992, the EPA
released a report entitled Environmental Equity that surveyed existing data on relative
pollution burdens. See ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 28. The report
concluded that there are differences in exposure to environmental pollutants according to
socioeconomic factors and race. Id. at 11, 13. The report noted, however, that it was not
clear whether these disparate exposures resulted in actual health impacts. Id.; see also
Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 1, 5 (1997)
(listing studies); Lazarus, supra note 100, at 801-06 (reviewing the data on
disproportionate distribution of environmental risk).
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correlation of environmental harms with race and class found that
'
race tended to be "the most important predictor of risk."165
Many of
the post-1992 studies analyzed correlations of environmental
problems with not only race and class, but other factors as well.
These studies tended to find that race and class were still important
predictors of risk, although not always the most important ones.166
Myths and Realities also presents the results of the authors' own
research. Unlike many of the studies they reviewed, which focused
on a single unit of analysis (e.g., zip codes or census tracts), their
study focused on three different geographic levels: state, county, and
city. 167

In comparing states,

they

considered

a wider

range

of

environmental harms than had been considered by other individual
studies, which tended to focus on one or another harm, but not a
range of harms together. 168 These harms included air pollution (two
types),16 9 hazardous waste (as in generation and disposal sites), solid
waste, toxic waste (as in certain indicators of toxic releases), 7 ' and
water pollution (two types). 7

Comparing levels of inequity among

states, they found that African-American concentrations were
correlated with five of the seven types of environmental harms they
researched, 172 and Hispanics were correlated with four of the seven in
some or most regions of the country. 7 3 Social class, measured by
income and education levels,174 was correlated with two of the seven
164. MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 160, at 14; see also id. at 57-58 (noting
studies' findings that race is a significant factor); id. at 59-60 (noting studies' findings that
class if often a significant factor).
165. Id. at 14.
166. Id. Some of the additional factors considered by other studies were "industry and
manufacturing, political mobilization, population density, severity of the communities'
overall environmental crisis, and transportation grids." Id.
167. Id. at 17-18.
168. Id. at 79-80.
169. Id. at 81. The study analyzed ozone emissions and toxic chemicals released to air
as one type of harm, and the levels of nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide, and sulphur dioxide
released as another type of harm. Id.
170. Id. at 83-84.
171. Id. at 84. The study analyzed the extent of water-system violations as one factor
and toxic and chemical pollution as another. Id.
172. Id. at 105-06. The study found injustice with respect to African Americans in
connection with all of the factors except solid waste and the degree of water-system
violations. Id. at 104-05. Two of the five areas of inequity were found to occur regionally
rather than nationally. Id. at 105-06.
173. With respect to Hispanics, the study found injustice nationally in connection with
hazardous waste and regionally with respect to toxic waste and both of the water pollution
factors. Id.
174. Id. at 60.
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environmental harms 175 when associated with additional factors that
also affected the degree of environmental harm.'7 6
In comparing counties, the study focused on one important form
of environmental harm: toxic air emissions. 7 7 They found that, to a
greater or lesser extent, both African-American and Hispanic
counties were exposed to higher levels of toxic emissions than other
counties. 78 For African Americans, the correlation was particularly
strong in the Sunbelt states.'7 9 For Hispanics, the correlation was not
present in many cases, but was strong where combined with "low
social class, western regionalism, and low county fiscal capacity." 8 '
In comparing cities, the study compared cities with populations
over 50,000,81 and once again focused on toxic air emissions.'82 The
study found a strong correlation between African-American cities
and toxic releases, but did not find a strong correlation between
Hispanic demographics and toxic releases. 83 The study also found a
strong correlation between social class and toxic releases,8 4 a
correlation that was stronger on the city level than on the state and
county levels.
Considering all of the analyses done of all of the respective
factors at the state, county, and city level, Myths and Realities
concludes that "[e]vidence of race-based environmental injustice is
evident ... in nearly 86 percent of the equations that focus on the
percent black population.' 8 5 For Hispanics, they report an incidence
of environmental injustice in fifty percent of their analyses. 8 6 Social
175. Id. at 104-05. Class was associated with releases of nitrogen oxides and carbon
and sulphur dioxides. Id.
176. Id. Class appeared to moderate the impact of "pollution potential"-i.e., where a
state appeared to have high pollution potential in light of its industrial character, the
pollution potential was mitigated in proportion to social class. Id. at 104.
177. Id. at 113-14. The study used data from the Toxic Release Inventory, an
inventory created by reports from all large sources of toxic emissions. See id. at 114-15.
Such companies are required to report all toxic emissions sources, including both
smokestacks and unaccounted for emissions (known as "fugitive" emissions). Id. at 11315.
178. Id. at 129.
179. Id. at 121-24, 129-30. The Sunbelt states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas. Id. at 132.
180. Id. at 128-30.
181. Id. at 135.
182. Id. at 133-34. The precise factors analyzed and data used did, however, differ in
some respects. Id.
183. Id. at 145-46 (summarizing results).
184. Id. at 146 (summarizing results).
185. Id. at 152.
186. Id. at 154.
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class proved to be correlated with environmental harm in thirty-five
to fifty percent of the equations, and was at times particularly
relevant where class was analyzed together with race.'87 While the
study does not reveal inequities at every geographic level with regard
to every type of pollution analyzed, it confirms many of the
widespread disparities observed in previous studies, particularly with
regard to race, and especially with regard to African Americans.
An issue that is likely to arise in connection with the Myths and
Realities study is the relatively large size of the units of analysis: the
smallest unit, cities, is larger than that used by most other studies,
which typically consider zip codes or census tracts.'88 Large units
create potential "aggregation" problems: they may not reveal
significant variations within the chosen unit.'89 For example, while
there may be a high minority population in a county, that population
is not distributed evenly. The environmental harms identified in the
county may or may not be located near minority residents. The
aggregation objection is apt if the primary issue is actual exposure to
harm. Where broader issues are at stake, however, such as
understanding the political, social, or economic dynamics of largescale distributional patterns, larger units of analysis are appropriate.
In general, it is worthwhile to have data about distributional equity at
a number of different levels, and focusing on cities, counties and
states reveals patterns that might not be revealed with a smaller unit
of analysis.
To provide a fuller range than that provided by the Myths and
Realities study I will briefly discuss the most significant nationwide
studies on the distribution of hazardous waste sites that use smaller
units of analysis. I focus on hazardous waste studies because
hazardous waste site distribution is one of the few issues for which
there are national studies.
The United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice
("UCC Report") conducted the first major national survey on the
distribution of hazardous waste sites.' 90 Using zip codes as the unit of
analysis, the study found that the percentage of minorities near
controlled hazardous waste facilities was higher than in communities

187. Id. at 151-52.
188. The authors were aware of this potential criticism, but justified their choice. Id. at
17-18, 85-86.
189. Id. at 18.
190. COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 89, at ix.
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without such facilities.19 ' Based upon a descriptive study, the UCC
Report concluded that uncontrolled toxic waste sites are concentrated
in minority communities.'92 The economic status of a community was
also correlated with the presence of hazardous waste facilities, but
was not as strong an indicator as race.193 A follow-up report
completed in 1994 concluded that the average percentage of
minorities living near hazardous waste facilities had increased since
1 94
the original 1987 UCC Report.
Some commentators have contended that, for various reasons,
the UCC Report's reliance on zip codes was problematic, and that
census tracts should have been used instead.' Two similar studies on
the distribution of hazardous waste sites have been done using census
tracts. The University of Massachusetts's Social and Demographic
Research Institute ("SADRI") evaluated demographic data regarding
the distribution of commercial hazardous waste facilities. 196 Unlike
most of the studies referenced above, the SADRI study concluded
that there was no statistically significant disparity between the
minority populations in census tracts with hazardous waste facilities
and those without.197 The SADRI study did, however, find a
correlation between facility distribution and certain socioeconomic
factors.'9 8

191. With respect to controlled hazardous waste facilities, the UCC Report concluded
that the average percentage of minorities in communities with one facility was likely to be
higher (24% minority) than in communities without such facilities (12% minority). Id. at
13. Where a community contained two hazardous waste facilities or a facility that was one
of the nation's five largest landfills, the average percentage of minorities was 38%. Id.
192. Id. at 23.
193. See id. at 13, 15-16, 41-42.
194.

See D. BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITTON, Toxic WASTES AND RACE

REVISITED 2-5 (Center for Policy Alternatives 1994). The updated study was conducted

by the UCC Commission as well as by the Center for Policy Alternatives and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
195. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 11 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 4-5 (1995) (arguing that a number of factors make census tracts
preferable) [hereinafter Been, Evidence of Environmental Justice]; LAMBERT ET AL.,

supra note 87, at 5 (arguing that census tracts are preferable to zip codes because they are
smaller and therefore more precise); Kevin, supra note 87, at 134-35 (noting that use of
census tracts is preferable to zip codes).
196. See Been & Gupta, supra note 163, at 8 (describing the SADRI study).
197. See id. (summarizing the SADRI report results).
198. See Kevin, supra note 87, at 134 (discussing the SADRI study). The relevant
socioeconomic factors were: lower male employment rate; employment in industrial jobs;
and lower housing values. Id.
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A subsequent study199 using census tracts did, however, find a

link between race and distribution, and criticized some of the pivotal
assumptions made in connection with the SADRI study. Professor
Been argues that the SADRI researchers' inappropriate elimination

of many relevant census tracts from consideration "reduced the
differences between the racial and ethnic composition of host and
non-host tracts."2 0 When the relevant census tracts were included in
the analysis, Professor Been found that the percentage of African
Americans or Hispanics in a census tract was a significant predictor of
whether the tract hosted a hazardous waste facility. 01 Professor Been
found that income, particularly very low income, was not a significant
predictor of hazardous waste facilities.2 2 The national hazardous
waste studies thus present somewhat mixed results.
The results of the national hazardous waste studies, the Myths
and Realities study, and the many additional studies that have been
conducted depend upon important, but debated, methodological

choices.0 3 As indicated above, the unit of analysis is critical: state,
county, city, zip code, census tract, or "neighborhood." I would argue
that there is value to evidence from all of these levels, and that the
appropriate unit of analysis depends upon the nature of the facilities
being studied and the purpose of the study. A study evaluating the
health effects from facilities having highly localized impacts would
ideally use a small unit of analysis. Facilities having more widespread
impacts would suggest the need for larger units of analysis. On the

other hand, a study focusing on the equity of siting decisions, that is
199. Professor Been's study was designed to assess not only the current distribution of
hazardous waste sites, but to analyze whether current disparities existed at the time of
siting or arose subsequently through the operation of the housing market.
200. See Been & Gupta, supra note 163, at 16 (describing the SADRI study's
elimination of 18,000 non-host tracts from comparative analysis). The SADRI researchers
apparently eliminated many tracts without hazardous facilities from comparison because
they believed that the eliminated tracts would not have been viable alternatives for the
hazardous facilities in question. Id. at 16. The researchers appeared to presume that if the
eliminated tracts would not have been viable, then their lack of hazardous facilities would
not have been attributable to racial factors. Professor Been questions this assumption,
concluding that the eliminated tracts might have been viable for certain types of hazardous
waste facilities. Id. at 16-17; see also id. at 16 n.54 (referencing additional critiques of the
SADRI methodology).
201. See id. at 31, 33. Note that the degree to which the relative number of minorities
affected the siting of hazardous waste facilities is a different issue.
202. See id. at 34.
203. See Been, Evidence of Environmental Justice, supra note 195, at 8. See generally
Paul Mohai, The Demographicsof Dumping Revisited: Examining the Impact of Alternate
Methodologies in Environmental Justice Research, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 615 (1995)
(examining the methodologies of key studies); Zimmerman, supra note 151 (discussing
methodological issues raised by environmental equity analyses).
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not necessarily limited to evaluating the direct physical risks from the
facility, could use a variety of units of analysis, including very large
units, to identify the political dimension of siting decisions.2 °4
Other important issues include how to define a "minority"
community,2 °5 and whether the baseline for determining disparate
impact should be the national average or the average for the state or
region under study. Researchers must also consider whether studies
should focus on the presence of facilities versus actual risk from those
facilities. 0 6 If the relevant inquiry concerns political and social
equity, then the presence of facilities may be the appropriate factor.
If instead, the inquiry concerns physical harm, then risk may be the
suitable factor. 07 The science of statistical analysis is enormously
complex, and there are many variations in the manner in which
analysis is conducted that can affect outcomes. Researchers differ in
their choices and the importance they attach to them.20 ' The validity
and conclusions of studies are regularly challenged. Although some
studies are undoubtedly better than others, in many instances the
controversies turn on differences of opinion for which there are few
right answers.
Notwithstanding the disputes about methodology, the vast
majority of the studies demonstrate some degree of inequity in the
distribution of LULUs on the basis of race and/or income, with race
being the more frequently relevant factor.20 9 While these studies do
not prove anything about the presence of distributive injustice in
every locality, they do support the "broad" claim of distributive
injustice-that the overall pattern of LULU distribution is unequal.
This corresponds with the visual image of urban America: clean,
204. Myths and Realities appears to have taken such an approach. See supra notes 16787 (discussing their studies at the state, county, and city levels); see also supra notes 188-89
and accompanying text (discussing size of analytical unit).
205. See LAMBERT ET AL., supra note 87, at 4-5; Been, Evidence of Environmental
Justice, supra note 195, at 14-15.
206. See LAMBERT ET AL., supra note 87, at 6.
207. Studies finding disparities have also been critiqued because they focus on relative
rates of exposure rather than the absolute number of those exposed. See id. at 5. Where
the relevant issue is fairness, however, the relative rates of exposure rather than absolute
numbers exposed does appear to be a relevant inquiry, which is not to say that absolute
numbers are not also of interest.
208. See generally MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 160 (discussing complex
methodological choices). For example, some have criticized the UCC Report for using
"discriminate" rather than "regression" analysis techniques because the discriminate
analysis is less able to differentiate among the effects of multiple variables. See Lazarus,
supranote 100, at 802 n.56.
209. I use the data for the purpose of referring to the equity of basic distributions, not
the physical harm resulting from that proximity.
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green, wealthy and white suburbs juxtaposed with poor and minority
residents living near industrial facilities, homeless shelters, bus
stations, and the like.
The evidence from the aforementioned studies tells us that the
existing distribution of land uses does not satisfy the dictates of an
"equal division" theory of distributive justice. Although the evidence
says nothing about the causes of these inequities-whether they are
neutral factors, discrimination in siting, broader social injustices, or
post-siting housing dynamics-identification of causes is not
necessary to prove distributive injustice. 10 Focusing on what
communities now experience, the evidence reveals that the existing
division of LULUs is pervasively unequal.
V. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE UNDER THE COMMUNITY PREFERENCES
MODEL

A.

DistributiveJustice as the Equal Satisfactionof Community
Preferences

Professor Lynn Blais has argued that this evidence of
disproportionate distribution does not necessarily tell us whether the
disparities are unjust."' As discussed above, the equal division model
generally rests on the assumption that all communities measure the
benefits and burdens of various land uses in the same way. If,
however, communities value different land uses differently, then a
different model of distributive justice may be appropriate: one that
evaluates justice by whether people's preferences are equally met, not
by whether they are all subject to the same number of disagreeable
land uses. As indicated above, I term this the "community
preferences" model of distributive justice. Under this model,
disproportionate distributions would be just if the disparities matched
differing preferences.
In addition to Professor Blais, others have implicitly suggested
that an assessment of distributive justice ought to consider relative

210. See MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 160, at 136 (observing that "a positive
relationship between race and environmental harms constitutes evidence of environmental
injustice" whether caused by "a conscious effort to place hazards in minority communities
or ... simply ... the unintended consequences of industrial development and existing
demographic patterns").
211. Professor Blais states that the environmental justice "literature presents no
coherent theory about why the current distribution-even if disproportionate-should be
considered unfair." Blais, supra note 22, at 80.
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preference satisfaction.2" 2 Implicit evidence of the theory is pervasive
in many of the ongoing debates about environmental justice. For
example, in response to proposed EPA guidance documents
suggesting that environmental permitting agencies must take the
disparate impact of permits into consideration or risk violating Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act,213 many commentators questioned whether
this disparate impact approach would interfere with the ability of host
communities to obtain desired facilities.214 They thus assumed that a
disparate impact-an unequal division-would not be unjust if
communities desired the LULU at issue in a permitting decision
notwithstanding its disparate impact.
Coming from the left,
Professors Eric Yamamoto and Jen-L Lyman have critiqued the
environmental justice movement for failing to recognize the critical
differences among various ethnic communities in their attitudes about
particular land uses, and cautioned against absolute positions that
ignore such distinctions. 15 They thus implicitly adopt the view that
justice should be considered in light of the unique preferences of
particular communities.2 6

212. See, e.g., LAMBERT ET AL., supra note 87, at 15 (arguing that communities should
be free to accept facilities even if they are unequally distributed); Seth D. Jaffe, The
Market's Response to Environmental Inequity: We Have the Solution; What's the
Problem?, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 655, 656 (1995) ("Fairness cannot be defined as an even
distribution of LULUs across all communities," and that the government should not
interfere with siting processes "if host communities in fact want these projects .... ");
Kevin, supra note 87, at 140-41 (discussing communities' desire for LULU sitings, thereby
implying that a distribution would not be unjust if desired by community residents); cf.
MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 160, at 14-15 (noting plausible definition of
environmental justice that would take into consideration whether minority or poor
community, having the requisite information, chose to respond to that information).
213. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Title VI guidance).
214. See, e.g., Editorial, EPA's Job Killers, DETROIT NEWS, July 21, 1998, at A6
(describing concern that *environmental justice policy barring disparate impact would
reduce economic development in minority communities); Pamela Newman-Barnett,
Mayors Join Critics of EPA EnvironmentalJustice Rule, DAILY AM CONG., July 7, 1998
(same); Henry Payne, Planting Prosperity or Sowing Racism? EPA Policy that Bars
Polluting Plants from Minority Communities Comes Under Attack, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, June 15, 1998, at A9 (same); Donna Porstner, Chambers Align to FightAgainst
'EnvironmentalJustice' Policy, WASH. TIMES, July 20, 1998, at D17 (same).
215. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental
Justice, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 311 (2001) (exploring the meaning of "environmental
justice" by focusing on race as it merges with the environment). For example, Yamamoto
and Lyman note that a "hazard-free physical environment" may be less important to some
communities than the economic and political empowerment opportunities that could
accompany development. Id. at 320-22, 329-31.
216. Yamamoto and Lyman reject the "one-size-fits-all" approach used by many in the
environmental justice movement. Id. at 329. The "equal division" model of distributive
justice could be characterized as such an approach.
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Under the community preferences model, the critical question
would therefore be the extent to which communities are equally
satisfied with the land uses that surround them, not the extent to
which the land uses and their impacts are equally distributed.217
Different communities may have differing degrees of tolerance for
the burdens imposed by the various types of LULUs. What might be
a highly objectionable LULU to one community may be only
moderately annoying to another. Some communities might rise up in
arms against a small clinical hospital; others might be merely
indifferent.
Some communities may be more attuned to and
concerned about environmental quality than others. 18
Moreover, many LULUs bring a mix of benefits and burdens.
For some communities, the benefits could outweigh the burdens, with
the net result that an arguably "undesirable" land use becomes,
overall, a desirable land use.2 19 Professor Blais reflects this possibility
in her use of the term "environmentally sensitive land uses" rather
than "locally undesirable land uses,' ' 22 and in referring to possible
"differentials" in facility distribution patterns rather than
"disproportions. '221 The benefits could include direct services, such
as medical care needed within the community.2 22 Many LULUs, both
industrial and service-oriented, could bring significant employment

217. Professor Been's reference to a theory of fairness based on an "equal initial split
and competitive bidding" resonates with the theory of distributive justice suggested here.
Under the "competitive bidding" conception, communities would be given a limited
number of veto rights against LULUs. Simplifying slightly, communities would choose
when to exercise their vetoes. What one community vetoes another community might
allow, and vice versa. This form of distributing LULUs would be more likely to meet
unique community preferences than a mechanical equal distribution model. See Been,
What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1052-55 (articulating competitive
bidding proposal based upon a theory devised by Professor Ronald Dworkin). The
competitive bidding theory for how to distribute LULUs appears to rest on an underlying

conception that distributive justice is achieved when community preferences are met (and,
to some extent, not met) equally.
218. See id. at 1037-38 (noting that different communities might have differing degrees
of aversion to risk). As discussed below, Professor Been observes that these differences in

risk-aversion may be traceable to underlying inequalities.
219. See Blais, supra note 22, at 81; LAMBERT ET AL., supra note 87, at 15-17 (arguing
that communities may find that facilities provide net benefits); cf Been, What's Fairness
Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1024-25, 1036-37 (acknowledging argument that an

assessment of the full impact of LULUs should consider the net effect of perceived
burdens and perceived benefits).
220. See Blais, supra note 22, at 78 n.8.
221. Id. at 80 n.18 (referring to remarks by Professor Richard Markovits).
222. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1035-36 (noting

that certain communities may have a greater need for certain LULUs than others).
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A significant enterprise could

improve an area's tax base.224 Moreover, some communities are
plagued by abandoned properties, industrial and otherwise, that
degrade the community environment.225
A LULU might be
considered an improvement on the existing environment,
notwithstanding certain undesirable features. The movement to
develop "brownfields"-former industrial properties-reflects the
judgment that communities could improve their lot by encouraging
the development of new facilities on existing abandoned, industrial
properties.226
The community preferences model is rooted in insights stemming
from neoclassical economic theory. In a nutshell, neoclassical
economic theory assumes that individuals have particular preferences
regarding all key aspects of life, 27 and that they have the capacity to
act rationally in seeking to satisfy those preferences.228 The "market"
is the medium through which individuals and other actors make
choices, consistent with their preferences, about what to do and
where to be. Under the neoclassical model, the ability of private
actors to realize their preferences through the market is critical to
223. See id. at 1036; Blais, supra note 22, at 102; Kevin, supra note 87, at 141; Lambert,
supra note 87, at 1177.
224. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1037; Lambert,
supra note 87, at 1177.
225. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams?": Challenges and Limits of Voluntary
Cleanup Programsand Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 891-92; Gabriel A. Espinosa,
Building on Brownfields: A Catalystfor Neighborhood Revitalization, 11 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 9 (2000) (reporting Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimate of
tens of thousands to 450,000 brownfields sites nationwide).
226. See Carol M. Browner, Brownfields Are Becoming Places of Opportunity, 13 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. i-vi (1997-1998); Eisen, supra note 225, at 893-95
(describing community advantages of brownfields development). See generally Espinosa,
supra note 225, at 20-29 (describing successful brownfields redevelopment projects);
Eileen Gauna, EPA at 30: Fairness in Environmental Protection, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,528, 10,551-54 (2001) [hereinafter Gauna, EPA at 30] (describing potential economic
and environmental advantages of brownfields).
It should be noted that a number of these authors express concern about whether
brownfield development, at least as currently undertaken, will necessarily provide an
overall net benefit to affected communities. See Eisen, supra note 225, at 1020-30
(identifying potential problems with brownfields programs); Gauna, EPA at 30, supra, at
10,551-54 (same).
227. See Blais, supra note 22, at 94; Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and
Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 152-53, (1977-1978) [hereinafter Michelman, Political
Markets].
228. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 6-11
(1976); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998); Robin L.

West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 666 (1990).
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maximizing individual welfare. Maximizing individual welfare is, in
turn, critical to maximizing overall social welfare.22 9
Many
fundamental allocative and distributional consequences flow from the
realization of private preferences through the invisible hand of the
market. 3 ° Social welfare is maximized by respecting the allocation.231
Professor Blais's analysis assumes there is a "market" that operates to
distribute land uses and/or residents in response to resident
preferences.23 2
In general, under this view, the market is superior to
government-led distributional efforts. For example, the market
preserves individual liberty by allowing individuals to make choices
for themselves rather than having choices imposed by the
government.2 33 It is also the most efficient mechanism for insuring
that people's differing tastes are satisfied, since residents know what
they want better than the government, and are more likely to have
their preferences met if they, rather than the government, make key
decisions.234

229. See Blais, supra note 22, at 99; Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary
Transactions, in 31 NOMOS 279, 281 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal
Interference];see also West, supra note 228, at 660, 661 (noting that conservative theorists
believe that the satisfaction of individual preferences is "the source of value" in society).
230. See Blais, supra note 22, at 94.
231. See Milton Friedman, Methodology of Positive Economics, in FOUNDATIONS OF
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 28, 38 (Avery Wiener Katz ed., Foundation Press
1998) (noting that economists often believe "that the interest of society is reducible to the
interests of its individual members"); Michelman, Political Markets, supra note 227, at
152-53 (noting economic conception of human experience in which "there can be no
objective good apart from allowing for the maximum feasible satisfaction of private
preference as revealed through actual choice").
232. See Blais, supra note 22, at 94-108.
233. See id. at 99; cf Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, in
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW, supra note 231, at 11, 13

(presenting "libertarian" defense of free market exchange).
234. See Blais, supra note 22, at 99; cf Friedman, supra note 231, at 38 (noting that
economists believe in "consumer sovereignty-the idea that individuals are ordinarily the
best judges of their own interests"); Thomas Schelling, Economic Reasoning and the Ethics
of Policy, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW, supra note 231, at
18, 24-25 (noting the principle of market economics "that most people are better at
spending their own money than somebody else is at spending it for them"); West, supra
note 228, at 666-69 (noting that conservative theorists believe that judges are unable to
evaluate individuals' differing and personal preferences, and should therefore defer to
such preferences as expressed through private contracts and political markets rather than
intervening).
Economists describe an "efficient" market as one that moves resources to their
most highly valued uses. See Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market
Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOzO L. REV.
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One might argue that, even if free markets provide the ideal
mechanism for sound organization, the concept is simply inapplicable
in the land use siting context. As will be discussed in detail below, the
land use siting process is not an unencumbered market in which
residents choose their desired land uses, or even in which facility
siters and communities negotiate freely toward preference-matching
outcomes.235 In many instances, LULU siting involves a political
decision, whether by local, state, or other political entities.236
Nonetheless, preference theory remains relevant. The neoclassical
economic theories that have informed the market preference-based
view of social welfare have a political analog: public choice theory.237
Under public choice theory, the political forum is similar in function
to the market: both serve as venues where private preferences are
weighed and decisions maximizing private preferences could, at least
theoretically, be realized. 238 While not everyone's preferences could
431, 440-41 (1996) (describing why economists value efficiency). In the land use context,
one would argue that land uses move to the locations where they are most desired.
The term "efficient" is also used here in general terms to mean the most effective
mechanism toward a desired end. A full discussion of all of the possible definitions of
"efficiency" and how they relate to the market theory articulated here is beyond the scope
of this Article. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 228, at 13-16 (discussing differing types of
"efficiency").
235. As the discussion below will reveal, some authors' depiction of the land use siting
process as a market negotiation between the facility proponent and the affected
community is deeply flawed. See Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, Environmental
Justice Risks in the Petroleum Industry, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 67, 8384 (2000) (implying that siting process consists of a market transaction between the
affected community and a facility).
236. The land use siting process, and the role of political decision-making within it, is
discussed extensively below. See infra Section VI.D.2.
237. Others have described this theory as basic "pluralism." See Baron & Dunoff,
supra note 234, at 452-53.
238. See id. at 453 (describing this theory in terms of "pluralism"); Blais, supra note 22,
at 97 (observing that public choice theory views the political process like the market, and
assumes the government's role is to "combin[e] private preferences into a social decision")
(quoting DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 44

(1991)); id. at 98 (observing that "the role of the political process is ... to translate private
preferences into social choices"); Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the
Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437, 441-43 (1988)
(describing political public choice theory and its relation to.economic theory); Michelman,
Political Markets, supra note 227, at 148 (stating that, under the public choice model,
"[tihere is no public or general social interest, there are only concatenations of particular
interests or private preferences"); West, supra note 228, at 661 (observing that
conservative theorists believe that the political process yields laws that reflect citizen
preferences); cf. Eileen Gauna, The EnvironmentalJustice Misfit: Public Participationand
the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 19-28 (1998) [hereinafter Gauna, The
Environmental Justice Misfit] (discussing "pluralist" model of administrative agencies, in
which agencies juggle stakeholders' private preferences).
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be satisfied by every decision, this model envisions an on-going
sequence of decisions involving trade-offs and compromises that lead,
in the long run, to an expectation that "everyone would enjoy a net
balance of political gains in excess of losses. "239
As with the pure market model, market advocates would likely
argue that the political choice model would perform its preferencemeeting functions best if allowed to operate freely in response to each
Government efforts to resolve
community's preferences.
through, for example, general
broadly,
more
issues
distributional
restrictions on disparate impacts, would interfere with communities'
capacity to meet preferences in individual cases. 24" Thus, whether the
private or the public "political" market is at stake, community
preferences will most likely be met and liberty will be preserved if the
government does not impose an overarching distributional program.
Assuming a community preferences model, how does one
measure whether its dictates have been met? Clearly, some degree of
preference satisfaction is implicit in the model, or its very basis of
justification-maximizing social welfare through maximizing varying
individual preferences-would be lost. Even a strong proponent of
the model, however, is unlikely to measure justice under this theory
by requiring one hundred percent resident satisfaction. Having all
LULU siting decisions hinge upon the unanimous consent of all
members of affected communities would make for poor public policy.
There may be a variety of factors that could justify a siting decision
notwithstanding community opposition. There are undoubtedly more
LULUs than there are people who want them. Furthermore, if a
LULU is undesirable to all, it may be impossible to find a consenting
community. Where the undesirable LULU is necessary, requiring an
It is worth noting that much of the public choice literature is, in fact, highly critical
of the ability of the political system to fairly and accurately mediate preferences. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism,and Democratic Politics, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 2121, 2124 (1990)
(observing that social choice theorists conclude that the democratic process is incapable of
producing meaningful or rational results); Michelman, Political Markets, supra note 227, at
157 n.48 (noting that some of the public choice literature is skeptical that majoritarian
processes can optimize preferences efficiently).
239. Michelman, PoliticalMarkets, supra note 227, at 173.
240. Although government decisions imposing across-the-board outcomes, such as a
prohibition on disparate impacts, are also a consequence of the "public choice" process,
they differ from site-specific decisions because they do not weigh the unique preferences
associated with each site. Under the individual preference-maximizing view of the market
and political decision-making, one assumes that those political decisions that maximized
the opportunities for individuals to seek site-specific preferences would be valued over
political decisions that muted this individual-welfare maximizing function.
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unattainable community assent could interfere with the ability to
resolve important social and environmental problems.24'
Thus, while some degree of preference satisfaction is necessary
to the attainment of justice under the community preferences model,
the critical issue is whether the ratio of satisfaction to dissatisfaction is
equivalent. If some communities were able to have more of their
preferences met than other communities, then we would not have
distributive justice under the community preferences model.
As with the equal division model of distributive justice, the
challenge of measuring fairness pursuant to this theory is formidable.
This theory shares all of the practical difficulties in defining
"communities" that the equal division model presents.242 In addition,
preferences are frequently individual and subjective. As such, the
task of determining what a "community" prefers presents a daunting
task. It is not clear how one would identify a community's
"preference," or how the differing views within a community would
be assimilated into an overall level of preference, or who would speak
for a community in attempting to gauge a community's relative
satisfaction with its LULUs or the prospect of future LULUs.2 43

Although these are major challenges that must be faced by anyone
choosing to design an implementing policy, they do not undermine
the coherence of the overall theory.
To what extent do advocates of the community preferences
model believe that its dictates have been met? Professor Blais
implies that the community preferences model is sufficiently
satisfied-or, at least, satisfied sufficiently to preclude the need for
government involvement. She has concluded that:
a community decision to act as host for an environmentally
sensitive land use, or a private determination to live near
241. See Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D.
L. REV. 198, 198-201 (1990) (discussing social and environmental consequences of
widespread opposition to LULUs).
242. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
243. For example, it is possible that a vocal minority could claim to speak for the
majority. The inaccuracy could be mistaken or intentional. Given the likelihood of a
divergence of viewpoints within a community, it may be difficult to ascertain the
"majority" opinion. The dispute over the Shintech siting dispute in Louisiana provides a
case in point. An NAACP poll of residents in the affected parish showed that seventythree percent of the residents favored the plant. Lambert, supra note 87, at 1178.
Another poll, however, indicated, that fifty-two percent of the residents living closest to
the site opposed construction of the facility. Id. at 1178 n.78; cf Been, What's Fairness Got
to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1045 (arguing, in context of negotiation over
compensation, that it may be difficult to determine who represents and speaks for a
community's position).

1085

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

2003]

one, can be viewed as rational and informed, and the
political and market determinations leading to the current
distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses can be
understood to accurately reflect rational and legitimate
private preferences and collective judgments.244
To be sure, Professor Blais, like most neoclassical economists,
acknowledges that the market does not always work perfectly to
maximize the satisfaction of private preferences.24 5 Inequalities in

wealth impact individuals' abilities to realize their preferences, 2 46 as
do persistent problems of discrimination. 247 Even if it is not perfect,
however, neoclassical economists believe it is often better to let the
market operate than to interfere in its operation through an acrossthe-board government effort at improving distribution.248
Government intervention poses a threat to the liberty and efficiency
goals achieved by the market.2 49 Government efforts to control siting

would be paternalistic, questioning communities' ability to choose
desired land uses for themselves.25° Moreover, the government
244. Blais, supra note 22, at 82. In the siting context, Professor Blais acknowledges
that the benefits of a siting decision will not necessarily outweigh the burdens for every
individual within a community. Id. at 104-08. But she questions whether those benefited
or burdened are necessarily divided along race or class lines. Id.
245. See id. at 95-97.
246. See id. at 96-96 (in market context); id. at 98 (in political context); id. at 118 (in
housing context).
247. See id. at 93-94 (referring to impact of class and race differences on revealed
preferences); id. at 118-19 (referring to discrimination in housing market).
248. Professor Blais argues that "[m]easures designed to interfere with the preferences
revealed through ... [the market and the political process] generally demand substantial
justification." Id. at 94; see also id. at 116-17 (arguing that interference with markets is
justified only by "significant and exceptional process failures"). Although extreme market
failure could justify government intervention, she concludes that, "[i]n most contexts...
market defects are considered de minimis and thought not to distort unduly the
preferences measured by the system." Id. at 117; see also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R.
Weingast, Political Solutions to Market Problems, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417 (1984)
(questioning usefulness of government intervention in certain cases, notwithstanding
identified market failure). Recent market advocates thus critique many of the underlying
assumptions of the post-New Deal welfare economists, who had advocated government
intervention as an antidote to market failure. See WILLIAM C. MITCHELL & RANDY T.
SIMMONS,

BEYOND

POLITICS:

MARKETS,

WELFARE,

AND

THE

FAILURE

OF

BUREAUCRACY 3-19 (1994).

249. See Blais, supra note 22, at 99.
250. See Whitehead & Block, supra note 235, at 86 (arguing that elitist
environmentalists attempting to control siting are insulting the dignity of those who
choose to live near LULUs). But see Sheila Foster, Piercing the Veil of Economic
Arguments Against Title VI Enforcement, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 331, 343-45 (1999)
[hereinafter Foster, Piercingthe Veil] (arguing that, since communities affected by LULU
siting decisions do not have an effective voice in those decisions, their views are not being
overridden by "paternalistic" government efforts).
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suffers from so many of its own functional failures that there is no
assurance that it will function better than the market. 1 Professor
Blais concludes that "while disquieting vestiges of social injustice
remain in our society, no convincing argument has been made for
rejecting measured preferences concerning environmentally sensitive
land uses.

252

This conclusion raises the critical question of whether the market
in fact meets community preferences sufficiently to preclude
consideration of other initiatives to guide LULU distribution. If it
does not, then the market's goals of achieving "liberty" and
"efficiency" are not being furthered because residents are not able to
have their preferences met, or at least met equally.
Neither
3
individual nor social welfare is being maximized.
If preferences are
not being met, or are being met unequally under current market
conditions, then exclusive reliance on the market will not serve to
meet the goals of the community preferences model.
Before analyzing the likelihood that preferences are met, a few
words on the preferences model itself are in order. Although this
Article takes the community preferences model as a given, it is worth
noting that fundamental critiques could be leveled against it. If
unequal distributions of LULUs were to cause serious harm to a
community, it is not clear that preferences for the LULUs should be
honored. 4 More broadly, preferences are a function of social
context, and if that context is unjust, the resulting preferences may
not form a legitimate basis for social decision-making. 25 5
A
community's preferences and, more particularly, its weighing of the
benefits and costs of LULUs, may be significantly shaped by factors
such as relative wealth and race. 6 On a fundamental level, poorer
251.
"public
Shepsle
market

See MITCHELL & SIMMONS, supra note 248 (arguing that, due to widespread
failure," government intervention is not likely to remedy "market failure");
& Weingast, supra note 248, at 425 (arguing that, under certain circumstances, the
may be more efficient than government, even where there is some degree of

market failure).
252. Blais, supra note 22, at 83.
253. Cf.id. at 116 (noting, theoretically, that market defects can prevent individuals
from maximizing welfare).
254. See Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 229, at 1131 (noting that private
preferences that produce harm to a person should not be gratified).

255. See id. at 1131 (noting that argument against gratifying private preferences is
sometimes based on "the inevitable preference-shaping effect of the legal rules that
allocate entitlements and wealth in the first place").
256. This inquiry is similar to that discussed in regard to "compensation" proposals.
See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. It differs, however, because here the
benefits of concern are those derived from the LULU itself rather than from an external
compensating source.
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communities may place a lower value on environmental quality than
wealthier communities because other needs may appear more
pressing 2 7 and because they may not have the knowledge or
resources to recognize the full harms associated with certain
LULUs.258 Poor and minority communities may also value the
purported benefits of LULUs more highly due to their need for
employment.' 9 They could be more likely to welcome the siting of a
LULU, or move toward one, than those with greater economic
options and security. It is thus questionable whether it is "just" to
allow a distribution that places more LULUs, with their inevitable
burdens, in poor and minority communities when the differing
preferences are borne of disparities in wealth and a legacy of
discrimination.
The preceding suggests why it may be inappropriate to accept
certain preferences for LULUs. It may also be inappropriate to
accept certain preferences against LULUs. Opposition to low-income
housing, group homes for the disabled, and the like may be born of
prejudices that the legal system should not simply accept as given.260
More broadly, one could argue that community preferences against
LULUs are obstacles to be overcome, not satisfied.2 6' Widespread
257. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1038 (observing

that white communities may be more risk-averse than minority communities because they
have more time and resources to devote to environmental problems). Historically, civil
rights leaders were skeptical about environmentalism due, in part, to concern that
devoting resources to environmental protection would divert resources from poverty
alleviation.

See

KATHLYN

GAY,

POLLUTION

AND THE

POWERLESS:

THE

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 19 (1994) (describing civil rights movement
concern that environmentalism would divert attention from equal justice issues); Lazarus,
supra note 100, at 788-89 (describing minority leaders' reactions to environmentalists in
the 1970s).
258. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1041 (discussing

information deficit in context of compensation). The argument could also run the other
way, however. Communities could be more concerned about risk than the scientific
evidence warrants.
259. See Blais, supra note 22, at 102. Some argue that LULUs rarely provide promised
job benefits. See, e.g., Foster, Piercing the Veil, supra note 250, at 340-43 (1999)

(demonstrating, through examples, that new LULUs often fail to employ members of the
poor and minority communities in which they locate); Kuehn, supra note 36, at 10,701-02

(same).
260. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-50

(1985) (holding that city's denial of a permit for a home for the mentally retarded based
on community sentiment was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest
when the sentiment was based on "negative attitudes" and unsubstantiated fears); see also
Sunstein, Legal Interference,supra note 229, at 1130 (observing the legal system's rejection
of preferences based on discrimination).
261.

See, e.g., STEERING COMM. ON UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND

COMM'N ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, NIMBY:

A PRIMER FOR LAWYERS AND
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local opposition to unwanted land uses has come to be known as the
"Not-In-My-Back-Yard,"
or
"NIMBY"
phenomenon.262
Communities who cry NIMBY are often considered selfish, shortsighted, and an obstacle to providing needed social services and other
necessary but undesirable land uses.263
This Article is not, however, the place to determine the ultimate
legitimacy of theories of distributive justice. The benefits and
drawbacks to the equal division and community preferences models,
and their role in specific public policies addressing environmental
justice, will be the subject of future work. Instead, this Article
addresses an important preliminary inquiry: whether the evidence of
distributive injustice under the equal division model is moderated or
eliminated by using a community preferences rather than an equal
division model of justice.
B.

Assessing DistributiveInjustice Under the Community Preferences
Model: The Need to Review Process to Assess Distribution

Under the community preferences model of distributive justice,
an unequal distribution of LULUs would not necessarily constitute
distributional injustice.
Everyone might be equally satisfied,
notwithstanding different exposures to LULUs.2 6 The question,
then, is how to determine whether we have justice under the
community preferences model.
Direct evidence on relative satisfaction of preferences is
impossible to obtain; it is not feasible to research the extent to which
siting decisions actually meet community preferences for every
AM. BAR ASS'N 17-85 (1999) [hereinafter NIMBY PRIMER] (detailing
strategies for overcoming community opposition to social service facilities).
ADVOCATES,

262. See id. at 5; Delogu, supra note 241, at 198.
263. See NIMBY PRIMER, supra note 261, at 5 (observing that NIMBYism can delay

or prevent the siting of necessary social services); Delogu, supra note 241, at 198-201
(describing the local and national consequences of NIMBY attitudes); Michael B.
Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 502-16 (1994) [hereinafter

Gerrard, Victims of NIMBY] (identifying the "victims" of NIMBYism) , Michael Wheeler,
Negotiating NIMBYs: Learningfrom the Failureof the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE

J. ON REG. 241, 245-46 (1994) (articulating argument that NIMBYism is parochial and
selfish). It should be noted that some of these authors question whether NIMBYism is
necessarily as destructive or morally reprehensible as its critics suggest, particularly in the
non-social service context. See Gerrard, Victims of NIMBY, supra, at 516-20 (identifying
the beneficiaries and benefits of various forms of NIMBYism); Wheeler, supra, at 246-50
(analyzing justifications for NIMBYism).
264. Once again, the reference to "equal satisfaction" does not mean that all
communities are fully satisfied, since universal satisfaction may not be achievable. It
means that all communities enjoy about the same relative degree of satisfaction in
comparison with dissatisfaction. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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LULU around the nation. The closest one can get is to analyze the
likelihood that preferences have been met, and met equally. To
analyze this likelihood, one must evaluate the processes impacting
land use distributions to determine whether the processes are likely to
have generated equitable distributions under the community
preferences model. While this Article is primarily devoted to the
question of fair distribution, it considers processes to help predict
likely distributions, not to evaluate the processes in and of
themselves.
The inquiry first focuses on the land use siting process to
determine what it tells us about the likelihood that the resulting
distributions meet preferences. An important threshold question is
whether there is evidence that land use siting decisions had a
disparate impact when they were made; 65 the data about the
disparate distribution of LULUs discussed above address only the
current demographics,266 not the demographics at the time of siting.
However, these studies are limited, and they tell us only about
distribution, not about preferences.
To evaluate the likelihood that preferences are equally met, the
Article identifies the factors that generally govern the initial
distribution of land uses, evaluate the extent to which community
preferences are likely to play a role, and, to the extent community
preferences do play a role, evaluate whether they are satisfied
equally. The analysis first considers market forces, regulatory
requirements, and other types of "objective" factors that may
influence the placement of LULUs. 267 The Article then analyzes the
political process associated with siting decisions,268 considering both
general zoning provisions 269 and the site-specific political
determinations that are often made in connection with controversial
land uses.27 ° Finally, it considers whether statutes that explicitly
require public participation in the siting process or in permitting
decisions are likely to increase the extent to which community
preferences are taken into account equally.271
The Article then evaluates whether the post-siting housing
market is likely to lead to distributions that satisfy community
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See infra Section VIA.
See supra Section IV.B.
See infra Section VI.C.
See infra Section VI.D.
See infra Section VI.D.1.
See infra Section VI.D.2.
See infra Section VIE.

1090

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

preferences equally.272 Regardless of what occurs at the siting stage,
the market could, conceivably, remedy any distributional inequities
that arise from the siting process. Residents could move toward or
away from LULUs depending upon their preferences, thus leading to
an equal satisfaction of preferences. The analysis also considers
whether post-siting housing market dynamics have the opposite
effect: whether they are likely to exacerbate rather than improve
disparities in the extent to which the distribution of LULUs meets
community preferences equally.
Although the primary thesis of this Article is that distributive
injustice is worthy of concern in its own right, political and social
injustice provide additional (though not necessary) arguments for
addressing disparities. Since the discussion of siting processes and the
housing market will inevitably expose many of the political and social
causes of distributive injustice, I also note below how they provide
additional grounds for addressing distributional disparities.273
VI. IS THE LAND USE SITING PROCESS LIKELY TO SATISFY
COMMUNITY PREFERENCES EQUALLY?

A.

Evidence of Siting Decisions' DisparateImpact

A first issue to consider in assessing the land use siting process is
the extent of the disparities resulting from that process. While the
presence or absence of disparities does not indicate whether they are
the result of differing preferences or not, it would at least provide a
starting point for analysis. The demographic evidence presented
above suggests that many LULUs are currently disproportionately
located in poor and minority neighborhoods. 4 But since the current
demographics could have evolved after an initially neutral siting
decision, evidence of current demographics does not prove that the
original siting decisions had a disparate impact. Unfortunately,
however, the data on the impact of actual siting decisions are too
limited to be of significant use.
Professor Been has conducted several analyses of landfill
sitings 5
Two small and fairly localized studies did indicate
272. See infra Section VII.
273. See infra Section VI.F (addressing political injustice in the land use siting process)
and Section VII.C (addressing political injustice in the housing market).
274. See supra Section IV.B.
275. Her studies of demographics at the time of siting decisions were designed to
determine whether the existence of current disproportionate distributions were a function
of initially disproportionate siting decisions or of post-siting housing market dynamics.
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disproportionate impacts on African-American neighborhoods.27 6
Professor Been's largest study, of 608 hazardous waste sites sited
between 1970 and 1994,277 revealed that, during this time period, the
locations selected were not disproportionately African-American or
27 8
poor, but that they were disproportionately Hispanic.
Nevertheless, the study noted that African-American communities
are more likely than others to host a hazardous waste landfill. 279 The
current disparity may be a consequence of disproportionate siting or
post-siting housing market dynamics that took place prior to 1970, the
beginning of the study period. 28 ° The study observed that working
class and lower-middle income neighborhoods were more likely to be
See, e.g., Been & Gupta, supra note 163, at 9; Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses
in Minority Neighborhoods: DisproportionateSiting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J.
1383, 1398 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Market Dynamics].
276. Her study of the demographics associated with the placement of commercial
hazardous waste landfills in the southeastern United States found that "all of the host
communities were disproportionately populated by African Americans at the time of the
sitings." Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275, at 1398. Her study of waste facilities in
Houston, Texas, revealed that "the siting process had some disproportionate effect[,]"
with about half of the facilities sited in disproportionately African-American
neighborhoods. Id. at 1403.
Another study reveals similarly disproportionate siting decisions. Manuel Pastor,
Jim Sadd, and John Hipp found that toxic facilities in Los Angeles County were
disproportionately sited in areas that had more minority, poor, and blue-collar residents,
had fewer homeowners, lower home values and rents, and a lower percentage of collegeeducated residents. Manuel Pastor, Jr. et al., Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority
Move-In, and EnvironmentalJustice, 23 J. URB. AFF. 1, 9, 12 (2001).
277. Been & Gupta, supra note 163, at 10, 19-27.
278. Id. at 27. In the similar, though not identical, context of existing hazardous waste
facilities' decisions to expand capacity, one study noted that expansion decisions "had a
disproportionate effect on low income communities and communities of color." Been,
Market Dynamics, supra note 275, at 1396-97 (discussing Professor James Hamilton's
study).
SADRI has also analyzed whether hazardous waste facilities have been sited
disproportionately in poor and minority communities. See John Michael Oakes et al., A
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Equity in Communities with Hazardous Waste
Facilities, 25 Soc. SCI. RES. 125, 125 (1996). Their study found no evidence that facilities
were sited in poor or minority communities when compared with other areas having
significant industrial employment. Id. at 137 (using existing census tracts); id. at 142
(accounting for changes in census tracts between 1970 and 1990). The authors, however,
limited the comparison sites. Instead of comparing affected tracts to all census tracts
without waste facility sitings, they limited the comparison to those without sitings but that
were nonetheless within a metropolitan area or rural county having at least one facility.
Id. at 130. Since the comparison group included only census tracts in areas already having
waste sites, and no tracts in areas devoid of all development (which may have been whiter
and more affluent than the comparison tracts used), the results of the study are of limited
value. See also supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing similar limitations to
SADRI study of existing waste facility distribution).
279. Been & Gupta, supra note 163, at 33.
280. Id. at 32.
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facilities than poor or wealthy
studies provide some evidence of
are limited in extent and do not
a function of differing preferences.

Overview of Land Use Siting Processes

The following discussion of land use siting processes is intended
to determine whether they are likely to meet community preferences
equally. The analysis does not address whether land use siting
processes should address community preferences; instead, it critically
evaluates the contention that they do so fairly.
If communities and LULU proponents negotiated on an equal
footing about where to put various land uses, then, at least
theoretically, the resulting distribution might reflect community
preferences and interests.2 82 In fact, that image of an affected
community's role does not correspond with the complex reality of
land use decision-making. In general, the primary players are facility
promoters and regulatory entities, with some role for underlying
municipal zoning decisions. The communities in which facilities are
to be placed often play only a tangential role in the siting process.
Where private LULUs are at issue, such as various types of
industry and many hazardous and other waste facilities, the industry
itself plays a key role in selecting site locations.283 State or local
governments are critical in siting the many LULUs that are public
facilities, such as landfills, prisons and jails, and social services like
hospitals and homeless shelters. Other high-profile LULUs, like
some hazardous waste facilities, may involve a mix of private and
public control.2 4
But site selection does not occur in a vacuum; it involves not only
a search for those characteristics deemed desirable by the facility

281. Id. at 34.
282. The inevitability of differences in power between communities and LULU
proponents, and differences in power among different communities, makes this image
purely theoretical.
283. See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND
FAIRNESS INTOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 47-49 (1994) [hereinafter GERRARD,
WHOSE BACKYARD] (discussing siting of hazardous waste facilities); Michael B. Gerrard,
Stopping and Building New Facilities,in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra

note 32, at 465, 468 [hereinafter Gerrard, Stopping and Building New Facilities] (regarding
private industry).
284. See Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV.
394, 403-06 (1991) (describing mechanisms states use to work with the private sector in
siting hazardous waste facilities).
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proponent, but meeting whatever local, state, and/or federal legal
requirements will ultimately be imposed. Siting processes thus often
involve a strong political or regulatory component, regardless of
whether they are initiated by a private or public entity.
Not surprisingly, siting processes vary tremendously depending
upon the nature of the facilities and the infinite variation of federal,
state, and local priorities and procedures. The importance of certain
factors will also vary depending upon the type of LULU at issue: for
example, "objective factors" may play a particularly important role
for large industrial or public works projects, while local zoning and
local politics may play a particularly large role for social service
LULUs. The analysis below cannot be encyclopedic; instead it is
intended to provide a general overview of both the objective and
political factors that are most significant in understanding the
likelihood that current distributions meet community preferences
equally.
C. Do Objective FactorsSatisfy Community PreferencesEqually?
1. Siting Criteria
Numerous "objective" factors influence the land use siting
process. Although individual needs vary, large-scale manufacturers
often consider a wide range of factors, such as real estate costs; the
physical features of the property; access to transportation, such as
highways, rail, river, or oceans; access to raw materials; access to
markets; infrastructure and site development costs; the presence and
cost of the requisite labor force; and government regulation.285 Other
factors include safety considerations, potential environmental
liability, and to a somewhat lesser extent, tax abatements and
incentives, proximity to similar businesses, and local zoning.286
Certain types of facilities may have very specific criteria; for example,
landfills are likely to require water-tight soils to avoid leaching into
underground water sources.

285. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State Brownfields
Programs Can'tLure Businesses to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51
RUTGERS L. REV. 1075, 1110-19 (1999) (discussing factors companies use in selecting
sites); Straw, supra note 87, at 666-67 (discussing classical market siting criteria). Site
Selection magazine profiles various industries and frequently identifies these types of
factors, in addition to industry-specific factors. See generally SITE SELECTION, at http://
www.siteselection.com (last visited on Feb. 28, 2003).
286. Robertson, supra note 285, at 1110-19.
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Many additional criteria are imposed on industrial and waste
facilities by local, state, and federal law.287 These include a wide range
of technical criteria, including environmental and other factors.
Many states have compiled lengthy lists of the relevant criteria. For
example, the California Energy Commission has identified twenty
technical areas, ranging from air quality to cultural resources, that
must be considered in reviewing construction permits for powergenerating plants. 88 Hazardous waste facilities are particularly likely

to be subject to extensive technical criteria. 89
For many forms of social service LULUs, proximity to the
population to be served may be an important factor. Facility
proponents may seek hospital sites close to population centers, and
homeless shelters close to areas with a significant homeless problem.
Like industrial or public works projects, the cost of land, costs of
developing the land, and the cost of doing business in an area are also
likely to be important factors.
To a limited extent, community preferences themselves have
become one of the "objective" factors for siting entities.9 In the
287. See Straw, supra note 87, at 667.
288. See CAL. ENERGY COMM'N,
GUIDE OF PRACTICES
DEVELOPERS

ENERGY FACILITY
AND PROCEDURES

LICENSING

PROCESS:

(Staff
Report/Draft) [hereinafter CAL. ENERGY COMM'N DEVELOPERS GUIDE] (providing the
purpose, scope, and approach to be considered by the California Commision's staff in the
different technical areas), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/siting/documents/2000-1207_700-00-007.PDF (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also CONN. SITING
19-39

(2000)

COUNCIL, APPLICATION GUIDE FOR AN ELECTRIC GENERATING FACILITY § VIII(I)(1)

(2000) (listing technical specifications required to be included in facility applications),
available at http://www.ct.gov/csc/cwp/view.asp?a=945&Q=247580&cscPNavCtr=#31223
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
289. See, e.g., CONN. SITING COUNCIL, APPLICATION GUIDE FOR A HAZARDOUS

WASTE FACILITY §§ VII(A)-(K) (1995) (listing environmental, land use, and public need
criteria to be addressed by siting applicants), available at http://www.ct.gov/csc/cwp/view.
asp?a=945&Q=247586&cscPNavCtr=#31226 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., COMMONWEALTH OF PA., COMMERCIAL
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES: PHASE I SITING CRITERIA 1-2 (2001) (explaining
geological, technical, social, and environmental criteria that applicants must satisfy),
available at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/wm/HW/Facts/FS1963.pdf
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT.,
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES: PHASE II
SITING CRITERIA 1-2 (2001) (explaining environmental, economic, and transportation
criteria that affect a site's overall suitability), available at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/
deputate/airwaste/wm/HW/Facts/FS1964.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
290. See FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.10[3][b] (Release

#50, 2001). It should be noted that I am referring to community preferences as a
substantive criterion. I am not referring to the many other situations in which
communities are given a procedural role in the siting process, without weight being
attached to the community preferences expressed through such procedures. See generally

20031
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prison siting context, Tennessee encourages communities to express
their interest in hosting a correctional facility, and final state approval
is contingent upon the local citizenry's expression of majority support

at a public hearing.291 While California has the power to override

local opposition to power-generating facilities, the California Energy
Commission nonetheless encourages applicants to address local issues

to avoid the delays and complications that would be necessary if the
Commission were forced to override local land use restrictions that
would otherwise bar the facilities in question.292 Many states
encourage

the

consideration

of such

factors

as

community

perception 93 and most at least include the opportunity for community
input.2 94 Practically speaking, in order to lessen siting costs,
companies may seek sites where residents are less likely to offer
vigorous or effective opposition.2 95
On the other end of the spectrum, frustration with community

opposition to certain types of important LULUs led some states to
adopt state override provisions designed to thwart local opposition
and prioritize other objective criteria.2 96 Such provisions are
particularly likely in the context of prisons, 297 hazardous waste
facilities,2 98 and power-generating facilities.299

While states with

infra notes 450-58 and accompanying text (noting that public participation provisions
generally do not insure that community preferences will have substantive weight in siting
decisions); supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting that procedural requirements do
not necessarily insure substantive results).
291. NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ISSUES IN SITING
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 17 (1992) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
More generally, the National Institute of Corrections emphasizes the importance of
dealing with community sentiments in the siting process. See id. at 10-12.
292. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, DEVELOPERS GUIDE, supra note 288, at 10.

293. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1(d)(1) (Michie 1997) (encouraging consideration
of community perception in siting hazardous waste treatment or disposal sites); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 224.46-830(2)(a) (Michie 1995) (same).
294. See infra notes 435-49 and accompanying text (describing public participation
provisions included in many environmental siting and permitting processes).
295. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 70-71.
296. For example, the Connecticut Siting Council may override local decisions on
electric generation facilities, hazardous waste facilities, and low-level radioactive waste
management facilities. Conn. Siting Council, Jurisdiction and Responsibilities, availableat
http://www.ct.gov/csc/cwp/view.asp?a=895&q=248310 (last modified Sept. 19, 2002) (last
visited Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The California
Energy Commission similarly may approve power-generating facilities that do not
conform to local planning and zoning. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25,525 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2002).
297. For example, in Florida the state may override local prison siting decisions.
NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 291, at 17. In light of major siting controversies, the
Arizona Legislature took over the prison siting process. Id. at 16.
298. See GRAD, supra note 290, at § 9.10[3][b].
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override authority may sometimes include community approval as a
relevant factor in the siting process,300 the overall purpose of these
provisions is to reduce the role of community preferences and to
increase the relative weight of arguably "objective" criteria.
To a very limited extent, environmental justice considerations
themselves are emerging as a potential factor in some siting decisions.
Federal agency siting decisions are subject to President Clinton's
Executive Order on Environmental Justice, which requires federal
agencies to consider the impact of their decisions on minority and
In addition, several states have
low-income communities.30 1
environmental justice policies that encourage state and local agencies

to consider the impact of siting decisions on minority and low-income
communities.302 Moreover, state and local government agencies
receiving federal funding are subject to Title VI of the federal Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination generally3 3 and, per
regulations implementing Title VI, prohibits actions having a
Based on interpretations of these
discriminatory impact.30 4
299. See Gerrard, Stopping and Building New Facilities, supra note 283, at 470. For
example, as California faced a state energy crisis in the spring and summer of 2001, the
state was prepared to override the San Jose City Council's decision not to rezone to
accommodate a new power plant. In the face of that certain override, the City Council
reversed its position in exchange for concessions and a "community benefits" package.
See Maria Alicia Gaura, Mayor's Power Plant Reversal; Gonzales Now Touts Benefits to
San Jose, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 2001, at A18; Timothy Roberts, Council's Reversal a Sign
Crisis Rules, SILICON VALLEY/SAN JOSE Bus. J., June 8, 2001, at 3, available at http://
(on file with the North
www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2001/06/11/story3.html
Carolina Law Review).
300. For example, as described above, the California Energy Commission, which can
override local zoning and opposition, encourages applicants to attempt to obtain
community approval. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
301. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
302. See generally Barlow, supra note 32, at 140-56 (detailing selected states'
For example, Connecticut, Delaware, and New
environmental justice programs).
Hampshire have state policies that require agencies to at least assess impacts on
demographic groups. Id. at 143-46.
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000). Section 601 of Title VI states that "[n]o person...
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance." Id.
304. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2002) (stating that state and local agencies receiving
EPA funds "shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, [or] national
origin." EPA's regulations are typical; to implement Title VI, virtually all federal agencies
adopted boilerplate regulations like EPA's prohibiting actions having a discriminatory
effect. See Mank, supra note 19, at 11,147 n.28 (2000). The EPA regulations also state
that the recipient agency "shall not choose a site or location of a facility that has the
purpose or effect of... subjecting them to discrimination." 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c).
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regulations that emerged in the early 1990s, a state agency decision to
issue an environmental permit in an area already suffering from a
concentration of undesirable land uses could be deemed to have
caused a prohibited disparate impact.3" 5
2. Objective Criteria, Community Preferences, and Distribution
Given the myriad factors that could influence a given siting
decision, which, if any, are likely to lead to decisions that reflect
community preferences? Given the sheer number of factors that are
likely to influence a given decision, the inquiry here cannot hope to
prove direct cause and effect. Nonetheless, it is worth observing the
potential influence various factors could have on the likelihood that a
siting decision will meet community preferences equally, even if any
one factor is unlikely to be determinative.
Factorsthat Could Satisfy Community Preferences
One might expect a correlation with community preferences
where economic incentive or tax abatement packages play a role in
the siting process. In some cases, this factor might well tend toward
satisfaction of community preferences. However, incentives have
likely played a relatively limited role in the siting of most LULUs. A
study on the impact of economic incentives on corporate siting
decisions found that they were not generally important in developing
the initial pool of candidate sites, although they did become
important once the location was included in the final "short" list.3"6 It
is also not clear whether the local governments offering economic
incentives represent the preferences of the neighborhoods in which
the sought-after facility is to be located. For example, the fact that a
a.

305. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in
David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 531-32 (1994) [hereinafter Cole,
EnvironmentalJustice Litigation] (proposing use of Title VI in 1994); Lazarus, supra note
100, at 834-39 (discussing potential use of Title VI in 1993). The EPA reflected this
position when it issued guidance documents interpreting its Title VI regulations to apply
to environmental permitting decisions. See INTERIM GUIDANCE, DRAFT RECIPIENT
GUIDANCE and DRAFT REVISED INVESTIGATION GUIDANCE, supra note 19 (articulating
EPA policy that Title VI regulations could prohibit state environmental permitting
programs receiving federal funds from causing disparate impacts). It should be noted that
despite the ostensible power behind the Title VI regulations, EPA's guidance suggests that
the EPA does not expect agencies to deny or revoke permits if disparate impacts are
found, but instead recommends other steps to reduce the impact. See 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650,
39,683 (June 27, 2000).
306. See Robertson, supra note 285, at 1112-13. In a study conducted by Professor
Robertson of thirty-four business relocation decisions, tax abatements and incentives had
a medium priority in the initial screening process. Id. at 1117.
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city government expressed an interest in attracting business through
tax incentives does not mean that those neighboring the ultimate site
for the facility desired it.3" 7 Furthermore, whatever a company's
responsiveness to economic incentives if offered, it is not clear how
often they are offered. In particular, economic incentives are not
likely to play a significant role with respect to smaller LULUs, such as
homeless shelters or small industrial facilities.

Direct community preference criteria may face legal obstacles.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found explicit
community preference criteria illegal, in large part due to the power
they give a community over the fate of the developer's property
rights. In Geo-Tech Reclamation Industries, Inc. v. Hamrick, °8 the

Fourth Circuit addressed a provision in West Virginia's solid waste
permitting statute giving the State the authority to deny a waste
facility permit when it is "significantly adverse to the public sentiment
...where the solid waste facility ...will be located."3 °9 The court

held that the State is permitted to consider the well-being of
communities affected by solid waste facilities,310 but that allowing the
State to rely on community sentiment itself would make the state

"potentially subservient to selfish or arbitrary motivations or the
whims of local taste." Whether all courts would address community
preference criteria in as restrictive a manner as the Fourth Circuit is,
311
however, unclear.
307. Cf Terry Props., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1527, 1534-35 (11th Cir.
1986) (describing local government effort to site an industrial facility that included white
city officials and white representatives of industrial development groups, but not residents
of the African-American community where the facility was ultimately sited).
308. 886 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1989).
309. Id. at 663 (quoting W.VA. CODE § 20-5F-4(b) (Supp. 1989)).
310. Id. at 665-66.
311. Geo-Tech rested on a line of cases addressing a similar but slightly different
question. While Geo-Tech considered whether it was appropriate for the government to
have the discretion to base permit approval on public sentiment, other cases have
addressed provisions that actually condition permit approval on neighbor consent.
Geo-Tech followed the approach of those cases that have deemed neighborconsent provisions an impermissible delegation of power by the state to potentially
arbitrary and selfish private individuals. See Washington ex. rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1928) (holding that a Seattle zoning ordinance
conditioning special permit approval for homes for children or the aged upon the consent
of two-thirds of nearby property owners violated the permit applicant's due process
rights); see also Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912) (holding that a local
ordinance that delegated authority to set building setback lines to nearby residents was an
unconstitutional exercise of the police power); Bozick v. Cobb County, 242 S.E.2d 48, 49
(Ga. 1978) (per curiam) (holding that a local provision conditioning liquor license
approval on the absence of objections from neighboring property owners is an
unconstitutional denial of due process and equal protection).
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Assuming it is not subject to legal challenge, the inclusion of
community preferences as a criterion for site selection might lead to
at least the chance of a greater correlation between a siting decision
and the surrounding community's preferences. Nonetheless, this
factor is not common, particularly historically.312 More generally, a
community preference criterion is one among many; there is no
assurance that it will play an important role in a final decision.313
Finally, as with communities that have offered financial incentives to

But not all neighbor-consent provisions have been found unlawful, and courts
evaluating community preference provisions and using the neighbor-consent provision
cases as precedent may have options that are more accepting than the Roberge line of
cases mentioned above. In at least some cases, if the ordinance in question gives
communities the power to remove rather than impose a land use restriction, then the
ordinances have been found constitutional. See Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,
242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (holding that a local ordinance banning billboards unless one-half
of the neighboring property owners agreed to remove the restriction was constitutional);
Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1086-87 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that a provision
prohibiting condominium conversions unless a requisite number of tenants consented was
constitutional). In essence, citizens can elect to forgo the protections the law would
otherwise afford. See id. at 1087.
Another line of cases, potentially inconsistent with those cases finding neighborconsent provisions unconstitutional, hold that if the activity to be restricted constitutes a
nuisance, then neighbor-consent provisions are constitutional. See Bourque v. Dettore,
589 A.2d 815, 824 (R.I. 1991) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of
licenses for junkyards if the majority of neighbors object is constitutional due to the
objectionable character of the land use). These cases build on dicta in Roberge suggesting
that a direct community role in another property owner's use permit could be justified if
the proposed land use were "inconsistent with public health, safety, morals or general
welfare." Roberge, 278 U.S. at 121. However, it is not clear whether the Roberge Court
was laying out a new and clear principle or, instead, was simply working hard to
distinguish the Cusack case, discussed above.
Finally, the Supreme Court has upheld ordinances that require a formal
referendum in connection with land uses. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426
U.S. 668, 679 (1976) (holding that a local ordinance requiring all zoning changes to be
approved by a fifty-five percent referendum vote was constitutional). See generally
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.04 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing
constitutionality of delegation-to-neighbors provisions); KENNETH H. YOUNG,
ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 21.16 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter YOUNG,
4TH ED.] (discussing local government provisions requiring neighbor consent for the
issuance of special use permits).
312. See GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, supra note 283, at 66 (noting that siting laws
generally focus on environmental factors and generally relegate community concerns to
the political process). It is also ironic that some of the examples of siting processes
including references to community preferences that were identified above are coupled
with state override provisions, see supra note 292 and accompanying text, which arguably
represent the antithesis of a concern for community preferences. The reference to
community approval in siting processes involving state overrides may be intended to
provide partial "compensation" for having effectively removed local control.
313. Cf. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 77 (noting that it is not clear what weight
socioeconomic factors are given in hazardous waste facility siting decisions).
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encourage investment, one faces the risk that the preferences of those

truly neighboring the facility will not be taken into consideration.314
Thus, while a criterion for community preference may lead to siting
decisions that are more likely to satisfy community preferences than
siting criteria without such a provision, they are not prevalent enough,
do not play a significant enough role, and are not carefully enough
applied to be a significant factor in assuring us that most siting
decisions have satisfied community preferences equally.
To the extent that companies seek locations where they are less
likely to encounter opposition, we have no assurance that the reason

they are less likely to encounter opposition is the community's
preference for the facility. Companies may seek locations where the
communities are less able, not less willing, to oppose a proposed
facility. The communities less likely to express opposition are often
"those with poorly educated residents of low socioeconomic
status,"3'15 communities that are frequently populated by people of
color.3 16 These communities are assumed to have less capacity to

mount effective opposition than wealthier and better-educated
communities.317 Thus, to the extent the desire to avoid effective
314. For example, in a major national search for a site for a uranium enrichment plant,
community support was one of the "principal criteria for site selection." In re La. Energy
Servs., L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367, 388 (1997) (final initial decision). But the facility proponent
met only with area officials who did not live in and were not representative of the small,
poor, largely African-American towns closest to the proposed site location. Id.
315. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 70.
316. Id. at 71.
317. Cole and Foster draw attention to a report commissioned by the California Waste
Management Board on how to site waste incinerators. The report emphasized the
importance of political, not just engineering factors, and suggested that companies should
target small rural communities whose residents were low-income, older, poorly educated,
and poor (among other things). Id. at 71. Although waste companies disavowed this
approach, their siting decisions have been consistent with the recommendations. Id. at 72.
In a study of hazardous waste facility decisions to expand capacity, which are
more common than facility siting decisions, Professor James Hamilton found that facilities
were more likely to expand in areas with lower median household incomes, lower
education levels, higher poverty levels, higher nonwhite populations, and lower
populations. James T. Hamilton, Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits,
Political Power?, 14 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 107, 122-23 (1995). After controlling
for a range of variables, he argues that the critical factor explaining the differences is the
likelihood that the community would engage in collective political action to oppose the
facility expansion decision. Id. at 107, 111, 123, 125, 126-27. The potential to engage in
collective action was measured by voter turnout rates and a set of additional relevant
variables. See id. at 118. The higher the potential for collective action, the lower the
probability that hazardous waste facilities would expand. Id. at 129. Professor Hamilton
also notes that the potential for collective action may be related to institutionalized racism
"[t]o the extent that racism in political markets or outcomes in housing, education, and
employment markets affect political participation." Id. at 129.
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public opposition is an important criterion in the site selection
process, it is likely to skew distribution to the poor and minority
communities least able to resist. This factor fails to respond equally
to community preferences.
b. FactorsIndependent of Community Preferences
The criteria considered so far are those most likely to lead to
LULU distributions correlated with community preferences. In
contrast, most of the criteria described in this Section operate
independently of a community's preference for the facility in
question. The criteria are ostensibly "neutral" in terms of their
impact on particular societal groups. Geological characteristics say
nothing about the type of community where a facility should go or a
community's preference for a landfill. Proximity to a railroad says
nothing about a particular community's preference for a major
manufacturing facility. Social service LULUs may go to where needs
are present, regardless of community demographics. And land costs
are often touted as a "neutral" factor unrelated to community
demographics and the preferences of neighboring communities.
Considering the community preference model of distributive justice,
we come to the not surprising conclusion that the objective criteria
provide no assurance that siting decisions will gravitate to the
locations where residents desire them. Nonetheless, while not
meeting preferences, the criteria, stated abstractly, at least appear
likely to satisfy or frustrate all communities' preferences equally.
Practically, however, the criteria may not always satisfy or
frustrate equally all communities.
In some cases, ostensibly
"objective" criteria may in fact tend to lead to LULU sitings that
satisfy the preferences of some more than others. 18 In light of
widespread racial and economic segregation, apparently neutral
factors can operate to reinforce underlying inequities.319 Consider,
for example, the apparently neutral criterion of "access to
transportation." To the extent poor and minority communities are
more likely to live along highways and railroad tracks, siting decisions
influenced by transportation concerns would be more likely to impact
poor and minority neighborhoods, regardless of the communities'

318. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 72 (arguing that ostensibly "race-neutral"
factors have disparate impacts).
319. Id. at 66-68 (noting that, where segregation has created long-standing inequities,
race-neutral policies often operate to reinforce those existing inequities).
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desire for the projects in question. 20 Thus, this "objective" criterion
could lead to a disproportionate concentration of LULUs in poor and
minority neighborhoods that is not explained by any evidence of
greater community preference for the LULUs.
Another factor that might lead to a concentration of LULUs in
poor and minority neighborhoods is the extent to which decisionmakers attempt to place certain social services close to the perceived
need for the services. Since social needs tend to be greater in poor
and minority communities, this factor is likely to lead to a greater
concentration of social service LULUs in poor and minority
communities. One could argue that, to the extent a social service
LULU provides a service needed by a particular community, that
LULU would likely meet the preferences of that community.
Arguably, differences in distribution would then be justified by
differences in community preferences.
That may not always be true, however. For example, residents in
an area with many homeless persons may argue that their community
is not the "source" of the problem, and that the placement of
homeless shelters simply creates and perpetuates the concentration of
homeless in their neighborhoods. Since homeless individuals do not,
by definition, have a home, there is no reason why homeless shelters
should be located in poor neighborhoods; those neighborhoods have
no more of a need for them than any other.32' Thus, while one could
posit that social service LULUs would be desired more by the poor
and minority communities in which they are likely to be placed than
they would be by communities that do not currently appear to face
the need for them, that assumption may be misplaced in some
instances.
320. Id. at 73 (observing that "[p]roximity to major transportation routes may also
skew the siting process toward communities of color, as freeways appear to be
disproportionately sited in such communities").
A recent controversy provides a typical example. In 1999, the St. Lawrence
Cement Company selected a poor, African-American neighborhood in Camden, New
Jersey, for a new industrial facility in part because of its status as a port town. Marcia
Coyle, Backyard Blues, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 2001, at A10. The company wanted the deepwater port to obtain raw materials from Europe and also believed that this port was
necessary to expand operations into its target domestic market, Id.; see also supra notes 17 (describing this siting dispute).
321. Since homelessness is a society-wide problem, homeless shelters should arguably
be distributed in all communities, rather than concentrated in the poor communities where
they are currently more likely to be found. Cf Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?,
supra note 19, at 1036 (observing that residents of poor neighborhoods "may argue that
they are no more responsible for the plight of those needing social services than residents
of wealthier neighborhoods").
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Land costs present one of the most complex factors. Since many
facilities, both public and private, are concerned about costs, they are
likely to gravitate toward the lowest cost location when considering
equally acceptable alternatives.322 Property values are likely to be
lower in poor and minority communities.323 Using land costs as an
important factor in facility siting is thus likely to lead to a greater
concentration of facilities in poor and minority communities,324
regardless of their desire for the facilities.
Giving the community preferences model the benefit of the
doubt, however, one could speculate that the poor areas with
inexpensive land may be somewhat more likely to desire the services,
jobs, and economic base that can come with development projects
than wealthier communities, even if the projects come in the form of
LULUs. 325 Thus, the disparate concentration of LULUs in poor and
minority areas due to cheaper land costs conceivably could be
justified by the assumption that these areas would have a greater
preference for such facilities.326
But acknowledging that possibility does not mean it is always or
even often true. The environmental justice movement itself has
arisen out of poor and minority communities' opposition to LULU
siting proposals.3 27 The political culture reveals that poor and
minority communities do not necessarily desire more LULUs. They
may not be willing to make the quality of life sacrifices. And they
may be aware that LULUs do not necessarily bring with them the
jobs or economic investment that are often presumed. For example,
in many instances, new industrial developments do not hire from the
neighborhoods in which they are located.328 If land costs skew
322. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 72; Straw, supra note 87, at 675-76; see also
Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity:
A Law and Planning Approach to
Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 516 (1992) (addressing hazardous waste
facilities).
323. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 72; Collin, supra note 322, at 516-17.
324. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1039 n.196 (noting
study of hazardous waste treatment facility site options in Albany, New York, that
"revealed that the choice that minimized the cost of the siting increased the inequity of the
siting by 110%").
325. See Straw, supra note 87, at 676-77; Whitehead & Block, supra note 235, at 68.
326. For the purposes of this Article, the community preference model is assumed to
be legitimate, and preferences are taken at face value. Preliminary criticisms of accepting
preferences as given are articulated supra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 39, at 24 (discussing local efforts to oppose LULUs in
minority neighborhoods throughout the nation).
328. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 77-78 (describing numerous examples in
which LULUs did not bring employment benefits to their local communities); Kuehn,
supra note 36, at 10,701-02 (same).
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LULUs to poor and minority neighborhoods, one cannot presume
that that skewing is justified by differences in community preferences.
Some criteria that appear "objective," and thus appear likely to
be at least neutral with respect to community preferences, may be
more subjective than they first appear.329 That subjectivity may leave
room for other factors, such as bias, that would lead to the satisfaction
of the preferences of some communities more than others. For
example, a Minnesota law governing the siting of waste containment
facilities includes as one of six general factors the "intrinsic suitability
of the sites."33 The issue of what makes a site "suitable" is deeply
subjective, and leaves room for the conscious or unconscious
intrusion of bias. Factors such as "impact on quality of life" present
similar risks.3
In addition, to the extent objective criteria appear neutral with
respect to community preferences, it is worth noting that they are not
always followed. 32 It is possible that they are not followed due to the
intrusion of subjective or political factors that might result in the
favoring of some communities over others, leading to inequality in
the satisfaction of preferences.333 Even "objective" criteria are not as
infallible or neutral as they might appear on the surface.
329. See GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, supra note 283, at 52-53 (noting that
seemingly objective criteria in fact express subjective value judgments).
330. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.20(b) (2002).
331. In one well known case, those attempting to site a uranium enrichment facility
evaluated the impact of the facility on "quality of life." In re La. Energy Servs., L.P., 45
N.R.C. 367, 388 (1997) (final initial decision). The site evaluators paid more heed to the
"quality of life" impact of building the facility near a lake used for recreation than they did
to the impact on a poor African-American community neighboring another possible
location, thereby favoring the needs and lifestyles of the more affluent community. Id.
332. See GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, supra note 283, at 53 (observing that the
proper application of siting criteria is often questionable).
333. For example, in a case in which I was involved, county supervisors selected a site
for a jail near a minority community that violated many of the county's stated criteria: it
did not meet the initial size requirements; though the county had sought lands without
wetlands, it contained protected wetlands, requiring extensive regulatory work to obtain
uncertain approval; initial studies suggested the need for follow-up hazardous waste
analyses due to the potential for past dumping; and, surprising though it may seen, the site
was already designated for affordable housing. See Collinsville Civic & Improvement
League Comments on Morris County's Individual Freshwater Wetlands Permit
Application 39-41 (June 1, 1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(describing extent to which site selected in minority community failed to meet the county's
objective siting criteria).
Another example was revealed in 1994 testimony before Congress: residents
opposed to the construction of a hazardous waste incinerator in low-income Gregg
Township, Pennsylvania, stated that the decision to site the facility in their community
violated numerous "objective" criteria, including location on protected agricultural lands,
close proximity to a penitentiary, and close proximity to a significant river. See EPA and
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To the extent environmental justice factors themselves become

"objective" criteria in siting processes, it is possible that they will
counteract some of the other objective factors that have the potential
to concentrate land uses in poor and minority communities. Most of
these criteria, however, are too new to have had an impact on existing
distributions, and they are thus unlikely to have counteracted factors
that historically placed land uses in poor and minority neighborhoods
regardless of their preferences. It is also unclear how strong a role
the environmental justice factors are playing and could play in future
siting decisions.334 Their role in the future is uncharted territory; for
our purposes, it is enough to conclude that they are unlikely to have
increased the likelihood that existing land use distributions have met
community preferences equally.
Thus, some objective factors, like geologic conditions, are
unlikely to affect different communities differently, and will operate

independently of community preferences. Other factors, like access
to transportation, perceived proximity to need, land costs, and other
more subjective factors may affect poor and minority communities
more than others in ways that do not reflect differences in
preferences. The recent emergence of environmental justice criteria
does not alter this overall description of existing conditions. Many of
these factors may be legitimate and useful, particularly if carefully
applied. But their legitimacy is not the issue. For our purposes, the
State Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility Siting Policies: Hearings Before the Environment,
Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations, 103d Cong. 115-17 (1994) (Statement of Clyde Peeling, Vice President,
Organizations United for the Environment).
A study of the Environmental Impact Statement for the uranium enrichment
facility described above, see supra note 331, revealed numerous methodological flaws,
including improper utilization of established siting criteria. See Daniel C. Wigley &
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Racism and Biased Methods of Risk
Assessment, 7 RISK 55, 58 (1996).
334. For example, the Executive Order is not legally enforceable. Exec. Order No.
12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995), reprintedas amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000) (stating that
the order does not "create any right ... enforceable at law or equity ... [and] shall not be
construed to create any right to judicial review involving ... compliance or
noncompliance"). On its own terms, it is not clear how strong a role environmental justice
concerns are expected to play in federal agency decisions. See Binder et al., supra note 31
at 11,140-50 (describing uneven federal agency implementation of the Executive Order).
Recent interpretations of many agency Title VI regulations to apply to environmental
permitting decisions still represent a novel application of Title VI, and remain highly
controversial. See generally Mank, supra note 19 (describing recent disputes over the Title
VI regulations and recent EPA guidance documents designed to interpret the regulations).
The Supreme Court has also ruled out private enforcement of Title VI, see Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001), leaving poorly staffed federal agencies with sole
enforcement responsibilities.
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critical point is that they do not lead to distributions of land uses that
meet the dictates of the community preferences model.
D. Does the PoliticalProcessSatisfy Community Preferences
Equally?
Objective factors are rarely the sole determinant of a siting
decision. The political process plays an important role in land use
siting. Overarching decisions are made when cities and counties
adopt land use planning regulations, comprehensive plans, and zoning
ordinances."'
In addition, many facilities require case-specific
political decisions to go forward. While these processes raise
important issues of political justice, the focus for the purposes of this
Article is on the outcome of these processes: whether they are likely
to lead to siting distributions that meet community preferences
equally.
1. Local Zoning Ordinances
Zoning ordinances establish the land uses that are permissible
within different "zones" in a given locality. A primary purpose of
zoning has always been to separate incompatible land uses, and, in
particular, to separate "noxious" industrial uses from residential
areas.33 6 Under many zoning ordinances, industries have been placed
in separate zoning districts. 337 That many industrial facilities are
found close to one another rather than spread evenly over a
municipal area is, thus, unsurprising. In theory, at least, an uneven
distribution of LULUs is consistent with good zoning.
But is that uneven distribution just? If industrial development is
separated equally from all residential neighborhoods then we do not
implicate issues of distributive justice. However, the evidence reveals
that significant numbers of industries, as well as other types of
LULUs, are located in and near residential areas, and that they are
more likely to be found in poor and minority neighborhoods.338 The
inquiry at this stage is: are these disparities the result of zoning
ordinances that have directed industrial development to communities
335. See PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE
REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW

138 (1998) (noting that "fundamental policy decisions are made by the local legislative
body... [and that] [z]oning is therefore an inherently political process").
336. See Eric Damian Kelly, Zoning, in THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PLANNING 251, 270 (Frank. S. So & Judith Getzels eds., 2d ed. 1988).
337. See id. at 268, 270.
338. See supra Section V.B (discussing evidence of unequal distribution of LULUs).
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that desired it? Or, at least, have zoning ordinances met community
preferences for industry and other LULUs equally? If so, then we
would have distributive justice under the community preferences
model.
In theory, a community could express its preferences for various
types of land uses through the political processes associated with the
development and modification of local zoning ordinances. If a
neighborhood did not want industrial development in certain areas,
then its elected representatives could reflect that preference in the
ordinance. Conversely, if a community wanted the economic or other

benefits of industrial development, then that preference could be
reflected in the ordinance. Since public officials are to be responsive
to the sentiments of their electorate, land use plans and zoning
ordinances should respond to resident preferences, thus meeting the
dictates of the community preferences model.
In reality, however, land use plans and zoning ordinances are not

likely to reflect resident preferences equally. Local zoning is a highly
political process, possibly the " 'most political of local functions.' ""',

Zoning ordinances, which are typically adopted on a city-wide basis,
will undoubtedly meet the goals of some neighborhoods, but are
unlikely to meet the preferences of all. Land use planning and zoning
processes often reflect differences in political power.34 ° Wealthy
neighborhoods may be more likely to have their preferences realized

than poor neighborhoods.3 41 Elected officials are dependent upon
339. See SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 138 (quoting W. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 32 (1985)).
340. See generally Brion, supra note 238, at 443-47 (describing ways in which political
processes are influenced by differences in power and other undemocratic forces); id. at
497-98 (noting that participatory power depends upon "the command of material
resources" and that such resources are not equitably distributed).
It should be noted that the Myths and Realities study ostensibly evaluated whether
"political mobilization" was correlated with the distribution of LULUs, and found no
correlation in thirteen of the fourteen settings they studied. See MTYHS AND REALITIES,
supra note 160, at 149-51. However, the study's definitions of political mobilization limit
the relevance of their findings. At the state and county level, political mobilization was
defined by reference to voter turnout. Id. at 60. I would argue that voter turnout is not an
effective proxy for political power, power that is reflected as much through informal
influence as through formal voting. Due to practical difficulties, the study did not use
voter turnout in analyzing political mobilization at the city level. Id. at 61. Instead, it used
the median value of owner-occupied homes as its proxy for political mobilization. Id. (The
use of that proxy clearly assumes that political power is linked to wealth.) Any data
revealed as a consequence of this analysis address the role of relative wealth, not the role
of relative political power. The study's conclusion that differences in political power are
irrelevant in the siting process is thus unconvincing.
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them for fundraising for reelection,342 and wealthy citizens' greater
financial resources allow them to participate in the lengthy,
convoluted proceedings in a manner that may be outside the reach of
poorer residents, who do not have the resources or sufficient leisure
time for this type of political engagement.343
Moreover, despite improvements in the last few decades, race is
still linked to political power. Until the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
African Americans were frequently excluded from voting through
numerous mechanisms that prevented them from having a voice in
government,345 including the local governments that developed the
zoning ordinances that shaped most of the land use patterns we see
today. After the Voting Rights Act was passed, many local and state
governments adopted measures designed to circumvent the Voting
Rights Act through new and subtle forms of vote dilution.346
Stemming in part from the Supreme Court's invalidation of some of
these subtle forms of vote dilution,3 47 African-American voting power
has improved, but only relatively recently. 48 A rough proxy for the
M
T

341. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Takings, Efficiency, and DistributiveJustice: A Response
to Professor Dagan, 99 MICH. L. REV. 157, 159 n.7 (2000) (observing that wealth is
correlated with political power).
342. See id. (noting that the wealthy have more political power than the poor in part
due to politicians' dependence upon fundraising for election and reelection).
343. See Reich, supra note 144, at 277 (observing that a lack of technical and financial
resources can impede "access to key planning decisions such as ... zoning").
344. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
345. See Sonia R. Jarvis, Historical Overview: African Americans and the Evolution of
Voting Rights, in FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION:
THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR
AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL POWER 17, 26-27 (Ralph C. Gomes & Linda Faye

Williams eds., 1992) (describing mechanisms, such as the poll tax, literary tests, white
primaries, party membership (in all-white parties), that kept African Americans from
participating in electoral politics).
346. These mechanisms included, among others, gerrymandering of voting districts by
splitting black populations into several districts where they would be a minority; switching
from district to at-large elections; and increasing the qualifying requirements for
independent candidates. Frank R. Parker, Eradicatingthe Continuing Barriersto Effective
Minority Voter Participation,in FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION, supra note 345, at 73,
75-77; see also Jarvis, supra note 345, at 29 (describing post-Voting Rights Acts
mechanisms to dilute or limit black voting).
347. The Supreme Court struck down some of the post-Voting Rights Act vote-dilution
measures in 1969 and continuing into the 1970s. Parker, supra note 346, at 77-78
(describing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), and White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755 (1973)).
348. For example, the number of African Americans registered to vote was 9.2% less
than whites in 1968, but only 3.4% less than whites by 1988. See Theresa Chambliss, The
Growth and Significance of African American Elected Officials, in FROM EXCLUSION TO
INCLUSION, supra note 345, at 53, 62-63. Black voter turnout in 1966 was 15.3% lower
than white voter turnout, but only 3.8% lower in 1986. Id. at 64. It is interesting to note
that things got worse before they got better. In 1976, the voting gap between whites and
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weakness of African-American voting power can also be seen in the
relatively few numbers of African Americans elected to office.
Although the number of elected officials has increased significantly in
percentage terms,349 as of the early 1990s, African Americans held less
than 1.5% of elected offices despite constituting 12.2% of the
population.3 5 ° Professor Owen Fiss has suggested that, despite the

elimination of obvious voting barriers, "structural limitations on the
political power of blacks still persist. 3 51

African Americans are

statistically a "minority" relative to the majority, tend to have a lower
economic status, and have been the "object of 'prejudice' " in a
manner that can "make it advantageous for the dominant political
352
parties to hurt them.
These concerns apply equally to other minority groups. Voter
turnout and registration rates among Hispanic and Asian-American
citizens are significantly less than those for white voters and
considerably less than those for black citizens. 3 In addition, because
the percentage of residents who are citizens and, therefore, eligible to
vote is smaller in Latino and Asian communities than in AfricanAmerican communities,354 the lack of political power is likely to be as

blacks was 12.7%. Between 1968 and 1976, the percentage of blacks registered to vote fell
from 66.2% to 58.5%. See Jarvis, supranote 345, at 29. In the 2000 election, 62% of white
non-Hispanic citizens voted, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE

ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2000 3 (2002), and 57% of black citizens voted, id. at 3-4, a 5%
difference.
349. The number of black elected officials in the United States went from 1,469 in 1970
to 8,868 in 1998. Eddie N. Williams & Margaret C. Simms, The Evolution of Black
PoliticalPower, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 2000 91, 94 (2000). In comparison,
prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, in 1965 there were only 280 black elected
officials. Chambliss, supra note 348, at 53.
350. Chambliss, supra note 348, at 54. The latest data she reports for elected officials is
in 1989, when there were 7,226. Id. The 1998 level of 8,868, see supra note 349, while
larger than the 1989 level, does not represent a wholesale change from the 1989 figure.
351. Fiss, supra note 95, at 152.
352. Id. Professor Fiss notes that the increasing election of black officials in some cities
should be considered "the exception, not the rule." Id.
353. In the 2000 election, voter turnout for Hispanic citizens was 45%, while turnout
for Asian and Pacific Islander citizens was 43%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 348,
at 4. In comparison, turnout was 62% for white citizens, id. at 3, and 57% for black
citizens, id. at 3-4. Voter registration rates were as follows: Hispanic: 57.3%; Asian and
Pacific Islander: 52.4%; black: 67.5%; white: 70.4%. Id. at 6 tbl.B ("Reported Voting
and Registration by Selected Characteristics: November 2000"). Combining the effect of
voter turnout and voter registration, "the voting rate for Asians and Pacific Islanders was
while for Hispanics, [this proportion was] 28
25 percent of the voting-age population ....
percent." Id. at 2-3.
354. Based on 2000 census data, 41% of U.S. Asian and Pacific Islander residents are
not citizens and 39% of Hispanics are not citizens. Id.at 2. In comparison, only 2% of
whites and 6% of Blacks are not citizens. Id.
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significant as or more significant than in the case of African
Americans. Latino and Asian communities may also be less able to
participate in local government zoning decisions due to language
barriers. 5
In sum, minority and poor communities are less likely to have
effective voting power and less able to participate effectively in land
use planning and zoning decisions than other communities, thus
lessening the likelihood that their preferences are equally met.
Existing evidence supports this theory. In a study of thirty-one
census tracts in seven cities,356 Professor Craig Anthony Arnold found
that "low-income, minority communities have a greater share ... of
industrial and commercial zoning, than do high-income white
'
communities."357
He observed that industrial uses were frequently
permitted near residential homes in low-income communities of
color, "creating the very sort of incompatibility of uses that zoning is
'
designed to prevent."358
Commercial uses were "also located in
greater concentrations in low-income, high-minority neighborhoods
'
than in high-income, low-minority neighborhoods."359
Many of these
"commercial" uses were industrial in character, including vehicle
storage yards, warehousing, machine shops, drilling, and the like.3"
While these differences in zoning could have been caused by differing
preferences,361 Professor Arnold also notes a wide variety of other
factors that are not related to community preferences: "intentional
discrimination by government decision makers, institutional
355. See Reich, supra note 144, at 277.
356. Craig Anthony Arnold, PlanningMilagros: EnvironmentalJustice and Land Use

Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 76-86 (1998).
357. Id. at 77.
358. Id. at 81.
359. Id. at 82.
360. Id. Professor Arnold's description of various "commercial" districts is compelling:
[In Wichita,] limited and general manufacturing, vehicle storage yards,
warehousing, welding and machine shops, and vehicle repair uses are allowed by

right, and solid waste incinerators, mining and quarrying, rock crushing, and oil
and gas drilling are conditional uses. In about 30% of [a] San Antonio tract ...
permitted uses include electro-plating, brewery, chicken hatcheries, poultry
slaughter and storage, machine shop, and certain kinds of manufacturing ....

Santa Ana's General Commercial (C2) districts may contain automotive garages,
blueprinting and photo-engraving businesses, metal shops, automotive
equipment wholesalers, research laboratories, farm products wholesalers, and
tire recapping businesses ....

Id. He notes that "[t]hese 'commercial' land uses may involve storage and processing of
hazardous or toxic materials, generation of large amounts of waste, emission of fumes,
odors, and air-borne particulates, and imposition of large unsightly structures on local
neighborhoods." Id.
361. Id. at 87.
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discrimination embedded in the land use regulatory system, market
forces ...lack of political power or resources, or most likely some
complex and variable combination of many or all of these."362
Another limitation on the ability of zoning to meet community
preferences, particularly in the context of siting the most
controversial LULUs, is state laws that authorize overriding local
zoning. As discussed above, such overrides are common in the case
of hazardous waste facilities, power plants, and prisons.363 Where
local decisions are overridden, they obviously will not meet local
While there may be very good reasons for state
preferences.
3
"
it
is clear that they place a limitation on the degree to
overrides,
which we can be assured that zoning will lead to land use distributions
that reflect resident preferences. 3 5 However, state overrides might be
expected to operate equally-while they keep land use siting from
meeting community preferences, in theory they affect all communities
3 66
equally.
The zoning process is also limited in its ability to respond to
changing preferences. If an area would like to limit the range of
permitted uses, generally to less intensive uses, then it faces a number
of potential obstacles. Landowners with existing commercial and
industrial uses are likely to have considerable political power in
resisting atterapts to change zoning. 367 Where changes occur, the
owners affected by the change, whose land uses suddenly become
"nonconforming uses" under the new zoning ordinance,3 6s have
powerful political 369 and legal interests.370 The ordinances generally

362. Id. at 87-88.
363. See supra notes 296-300 and accompanying text (discussing state override
provisions in the context of objective siting criteria).
364. Some vital but noxious land uses may be virtually impossible to site without
overriding local preferences.
365. See Arnold, supra note 356, at 130-32 (discussing role of state override provisions
in muting the influence of local opposition to siting decisions).
366. This more equitable outcome assumes that state override authority is exercised
more fairly than local authority. See Tessa Meyer Santiago, Note, An Ounce of
Preemption is Worth a Pound of Cure: State Preemption of Local Siting Authority as a
Means for Achieving Environmental Equity, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 76 (2002) (suggesting

the creation of state regulatory boards with final approval authority over all land use
decisions having environmentally significant consequences as a mechanism for overcoming
local discrimination).
367. See Arnold, supra note 356, at 130-38.
368. See SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 154 (defining "nonconforming
uses").

369. As the drafters of the American Law Institute's Model Land Development Code
noted, "local governments have been reluctant to exert strong pressure on nonconforming
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grandfather, rather than eliminate, the nonconforming uses.37 ' The
ordinances do, however, often prohibit changes in the nature or
purpose of the use,372 limit reconstruction or expansion,37 3 or, if the
nonconforming use is abandoned, prohibit its resumption.3 74 Some
states allow the nonconforming uses to be eliminated over time
through amortization provisions that provide a term of years
sufficient for the owner to recoup its investment,37 5 but these
provisions have not been upheld everywhere3 76 and are often limited

uses," particularly where the use is generating local employment and tax income. Id. at
158.
370. See YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 6.02, at 485-86 (observing that the early
drafters of zoning ordinances, "for legal and political reasons, avoided a frontal attack on
nonconforming uses," and that this pattern has continued); id. § 6.06 (same).
371. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 5.68; SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335,
at 154. Zoning ordinances rarely apply retroactively, see id. at 154, and some states
prohibit municipalities from applying them retroactively. Id. Court decisions on the
permissibility of retroactively prohibiting certain uses vary, with some courts holding that
permitted uses can be changed retroactively and others holding that such retroactivity runs
afoul of the takings clause. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, at 195-96; see also SALSICH
& TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 154 (describing case in which retroactive application was
held to violate a takings clause).
372. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 5.69, at 196; SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra
note 335, at 156.
373. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 5.70, at 198-99; SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra
note 335, at 155-56. For example, when the city of East Austin "downzoned" parcels from
industrial to commercial or residential uses, the objectionable existing uses were not shut
down, but were simply prohibited from expanding or changing to new industrial uses.
Arnold, supra note 356, at 100-01.
Ironically, the limitation on reconstruction often functions to degrade the land
use. If an owner cannot remodel a building to serve current needs, he or she may stop
maintaining the building entirely. See Kelly, supra note 336, at 263. Then, the
nonconforming use is not only nonconforming, but dilapidated and a blight to the
community. See YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 6.35, at 597-98.
374. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 5.71, at 199-200; YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note
311, § 6.65, at 676-82.
375. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 5.72, at 201-02; YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note
311, § 6.71, at 697. Not surprisingly, the larger the investment, the longer the amortization
period. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 5.72, at 201; see also SALSICH & TRYNIECKI,
supra note 335, at 157-58 (describing various factors affecting the length of amortization
provisions). Most modern amortization periods range between one and five years.
SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 158. Salsich and Tryniecki suggest that the
period is not intended to provide compensation, but simply to provide notice for the
owner to come into compliance. Id. at 157.
376. Some states have found the elimination of nonconforming uses, even with an
amortization provision, to be an unconstitutional taking under state law.
See
MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 5.72, at 201. For example, see Pennsylvania Northwestern
Distributing, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board, 584 A.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Pa. 1991). Most
courts have, however, upheld amortization provisions if the period is reasonable and
reflects a reasonable balance between the owner's property rights and the pubic interest to
be served by the ordinance. See SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 157-58.
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in scope."' While property owners have a legitimate interest in being

able to continue existing uses, it must be acknowledged that the
nonconforming use doctrine impedes a community's capacity to

respond to changing preferences, and thus decreases the likelihood
that current preferences are met.378
Attempts to make zoning more protective encounter obstacles in
addition to the nonconforming use doctrine. While most courts give
considerable deference to legislative zoning changes, 3 79 others allow
such changes only if certain criteria can be met, often to the detriment
of a community attempting to improve its environment.8 0 In
addition, if the zoning change is directed narrowly to one or a few
38
facilities, the effort risks challenge as impermissible "spot zoning. '
Furthermore,

while

a

devaluation

of property

values

as

a

consequence of zoning is not generally considered sufficient to
constitute an unconstitutional taking,382 in some states a significant
devaluation of property could lead to a successful takings challenge or
be struck down as an unreasonable exercise of the police power.383
The foregoing discussion addresses why the current land use

planning and zoning process faces limits in responding to current
preferences and in doing so equally. In order to understand the role
of zoning in meeting current resident preferences, one must also
377. One commentator has noted that amortization provisions tend to be applied to a
limited range of uses, such as relatively insubstantial structures like signs, and relatively
land-intensive uses such as junkyards. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 5.72, at 201.
378. Cf.YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 6.02, at 484-85 (observing that protection
for nonconforming uses has prevented zoning from accomplishing its goal of properly
separating incompatible land uses); Arnold, supra note 356, at 129-30 (noting limitations
on effectiveness of rezoning to impact current land uses in light of nonconforming use
doctrine, but arguing that rezoning is useful as a long term strategy).
379. Arnold, supra note 356, at 110.
380. See id. In some states, a zoning change is permissible only if the municipality can
demonstrate that there has been "a substantial change in the character of the
neighborhood ...or a mistake in the existing zoning." Id. at 111; see also SALSICH &
TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 199 (discussing "change or mistake" rule). In other words,
if the land uses have become more desirable in an area, that change in circumstances can
be reflected in more protective zoning. A community that wants to change land uses
simply due to changing preferences would not, however, meet these criteria. In fact, the
worse the circumstances for the neighborhood, the less likely it is for the decision-makers
to be able to show "changed conditions" justifying the change in zoning. Arnold, supra
note 356, at 110-11.
381. Id. at 111-12; see also SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 197-98
(describing spot zoning).
382. See SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 200; YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note
311, § 3.26, at 157-60.
383. SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 200;, YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311,
at § 3.26.

1114

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

consider the legacy upon which present efforts build.

[Vol. 81
Historically,

zoning has not functioned in an equitable fashion, and has failed to
ensure that community preferences have been equally met.
Zoning did not become common until the 1920s. 384

Although

common in the 1920s and 30s, its impact became more significant
during the period of expansive construction after World War 11.385 By
this time, however, industrial areas already existed in most large
cities. 386 Local zoning ordinances did not eliminate existing uses, even
if they were incompatible with the planned zoning designation. 387
While the hope was that these nonconforming uses would disappear,
that did not occur.388 The primary effect of the ordinances was to

keep new industry out of new residential areas (particularly suburbs);
the ordinances did nothing about existing industry concentrations in
older residential areas. These concentrations did not necessarily
reflect community preferences, but the private market factors that
had led to their original placement.
The juxtaposition of industrial and residential uses is not simply a
happenstance of history, however, nor is the inequitable distribution

of such juxtapositions. Some of the earliest zoning provisions were
expressly designed to create racial segregation. 389 Even after racial

zoning was ruled unconstitutional in 1917,390 many municipalities

384. Zoning did not become a common technique until after publication of the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act in 1922 and 1926. See Kelly, supra note 336, at 252.
Localities were also more comfortable enacting zoning after 1926, when the United States
Supreme Court declared it constitutional in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926). Id.
385. See id.
386. Cf. YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 6.02, at 484 (noting that zoning ordinances
were not enacted until half a century after major rural to urban migration).
387. See id. at 484-85.
388. Id. at 485.
389. See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 41 (1993) (describing blackwhite segregation law passed in Baltimore in 1910, segregation laws passed in numerous
Virginia cities between 1911 and 1913, and additional segregation laws passed in North
Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Louisiana cities between 19131916); Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective
Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REv. 739, 744-45 (1993)
(describing segregation zoning ordinances in southern and border cities enacted at the
beginning of the Twentieth Century).
390. The Supreme Court invalidated racial zoning in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,
82 (1917). The basis for the Court's decision was not the denial of equal protection, id. at
81, but the zoning restriction's unconstitutional interference with the owners' property
rights: the owners' rights to transact property with the buyer and seller of their choice,
regardless of color. Id. at 81-82; see Dubin, supra note 389, at 745-46.
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persisted in enacting explicit or implicit racial zoning.39' Segregation
did not result in "separate but equal" zoning for communities of
color; zoning was often less protective for minority neighborhoods.392
In particular, some communities of color have been subject to
"expulsive zoning," defined as "the practice of superimposing
incompatible zoning ...

through lower-grade zoning or zoning

authorizing noxious commercial or industrial uses which undermine
the quality of the residential environment and discourage continued
'
Such zoning is termed "expulsive" because it was
residencies."393
expected to prompt existing residents to leave.394 While many black

residents were displaced by industrial zoning, many remained in the
now-industrial areas, surrounded by incompatible and undesirable
land uses.395

As discussed further below, there are many reasons,

independent of a preference for LULUs, that might have kept poor
and minority residents in place, such as poverty and housing

391. See Dubin, supra note 389, at 749-50. Professor Dubin discusses post-Buchanan
racial zoning in Texas generally, where the state explicitly authorized local racial zoning,
id. at 750 n.47, and in selected Texas, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Florida, and Alabama
cities. Id. (discussing Texas, North Carolina, and Oklahoma); id. at 750 n.49 (discussing
Florida, Alabama, and Texas); see also Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable
Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP
101, 106-07 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989) (describing post-Buchanan
racial zoning in New Orleans, Norfolk, Dallas, Indianapolis, Winston-Salem, Dade
County, Florida, and Birmingham).
392. See Dubin, supra note 389, at 759 (observing that " 'separate' has also meant
'unequal' in the land use area"). Professor Dubin observes that many of the land use
techniques leading to segregation, both explicit and implicit, have been accompanied by
inequality in living conditions. Id. at 758-64; see also supra notes 341-46 (discussing
evidence that existing zoning is less protective of low-income, high-minority communities
than of high-income, low-minority communities). Examples abound. In East Austin,
Texas, the city explicitly planned a "Negro District" that would combine industrial uses
and African-American housing. Arnold, supra note 356, at 99. In Charlotte, North
Carolina, the judge in a school desegregation case observed that almost all of the
industrial land use in the city was located in the black community. Dubin, supra note 389,
at 763 (discussing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1365
(W.D.N.C. 1969)). In Cocoa, Florida, the town's historic African-American community
had been subject to incompatible zoning for decades, with various noxious commercial
uses such as auto body shops and junkyards permitted within the neighborhood. See id. at
771, 789 (describing historic information included in community's complaint against the
city in litigation over the city's new land use plans).
393. See Dubin, supra note 389, at 742, 762 (discussing Professor Yale Rabin's theory
of expulsive zoning); see also COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 69, 73 (same); Collin,
supra note 322, at 509 (same).
394. See Rabin, supra note 391, at 101-02.
395. See id. at 119 (indicating that the "mixed-use conditions, so common in lowincome black neighborhoods," suggests that expulsive zoning has been widespread, and
implying that the result of expulsive zoning is to create such mixed-use areas).
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discrimination.39 6 In any case, zoning whose purpose was "expulsive"
presents the antithesis of zoning designed to meet community
preferences.
Local municipalities' tendency to "overzone" for industrial uses
in the hopes of increased revenue could also have been-and
continue to be-a factor in the lesser protections afforded lowincome or minority communities. In a twelve-city study of expulsive
zoning conducted by Yale Rabin, he found that, where insufficient
vacant land existed for the desired industrial designations, such
zoning was often applied to existing black residential areas.397 Where
local governments have been pressured to provide affordable
housing, they have sometimes done so by zoning such areas in the
middle of industrial tracts.398

Low-income neighborhoods have also received less zoning
protection than wealthier neighborhoods, in part because they have
served as buffers between the more highly valued single-family
residences and industrial or commercial development.399
As
Professor Arnold states:
Buffer zones are perhaps one of the major reasons why lowincome and minority neighborhoods have so much industrial
and commercial zoning: the multi-family housing, where
many low-income and minority people live, is purposefully
placed near the industrial and commercial uses to create a
buffer that protects high-income, white, single-family
neighborhoods. 0°
Viewed historically, zoning has therefore clearly failed to meet
community preferences equally. The doctrine of nonconforming uses,
discussed above, makes it very difficult to undo this legacy of
discriminatory zoning. Other legal and political obstacles to rezoning
would likewise impede the ability to overcome the legacy of
discriminatory zoning.4 1 History has a strong effect on the present.
The foregoing discussion of the zoning process is intended solely
to determine whether zoning can be relied upon to meet community
396. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing impediments to housing
mobility for the poor and people of color); infra note 499 and accompanying text (same).
397. Dubin, supranote 389, at 763 (discussing Rabin study).
398. See id. at 764 (describing New Jersey municipality's zoning of land for affordable
housing in an industrial area in response to a court-ordered requirement that the
municipality eliminate zoning that effectively excludes the poor ("exclusionary zoning")
and include zones in which affordable housing would be permissible).
399. Arnold, supra note 356, at 119.
400. Id.
401. See supra notes 367-83 and accompanying text (discussing obstacles to rezoning).
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preferences equally, an analysis that is necessary in light of the
difficulty of gathering direct empirical evidence about the degree to
which preferences are equally satisfied. The ultimate legitimacy and
operation of zoning ordinances are not at issue here. For our
purposes, the critical point is that zoning has not led to distributions
of land uses that meet the dictates of the community preferences
model.
2. Political Forces Affecting Particular Siting Decisions
The political process is important not only in the formation of
zoning ordinances, but also in the placement of individual facilities.
Where public entities are responsible for siting a LULU, such as a
utility, landfill, homeless shelter, or jail, the siting process will
generally involve a facility-specific decision-making process. The
outcome will be determined not only by objective siting criteria,
regulatory requirements, and zoning provisions, but by a political
choice about where to locate the facility in question.
Even where siting decisions are in the hands of private parties, as
is frequently the case for industrial uses and some social service
entities, facility-specific discretionary approvals required under local
zoning afford a role for local political decision-making. There are two
relevant types of permits: conditional use permits for certain types of
land uses in certain zones, and variances, which grant an exception to
the usual ordinance provisions. In addition, where a project is
inconsistent with existing zoning, proponents may seek to amend the
zoning ordinance.
Typically, lists of land uses permitted in different zoning districts
are divided into "permitted" and "conditional" uses."° "Permitted"
uses may be constructed " 'as of right' " within the zoning district

without the need for any discretionary local approval of the use
itself.4"3 For example, single-family homes are typically permitted, asof-right, uses in a residential zone.
"Conditional" or "special" uses, however, are listed as permitted
in the zone, but are not "as of right." Instead, they require
discretionary approval by the local agency to determine if the use is
acceptable at the specific location where it is proposed and to
determine whether it meets certain criteria. 4 For example, an area
402. See SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 335, at 207.
403. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 6.39, at 249.
404. See id, § 6.54, at 264; see also YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 21.01, at 691-94
(describing special permits).
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could be designated for residential single-family use, but may allow
hospitals so long as the hospital applies for and receives a "specialuse" permit.
Nonetheless, considerable discretion may exist. For conditional
use permits, local government discretion varies by the degree of
flexibility given in the authorizing statute and the apparent
willingness of courts to grant local governments more or less

discretion.4"5 But even in those cases where the local government is
required to grant the permit if stated criteria are met,40 6 thus

appearing to leave relatively little discretion, the generality of the
requirements, such as whether the conditional use is "compatible"
with "the surrounding area," nonetheless provides significant room
for the government's discretionary judgment. 47 Thus, the conditional
use approval process often provides a considerable role for local
political judgments.
Variances allow exceptions to normal zoning provisions when the
normal zoning provisions will create a hardship or practical
difficulties.408 Typically, "area variances" allow exceptions to normal
height, bulk, site area, and setback standards.4 9 Many (but not all)
states permit "use variances," which may allow uses normally not
permitted in a zoning district.410
If the proposed use is incompatible with existing zoning, a zoning
ordinance amendment may be requested. As one commentator has
stated, "In no other area of American administrative law are requests
405. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 6.57, at 266-68 (describing cases in which
local governments have been given relatively little discretion); id. § 6.58, at 268 (describing
cases in which local governments have been given somewhat more discretion).
406. See YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 21.19, at 779-80 (stating that permits must
be granted if they meet the criteria in the ordinance).
407. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 6.57, at 267; see also NIMBY PRIMER, supra
note 261, at 39-40 (observing that permits are usually granted if the use is " 'in harmony
with the appearance and the orderly development of the district ...and not ...
detrimental to the orderly development of adjacent districts' " (citing Doe v. City of
Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 317 (3d Cir. 1989))). The degree to which community preferences
themselves can be an explicit factor in the local government's decision is a complex
question discussed below. See infra notes 418-27 and accompanying text.
408. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 6.41, at 250.
409. See id. § 6.42, at 251; YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 20.07, at 426-27.
410. See MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 6.42, at 251 (discussing use variances); id.
§ 6.43, at 252-53 (discussing minority approach prohibiting use variances); YOUNG, 4TH
ED., supra note 311, § 20.06, at 424-25 (defining use variances). Some courts have held
that changes in use should be made through an amendment to the zoning ordinance, a
legislative process, rather than through a use variance, an administrative process.
MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 6.43, at 252; YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 20.73, at
660-64.
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for amendments to the law so frequent that there are specific
application forms ... ."411 Use variances are likely to provide a role
for the political process if the proposed use is not consistent with
existing zoning. Where a zoning amendment is at issue, local officials
have broad discretion in exercising this legislative function,112 a
function that has been described as more "politically charged" than
requests for special permits or variances.413
Given the political nature of these decisions, the issues, for the
purposes of this Article, are the extent to which the political processes
associated with individual siting decisions have reflected-and
continue to reflect-community preferences, and the extent to which
these political processes reflect preferences equally.
While the amount of political leeway in individualized siting or
permitting decisions is likely to be more limited than in the more
clearly political context of zoning,4 14 the existence of political
discretion inhering in many of the site-specific decisions described
above suggests that community preferences are likely to play a role.
The political pressures facing zoning boards or local legislators are
likely to be similar to those confronted in the zoning context. 15
Theoretically, publicly elected officials desire reelection and should
therefore be responsive to community preferences.416 To the extent
that an agency, and not an elected official, is making a siting decision,
as may be the case where the government is responsible for siting a
public facility, the agency may not be as responsive to public
sentiment because it does not have the same electoral fears.
Nonetheless, agencies, and the public officials within them, are
subject to political forces. Agency decisions are likely to be affected
411. Kelly, supra note 336, at 258.
412. Id. For an example of a local decision to grant a zoning amendment request, see
R.IS.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144,1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd mem., 977 F.2d 573

(4th Cir. 1992), in which a municipal authority had changed local zoning from agricultural
to industrial to place a solid waste landfill in an African-American neighborhood. See also
Reich, supra note 144, at 274 (describing decision by predominately white parish council
to rezone a single-family residential district in an African-American town to heavy

industrial use to accommodate a rayon and polyvinyl chloride plant).
413. NIMBY PRIMER, supra note 261, at 37-38.

414. The degree of discretion varies, as suggested above. Local legislative bodies are
likely to have more discretion in responding to requests for zoning amendments than
administrative bodies, who administer statutes, are likely to have in responding to requests
for special use permits, variances, or various other types of permits.
415. See supra notes 339-55 and accompanying text.
416. See NIMBY PRIMER, supra note 261, at 46 (observing, in the context of local
decisions on special use permits, variances, or zoning amendments, that "pressure to
oppose the facility can be very persuasive to officials who know they must rely on the
community to be re-elected").
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by anticipated reactions from higher executive officials (who are

subject to electoral pressure), from the legislative bodies that fund the
agencies, from the electorate itself, and from those affected by agency
action.4 17

Thus, public agencies could also be expected to be

somewhat responsive to community preferences.
Where the decision in question affects a private developer, as is

often the case where conditional use permits, variance requests, or
zoning amendments are sought, the courts have established limits on
the role of community preferences in order to protect the rights of the
property owners whose development is affected.4

18

Decision-makers

generally cannot ground their decisions in the existence of community
opposition in and of itself. 419

As one court has stated, 42"° 'public

clamor' "is"not an adequate legal basis for... [a] decision.

Decision-makers are, however, permitted to consider community
input when it raises valid concerns that provide a rational basis for a

decision-maker's denial of a developer's request.

Community

preferences predicated on legitimate state concerns like traffic

congestion, crime, noise, or safety are entitled to consideration and
could provide a lawful basis for governmental action.42 1 As one court
417. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1027,1065-66 (1990); cf. DOUGLAS YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE
SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 66, 68, 69
(1982) (describing bureaucracies as their own "political interest groups" that will, among
other activities, lobby Congress to pursue their interests).
418. In this Section, I discuss the legal status of decisions informally based on
community preferences. For a discussion of the legal status of formal community
preference criteria, see supra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
419. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of St. Louis, Inc. v. City of Maryland Heights, 747
F. Supp. 1340, 1349 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (arguing that public opposition does not provide a
defensible basis for denying the renewal of a landfill's operating permit); McCollum v.
City of Powder Springs, 720 F. Supp. 985, 989-90 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (invalidating local policy
of denying liquor licenses when nearby residents object); Ross v. City of Yorba Linda, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 638, 644-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a city could not deny a request
to rezone a parcel based upon the mere fact of community opposition); Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Planning Bd.of the Town of Clifton Park, 687 N.Y.S.2d 794,
795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that denial of a special use permit for a church was
arbitrary and capricious because "generalized community objection, without more, is an
improper basis for denial of a special use permit"); Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756
P.2d 704, 711-12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that public opposition itself was not an
adequate basis for denying a conditional use permit for a substance abuse facility). See
generally YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 21.19, at 783 (stating, with respect to special
permits, that "[t]he generalized objections of neighbors are insufficient to support a denial
of permit"); id. § 21.28 (stating that community opposition, in and of itself, is not an
appropriate basis for denying a special use permit).
420. Davis County, 756 P.2d at 712.
421. See, e.g., Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 500-01 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that local decision-makers could have relied solely on community
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has stated: "We decline to equate the accommodation of legitimate
community concerns to a victory of mob rule .... ,,42

On the other

hand, if community preferences against a facility are not predicated
on legitimate state concerns and appear to be motivated by improper
motives, such as fear, bias, or bad faith, then a decision denying a
permit would be deemed unconstitutional.4 23

Although willing, in principle, to accept legitimate community
concerns as a rational basis for government decision-making, some
courts have created a high standard for proving the existence of such
concerns. Particularly where administrative decisions are at issue,
such as the decision on whether or not to grant a special use permit,4 4
courts have been unwilling to accept neighborhood "opinion" and
have instead required some sort of expert testimony or investigation
to support the contention in question. 425 As one court has stated:
opposition to deny a special use permit for a convenience store since that opposition was
rooted in legitimate state interests such as traffic and safety); Corn v. City of Lauderdale
Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that local decision-makers can
legitimately deny a permit to build a mini-warehouse based on citizen concerns that were
"fact-based ... [and] rationally related to legitimate general welfare concerns"); Midnight
Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 685 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that it is
valid for a city to consider nearby residents' legitimate concerns in deciding whether to
issue a dance hall license); City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc. 916 S.W.2d
95, 101 (Ark. 1996) (holding that the reasonable opinions of local residents about the
traffic, noise, and property value impacts of rezoning for mobile home use provide a
rational basis for a city's decision-making).
422. Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 685.
423. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(holding that community sentiment against a home for the mentally retarded was not
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest where based on "negative
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning
proceeding"); see also Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 685 (observing that government
decisions based on community sentiment could violate the developer's due process rights
if motivated by "the public's negative attitudes or biases, unfounded fears or speculation,
prejudice, self-interest, or ignorance").
424. Some courts differentiate their standard of review depending upon whether a
legislative action, such as a request for rezoning, or an adjudicative action, such as a ruling
on a conditional use permit, is at issue. These courts provide a presumption of validity to
legislative actions but review adjudications to determine whether they are supported by
substantial evidence. See Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. W. Jordan City, 2000 UT
App. 49, P16, 999 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). The stricter evidentiary
standards, discussed infra notes 425-26, appear to arise in connection with adjudicative
decisions.
425. See, e.g., Chanhassen Estates Residents Assoc. v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d
335, 340 (Minn. 1984) (en banc) (finding that the city improperly denied conditional use
permit for drive-in McDonalds because non-specific testimony about traffic hazards was
insufficient to rebut city engineer's contrary testimony); Retail Prop. Trust v. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 722 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(ruling that town's denial of a special use permit for a department store was arbitrary and
capricious because "[t]he generalized complaints of the residents as to ... increased traffic,
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"denial of a conditional use must be based on something more
concrete than neighborhood opposition and expressions of concern
for public safety and welfare. 4 26 Not all states apply such high
standards, however; others have made clear that, even where
administrative decisions are at issue, public testimony will be
considered credible without the need for expert validation.4 7
Thus, legally speaking, community preferences can have some,
but not unlimited, impact. A community's simple opposition to a
facility, in and of itself, will not provide a legitimate basis for a
government decision not to take action necessary to development.
Community preferences cannot, per se, govern individualized political
decisions. However, a decision that reflects legitimate community
concerns is defensible. Preferences articulated in such terms have at
least the potential to be influential, although the standards for their
acceptability may vary by jurisdiction and by whether the government
action is legislative or administrative.
Assuming, then, that community preferences based upon
accepted factors can have influence, the question is whether
communities are equally effective in having their preferences
reflected in individualized decisions. One confronts here many of the
issues that arise in connection with the political process associated

and the summary criticisms of the experts who testified on behalf of [a neighboring town],
were uncorroborated by any empirical data, and thus, insufficient to counter various
expert opinions"), rev'd, 774 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2002), remanded to 753 N.Y.S.2d 527 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003); Wadsworth, 2000 UT App at P18-19, 999 P.2d at 1244 (holding that city's
denial of conditional use permit for outdoor storage of heavy industrial equipment based
on neighbors' concern that it would be a nuisance lacked substantial evidence because the
staff did not undertake an investigation of the public's concerns); Davis County, 756 P.2d
at 711-12 (concluding that Planning Commission decision to deny a conditional use permit
to a residential treatment facility lacked a rational basis because community assertions,
such as concerns about property values, were not supported by studies or provided by
experts such as real estate appraisers).
426. Chanhassen Estates Residents Assoc., 342 N.W.2d at 340.
427. See, e.g., Prince v. County Comm'n of Franklin County, 769 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989) (stating, in connection with a conditional use permit for a farm equipment
retailer, that "[t]estimony of property owners regarding the value of their property and the
effect of administrative action upon that property is competent opinion evidence"). The
issues also arise in administrative settings. Professors Gillette and Krier observe that
agencies can make decisions " 'in the public interest' only if all the various interest groups
are indeed able to voice their wants effectively." Gillette & Krier, supra note 417, at 1067.
If "some groups enjoy a comparative advantage in catering to administrative needs and
desires ... ," then agency attention can be diverted from the public interest. Id. Although
Gillette and Krier focus specifically on agency capture by the regulated community at the
public's expense, the arguments are equally applicable to differing access opportunities
within the public sphere.
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with zoning ordinances.4 28 All of the weaknesses of the political
process generally manifest themselves in these individual decisions.42 9
Many in the environmental justice movement have implied that poor
and minority communities may have difficulty organizing to have
their preferences heard, and that the preferences of politically

powerful groups are listened to while the preferences of poor,
minority and relatively powerless neighborhoods are not.43° In fact,

many argue that the opposition of politically influential communities
428. See supra notes 339-55 and accompanying text. The issues also arise in
administrative settings. Professors Gillette and Krier observe that agencies can make
decisions " 'in the public interest' only if all the various interest groups are indeed able to
voice their wants effectively." Gillette & Krier, supra note 417, at 1067. If "some groups
enjoy a comparative advantage in catering to administrative needs and desires", then
agency attention can be diverted from the public interest. Id. Although Gillette and Krier
focus specifically on agency capture by the regulated community at the public's expense,
the arguments are equally applicable to differing access opportunities within the public
sphere.
429. For example, in considering the issuance of use variances, studies have found
"substantial abuses." MANDELKER, supra note 311, § 6.43, at 252. In many cases, they are
not required to be consistent with a comprehensive plan. See id. § 6.49, at 259. Thus, a
community, especially one with little political power, could find that an undesirable use
had been approved even though it was not listed as a permitted or conditional use in the
zoning district.
430. See, e.g., Anthony R. Chase, Assessing and Addressing Problems Posed by
Environmental Racism, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 335, 346 (1993) (arguing that minorities' lack
of political power may be one cause of disproportionate burdens); Cole, Empowerment as
the Key, supra note 163, at 628 (same); Gauna, Obstaclesand Incentives, supra note 11, at
32-33 (same); Godsil, supra note 284, at 399 (same); Lazarus, supra note 100, at 806-11
(same); Pastor et al., supra note 276, at 3 (observing argument that hazardous facilities are
located in minority communities because of their lack of political power, which is itself
rooted in a lack of "social capital and community efficacy").
In a study of requests for zoning changes from residential use to commercial use in
San Antonio, Texas, the "Anglo-dominated Zoning Commission" granted requests much
more often in low-income Latino neighborhoods than in other areas of the city. See
Dubin, supra note 389, at 778 (describing study by Professor Charles L. Cotrell). The
Latino neighborhoods were thus less likely to be protected from shifts to more intensive
zoning. Id. While this could conceivably have been a function of the neighborhoods'
preferences for more intensive zoning, less benign explanations are also possible.
A study of siting decisions for toxic facilities in Los Angeles suggests that minority
communities in ethnic transition may be particularly vulnerable. The degree of "ethnic
churning"-the transition from, for example, an African American to a Latino
population-proved to be a significant factor in predicting facility siting. Pastor et al.,
supra note 276, at 10-11, 15. One explanation for this result is that the ties necessary for
effective social organization in opposition to a proposed siting are more likely to form in
homogeneous communities and less likely to form in mixed communities, like those
undergoing ethnic transition. Id. at 10, 12.
In a study of commercial hazardous waste facilities' decisions to expand capacity
(a decision made more frequently than siting decisions), Professor James Hamilton found
that facilities were more likely to expand in communities that had lower indicators of
political power, including lower rates of voter participation. See Hamilton, supra note 317,
at 118, 129.
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has driven LULUs to poor and minority communities. 43 1

As

Professor Robert Bullard has called it, the NIMBY attitudes of the
wealthy may have resulted in "PIBBY"-Place in Black's
BackYards.432 Under this scenario, LULUs are concentrated in poor
and minority neighborhoods not because these neighborhoods want
them, but because more influential neighborhoods have been more

effective in having their preferences acknowledged.
The argument should not be overstated.

At times, poor or

minority communities have been successful in articulating their
preferences against a facility in a manner that ultimately prevails. 433
And it is likely that the preferences of wealthy and influential
communities are not always heeded. But the discussion here focuses
on whether, generally speaking, we can be assured that all
communities have an equal voice in the political process that doles
out unwanted land uses.

As with zoning ordinances, the existing distribution is a
consequence not only of siting decisions being made now, but of past
431. See, e.g., GAY, supra note 257, at 23 (describing shift in site for medical incinerator
from suburban community to poor urban neighborhood); Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters:
The Quest for EnvironmentalJustice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 728 (1993) (noting success of
white affluent communities in shifting undesirable sitings to low-income minority
communities); Gauna, Obstacles and Incentives, supra note 11, at 31-32 (stating that
unwanted land uses are shifted to communities that lack resources to resist them).
432. ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 4-5 (1990). But see Been & Gupta, supra note 163, at 33 (arguing that
hazardous waste siting decisions between 1970 and 1990 did not reflect the "PIBBY"
phenomenon because sitings were not more likely to occur in African-American
neighborhoods than others); Gerrard, Victims of NIMBY, supra note 263, at 514-16
(arguing that, in recent waste disposal facility sitings, there is little evidence of NIMBY).
433. Note, however, that this success may rest on the ability to raise successful legal
challenges to the siting in question rather than on the ability to have enough political
power to see preferences realized. For example, in Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v.
County of Kings, a community group successfully challenged a county's permit approval
for a proposed toxic waste incinerator based on the county's failure to translate documents
into Spanish, the language spoken by the neighboring community. 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357, 20,358 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991); see Cole, Environmental
Justice Litigation, supra note 305, at 528-30. The county subsequently decided not to
locate the incinerator in Kings County. Catherine Verhoff, Environmental Racism: Why
Communities of Color Lose in Environmental Politics, 1 ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 26, 29 (1994).
In Chester Residents Concernedfor Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
granted,524 U.S. 915 (1998), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998), the community argued
that the state agency violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by issuing a permit to a soil
remediation facility. Id. at 927. The Third Circuit upheld the right of the community
group to bring a private right of action against the state agency. During the litigation, the
company decided not to build the facility in Chester. (Subsequently, the court's ruling was
effectively overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 293 (2001), which held that there is no private right of action to enforce Title VI
regulations prohibiting disparate impacts.)
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siting decisions. Even if we did not currently witness disparities in
treatment, the question is whether the distributional legacy we have
received meets community preferences equally. Given the pervasive
racism in this country's history, the political component of
individualized siting decisions in the past likely concentrated
undesirable land uses in minority rather than majority areas.434

Individual siting decisions do not necessarily respond to community
preferences, and to the extent that they do respond, they do not
necessarily do so equally. The politics of siting are unlikely to lead to
distributions that meet the dictates of the community preferences
model.
E. Do Public ParticipationProvisionsSatisfy Community
Preferences Equally?
So far, the discussion has considered the impact that objective
factors and political processes have on matching LULUs to
community preferences. While these features of the siting process
may, overall, result in disparities in the degree to which community
preferences are met, one might argue that siting procedures that
explicitly include requirements for public participation would do a
better job at meeting preferences equitably.
Where the LULU proponent is a public entity, like a county for a
landfill or a city for a homeless shelter, the government entity is likely
to be governed by a local or state decision-making process that
includes provisions for community participation.435 If the federal
government is siting the facility, providing funding, or requiring
permits for a private or local project, then the LULU proponent must
prepare a review of environmental impacts and obtain community
input pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).4 36

In many states, state-initiated, funded, or permitted activities must
also complete a review of environmental impacts and obtain
community input pursuant to state-equivalents of the federal NEPA

434. See supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text (describing history of minority
exclusion from voting and civic participation).
435. See Godsil, supra note 284, at 403-05 (describing public participation in those
states with "super review" procedures for siting hazardous waste facilities); id. at 405-06
(describing public participation in those states taking a "site designation" approach to
hazardous waste siting).
436. NEPA requires that environmental impact statements be "made available ... to
the public." See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (regulations
outlining agency requirements for public involvement).
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statute.437 If the LULU proponent is a private entity, such as a
manufacturer, and the LULU requires permits to operate, the
permitting process is likely to require some form of public
participation. Thus, typical air and water pollution permitting
programs require public participation as part of the permitting
process,43 s as do programs for the permitting of waste facilities.439

Furthermore, local zoning decisions for conditional use permits, use
variances, or zoning amendments are likely to include public
participation elements. 440

Public participation provisions generally provide for public
notice and some opportunity for public involvement.
Notice
requirements vary widely from facility to facility and from state to
state regarding who must be provided notice, how they are to be

notified, and at what stage notice must be sent.441 Some siting
processes involve early notice to a broad range of players; 442 other
437. See Heather E. Ross, Comment, Using NEPA in the Fight for Environmental
Justice, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 353, 369-72 (1994) (observing that twenty-eight
states have enacted NEPA-equivalents for state-sponsored activities).
438. See U.S. EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS:
A REFERENCE GUIDE § 2-3 (2000)
[hereinafter EPA REFERENCE GUIDE] (noting that most federal permitting programs
require a public comment period); see also id. §§ 2-5 to 2-13 (describing public
involvement required under the federal Clean Air Act); id. §§ 2-22 to 2-24 (describing
public involvement required for pollution permits under the federal Clean Water Act).
These requirements apply whether the permitting program is administered by the federal
government or by states who have been delegated permitting authority. Id. § 2-1.
439. See Gerrard, Victims of NIMBY, supra note 263, at 498-99 (observing that
environmental permits requiring citizen participation would be required for such wastehandling LULUs as hazardous waste facilities, municipal solid waste facilities, medical
waste facilities, high-level radioactive waste facilities, and transuranic waste facilities); see
also EPA REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 438, at §§ 2-26 to 2-28 (describing opportunities
for public involvement required under the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, the federal hazardous waste permitting law); Sheila Foster, Public Participation,in
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 185, 190-94, 201-06
[hereinafter Foster, Public Participation] (describing special public involvement
requirements under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and describing
additional state public participation procedures for hazardous waste facility permits).
440. Public hearings are required for zoning approvals and amendments, variances,
conditional use permits, and most other land use approvals. William R. Klein, Building
Consensus, in THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 423, 425 (3d ed.
2000); YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 22.17, at 45.
441. See Foster, Public Participation, supra note 439, at 202-03; see also NIMBY
PRIMER, supra note 261, at 42 (observing that most zoning ordinances require special
permit or variance applicants to notify the surrounding community); YOUNG, 4TH ED.,
supra note 311, § 22.17-21, at 45-62 (describing notice requirements in connection with
land use zoning and permits).
442. For example, Connecticut requires that, once an application for an electricity
generating plant is filed, the proponent must provide notice to local and nearby municipal
decision-makers, "affected community groups," such as conservation organizations, and
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permitting processes involve later and less extensive notice." 3 The

EPA has established minimum notice requirements for state agencies
administering environmental permits that do not require public notice
until the agency has published its draft intent to approve or deny a
permit.44
Once notice is provided, the public is given some opportunity to
participate.
Types of participation include written comments,
informal workshops, public meetings, site visits, or other gatherings to
446
obtain public input. 44 Some agencies also hold formal hearings.
During such hearings, the public is generally permitted a limited time
for comments after the applicant makes an initial presentation. 447

Some of the formal hearing requirements are quite extensive." 8
abutting landowners through direct mail and newspaper notices. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16501(b) (1958 & Supp. 2002).
443. See Foster, Public Participation,supra note 439, at 202-03 (noting that some states
require notice only after a preliminary permit decision is made or a draft permit has been
issued).
444. See EPA REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 438, at § 3. While states are encouraged
to do general outreach, such as legal advertisements, radio announcements, signs, and to
maintain public information depositories, their mailing lists need only include people or
organizations who have asked to be on the list. Id. §§ 3-4 to 3-6. The agency must,
however, inform communities about the list by publishing a notice about it in newspapers
and periodicals. Id. §§ 3-6 to 3-7.
445. Id. §§ 3-4 to 3-6. Hearings are generally held in connection with zoning-related
determinations. See NIMBY PRIMER, supra note 261, at 43 (describing zoning hearing
process).
446. See Foster, Public Participation,supra note 439, at 203-05.
447. See id. at 204-05.
448. For example, both the California Energy Commission and the Connecticut Siting
Council require witnesses to petition for intervenor status in order to have their remarks
considered a part of the formal record. See CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, ENERGY FACILITIES
LICENSING PROCESS: A GUIDE TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (explaining process for
becoming an intervenor in California energy facility siting), available at http://www.energy.
ca.gov/siting/guide-license-process.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Presentation by Roberta Mendonca, Public Advisor, California
Resources Agency, California Energy Commission (Apr. 15, 1999) (same), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/1999-04-15-public_advisor.html
(on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Public Participation Proceedings before the Connecticut
Siting Council, at http://www.ct.gov/csc/cwp/view.asp?a=947&Q=247610&cscPNavCtr=l
#31230 (last visited Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(explaining process for becoming an intervenor in Connecticut energy facility siting
proceedings). The California Energy Commission requires intervenors to serve papers on
other parties, to swear an oath, answer data requests from other parties, submit to crossexamination, and to file and serve post-hearing briefs when necessary. See ENERGY
FACILITIES LICENSING PROCESS:
A GUIDE TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, supra;
Mendonca presentation, supra. The Connecticut Siting Council requires intervenors to
respond to pre-hearing questions, submit to cross-examination, and provide twenty copies
of all filings. See Public Participation Proceedings before the Connecticut Siting Council,
supra.
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Occasionally, public input takes the form of citizen advisory groups.
These typically consist of stakeholders involved in a particular permit
who meet with the agency issuing the permit.449
The widespread presence of community participation provisions
creates the appearance that community views about proposed
facilities play a critical role in facility siting. If that were so, then
facility siting might truly respond to and reflect community
preferences, to the extent possible.
Despite this appearance,
however, public participation provisions are generally not designed to
give the public a substantive role in the decision at hand.
Community preferences must be heard, but most siting
provisions do not require the siting decision-maker, whether it be the
public siting entity or an agency granting a necessary permit, to
respond to the preferences. According to a recent EPA guide for
public involvement, public participation activities should consist of
disseminating, gathering, and exchanging information. 4 0
These
functions would serve to inform the public of the agency's actions and
inform the agency of the public's views, but they do not otherwise
provide a role for public input. Most provisions governing the siting
process and providing for public participation do not tell the decisionmaker what role, if any, community sentiment should play in the
decision, much less require the assent of the community in which the
LULU is to be placed.
Under NEPA, for example, public participation is a critical
aspect of the statute.451 But, NEPA does not impose a duty on the
decision-maker to consider the views of the community, much less the
environmental impacts identified in the environmental review
process.452 So long as the public is allowed to participate, the
decision-maker is free to decide where and how to locate a facility,
without regard to the sentiments expressed in the public participation
process. Where an agency is considering whether to grant a pollution

449. See EPA REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 438, § 4-23; Foster, Public Participation,
supra note 439, at 205-06.
450. See EPA REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 438, §§ 1-1 to 1-2.
451. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000) (requiring that all environmental impact
statements be made available to the public); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (2001) (providing
regulations governing public involvement in the NEPA process).
452. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1066-68 (noting
that NEPA's procedural requirements have not been effective in shaping decision-makers'
substantive decisions); supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of
procedural requirements); see, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,
444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that NEPA imposes only procedural, not
substantive, requirements on decision-makers).
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permit, it is not clear that the environmental statutes, on their own,
give the agency the authority to base its decision on the community's
preference for or against the facility. 453 In these settings, the purpose
of the public meetings is largely to create a forum for the exchange of
technical information, not for obtaining public approval or
disapproval. 4 The same is true in the context of hearings held on
local land use decisions.455
The public may also have to contend with the strong role given
project proponents in many siting processes. The initial review of an
application for a zoning-related permit or an environmental permit
normally involves only the applicant and the agency, not the
community to be affected by the proposed permit.4 56 Many important
technical questions are discussed at this stage.457 From the public's
standpoint,
significant,
and
potentially
disputed,
policy
interpretations may therefore be decided before the local community
has the chance to participate. Once these issues have been resolved
between the agency and the applicant, it becomes more difficult for
the agency to change its interpretation or position in response to later
public input.458 The application process, and the dynamic between
agency and applicant, thus limits the role of public participation and,
ultimately, community preferences, in permitting decisions. Thus, we
cannot conclude that public participation provisions will ensure that
the siting or permitting decisions that are made will correspond to
community preferences. Nonetheless, when considered formally,
453. See Ann Bray, Comment, Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to Citizen
Participationin Environmental Agency Decision Making, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1111, 1131 (noting, in a Minnesota study of agency responses to public participation, that
agency officials preferred to deal with scientific issues and did not believe they could or
should take other factors into consideration).
454. See John C. Duncan, Jr., Multicultural Participationin the Public Hearing Process:
Some Theoretical, Pragmatical,and Analeptical Considerations,24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
169, 212-13 (1999) (observing that public participation involves information exchange
rather than actual participation in decision-making processes).
455. See YOUNG, 4TH ED., supra note 311, § 21.28, at 807 (observing that zoningrelated decisions should not "be controlled or even unduly influenced by opinions and
desires expressed by interested persons at public hearings" and that the purpose of such
hearings is to obtain facts, not respond to preferences).
456. See DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW § 8.16, 8-31, 32 (2001). For example, the California Energy Commission encourages

applicants to participate in meetings with its staff and other regulatory agencies prior to
the submission of a formal application. See CAL. ENERGY COMM'N DEVELOPERS
GUIDE, supra note 288, at 6. Once the application is submitted, the agency reviews the
adequacy of the data before notifying the public of the application. Id. at 6, 8.
457. See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 456, § 8:16, at 8-31.
458. See BENJAMIN DAVY, ESSENTIAL INJUSTICE:

WHEN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

CANNOT RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE DISPUTES 63-64 (1997).
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public participation procedures appear to operate equally: even if
communities are not satisfied through them, theoretically all
communities would be equally unsatisfied.
In reality, however, public participation opportunities may be
more relevant to substantive outcomes than they appear in theory.
Commentators differ in their assessment about how influential
participation provisions are likely to be. Some claim they are
virtually meaningless.459 Others claim that they do have some
effect.4 6 ° No entity likes to appear insensitive to public sentiment.
Where public officials are making the decision, the public officials
may have to face their electorate. That may create an incentive to be
responsive to public sentiment against a LULU. Where regulatory
agencies are making key decisions, the agencies do not have to worry
about losing the next election, but they face their own political
pressures.46 1
Thus, as a practical matter, public participation
processes may create a greater likelihood that siting decisions will
respond to community preferences than one would expect
considering the laws and regulations on their own.

459. See Foster, Public Participation,supra note 439, at 204-05 (arguing that public
hearings often have little influence on agency decisions); Bray, supra note 453, at 1137
(concluding, based on study of public participation process for hazardous waste facilities in
Minnesota, that citizens rarely participate effectively in scientific decisions); cf Gauna,
The Environmental Justice Misfit, supra note 238, at 31-36 (suggesting that, to the extent
administrative agencies are based upon the model of agency expertise, they are insensitive
to public input).
460. See Arnold, supra note 356, at 60-63 (discussing potential of public participation
provisions in NEPA and other permitting processes to advance community interests);
Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA 's in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 565, 571 (1997) (observing potential of public participation provisions to
empower communities and impact government decisions); see also Celia Campbell-Mohn
& John S. Applegate, Learningfrom NEPA: Guidelinesfor Responsible Risk Legislation,
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 93, 129 (1999) (implying that NEPA's public participation process
creates the potential for meaningful participation); Daniel A. Mazmanian & David Morell,
The "NIMBY" Syndrome: Facility Siting and the Failure of Democratic Discourse, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s 233, 240 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft,

eds., 2d ed. 1994) (noting that "the wider arena for participation in siting decisions [has]
vastly expanded the opportunities for local opposition" and that such opposition has been
effective); Walter A. Rosenbaum, The Politics of Public Participationin Hazardous Waste
Management, in THE POLITICS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 176, 191-92

(James P. Lester & Ann O'M. Bowman eds., 1983) (noting that forty-six percent of (fortytwo out of ninety-four) hazardous waste permit applications facing public opposition in
Pennsylvania were "rejected, withdrawn, appealed, or otherwise delayed," and concluding
that "public activism was clearly influential, if not decisive, in a great number of [these]
permit determinations").
461. See supra note 417 and accompanying text (discussing political forces driving
administrative agencies).
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Assuming that public participation provisions do lead decisionmakers to respond to community preferences to some extent, the next
question becomes whether decision-makers will respond equally or,
instead, respond more to the preferences of some than others. Here
we return to the analysis considered in connection with the political
process accompanying zoning or individual siting decisions. Just as
the political process is likely to be, and to have been, skewed by the
political influence of the neighborhoods in question, 462 an entity's

response to public input in formal public participation forums is likely
to sway with the degree of influence of the "public" in question.
Moreover, while public participation provisions ostensibly
provide equal opportunity for public participation, they do not
necessarily guarantee that all members of the public will participate
equally.463
Poor and minority communities may face greater

obstacles, and hence have less influence, than other communities.
They may receive less notice; 464 may, in light of fewer educational
462. See supra notes 415-16 and accompanying text.
463. These disparities arise even where elaborate public participation procedures have
been developed to improve community participation.
Luke Cole analyzed the
implementation of California's Tanner Act, which mandates the creation of "local
assessment committees" ("LAC"), including representatives of the public, to assist local
governments considering hazardous waste facilities. See Luke W. Cole, The Theory and
Reality of Community-Based Environmental Decisionmaking: The Failureof California's
Tanner Act and Its Implicationsfor Environmental Justice, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 733, 736-39
(1999) (describing Tanner Act requirements). The process worked well where there was a
relatively homogenous community, significant expertise among the participants, and
where funds were provided for technical assistance. Id. at 740-42, 751 (describing
Martinez experience). In another case, the local government subverted the process by
picking only project supporters for the LAC, including only one Latino member on the
LAC despite the plan to site the facility in a 95% Latino community, and holding meetings
forty miles away from the targeted community. Id. at 743-45 (describing Kettleman City
siting experience). In a third case, the county initially did not include any residents of the
targeted community on the LAC, did not appoint any Latino members although the
targeted community was over 50% Latino, and, for most of the history of the process, did
not provide Spanish translation of the meetings although the majority of attendees did not
speak English. Id. at 745-46 (describing Buttonwillow experience). The county
suspended the LAC for over two years, and then gave only ten weeks for input. It refused
to translate the relevant documents or provide any technical assistance for evaluating
them. Id. at 746. Cole argues that one of the factors that appeared to explain the
differences in experiences was race: the process worked well in a homogeneous
community, Martinez. However, it worked very poorly where the relevant county
decision-makers were white and the affected communities were Latino. Id. at 752.
464. Official documents for providing notice, like the Federal Register or its state
equivalents, are unlikely to be read by community groups unfamiliar with the
administrative process. Moreover, agencies are generally required to mail notice only to
landowners, not to low-income renters. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT SITING COUNCIL,
APPLICATION GUIDE FOR AN ELECTRIC GENERATING FACILITY, supra note 288, § VII
(stating that notice of a permit application must be sent to all abutting landowners). While
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resources, face even higher barriers than other citizens in responding
to highly technical agency documents; 465 may be unable to participate

effectively due to language barriers; 466 may have less time to
participate in agency proceedings;467 and are likely to have fewer
financial resources to engage in the process and hire experts to assist
them in responding to an unwanted land use.468
most siting processes allow community members to be placed on a mailing list, see EPA
REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 438, § 3-7, unsavvy residents may not be aware of this
opportunity.
465. Documents associated with facility approval are frequently lengthy and written in
technical and legal language that may be "incomprehensible to the average layperson."
Foster, Public Participation,supra note 439, at 188. One analyst of NEPA found that
environmental impact statements were "too long and technical" for the public to use. See
James W. Spensley, National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 483, 519 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., Government Institutes 16th ed. 2001); see
also Johnson, supra note 460, at 600 (observing that technical nature of the environmental
review documents may impede effective participation by some communities).
466. See Reich, supra note 144, at 277 (noting that people of color may lack access to
key permitting decisions due to language problems).
467. Hearings on large facilities can be quite extensive, and hearings held during the
day are difficult for wage-earning individuals to attend. Where full participation in
hearings is limited to formal intervenors, the obstacles increase. Residents may be
intimidated by the application process, by the need to submit to cross-examination, and by
other formal legal requirements. See supra note 448 (discussing intervention process).
468. See generally Foster, Public Participation,supra note 439, at 186 (observing that
low-income communities and communities of color enter decision-making processes with
fewer resources, "less time, less information, and less specialized knowledge concerning
the legal, technical, and economic issues involved" than communities that are "less
disadvantaged"). In order to comment effectively, communities must often hire technical
consultants. See Gauna, The EnvironmentalJustice Misfit, supra note 238, at 66 (observing
that decision-makers give weight to commentators with expertise but ignore "community
residents or dismiss[] them as hysterical"). A study of public participation in Minnesota
found that agency staff were "skeptical about the accuracy of citizen scientific data" and
that such data rarely influenced agency decisions. Bray, supra note 453, at 1128. Hiring
experts, who are more likely to be listened to by decision-makers, is likely to be beyond
the means of many poorer communities.
Even obtaining the documents may be beyond the means of some communities.
For example, the Alabama Department of Environmental Management charged $0.40 per
page for copies of documents, a cost that could easily accrue into hundreds of dollars. See
Environmental Protection Agency Cabinet Elevation-Environmental Equity Issues:
Hearing before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives, 103d Cong. 150 (1993) (Testimony of
Mrs. Kaye Kiker).
As the environmental justice movement develops, environmental or civil rights
public interest groups could assist disadvantaged communities in overcoming these
limitations. See, e.g., Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 163, at 673 n.236
(discussing the 1991 formation of the Environmental Poverty Law Working Group,
created to provide expertise and resources for legal services offices undertaking
environmental cases); Peggy M. Shepard, Issues of Community Empowerment, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739, 742 (1994) (discussing partnership between Harlem community
organization and the Natural Resources Defense Council, a national environmental
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If some groups use the public participation system more
effectively than others, then, to the extent that public participation
provisions do affect substantive siting decisions, one can expect that
they will decrease siting where public participation exists and is
effective and increase siting where there is less, or less effective,
participation.469 If the poor and minorities are less able to use public
participation provisions effectively, then they are more likely to be
subject to land uses that do not match their preferences.
In sum, public participation provisions do not necessarily ensure
responsiveness to community preferences. They are usually designed
to provide and obtain information, not to give public viewpoints a
substantive role in siting decisions. Moreover, to the extent that
siting decision-makers are responsive, differences in communities'
political power and available resources may lead them to respond
more to the views of wealthy members of the majority than those of
the poor and minorities. While public participation processes have
the potential to improve the responsiveness of siting decisions, we
cannot be assured that, in their operation to date, they have helped
achieve justice under the community preferences model.
F.

The Land Use Siting Process and PoliticalJustice

My central thesis is that distributive injustice is worthy of public
policy attention, regardless of cause. But, as discussed above, if the
cause of a distributional inequity is some form of political or social
injustice, then that presents additional grounds for concern.47 ° In this
Section, I will briefly identify the political and social injustices that
might underlie some facets of the land use siting process described in
the previous Section.
As described above, certain objective factors, such as cheaper
land values, may lead to disparate siting of LULUs in poor and
minority neighborhoods, regardless of those neighborhoods'
preferences. While that distributive inequity is worth considering in
its own right, the reason why land costs are lower in some of these
neighborhoods may present issues of social justice that provide
organization). The movement is too recent, however, to have had a significant impact on
low-income and minority public participation in many past siting processes.
469. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text (describing tendency to site
facilities where there is likely to be less organized opposition); supra notes 430-32 and
accompanying text (discussing theory that wealthy and non-minority communities'
NIMBY leads to PIBBY-placement in black's backyards).
470. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (describing distributive justice
caused by political and social injustice).
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additional grounds for concern. Land values are strongly influenced
by how the "market" perceives the value of land. Land owned by
minorities is frequently given a lower value than if that same land
were owned by whites.47 ' The negative value associated with
minority-owned property is a consequence of racist assumptions.4 72
Distributional disparities caused by lower land values are thus
related, albeit indirectly, to the racist assumptions and history that
lower the land's value in the first place.473
Similarly, that poor and minority neighborhoods end up
receiving many social service LULUs is a legacy of the conditions that
made the neighborhoods poor and segregated.4 74 When one considers
that the cause of the need for social services is rooted in racism and
systemic economic problems, the distributional disparities become
more troubling than they would be if considered on their own.
As discussed above, the subjectivity of certain siting factors, such
as "suitability" and "quality of life impacts," leaves room for potential
bias, including decision-making that violates political justice by
favoring the interests of some over those of others. While the
exercise of discretion might frequently be exercised in an evenhanded fashion, discretion leaves open the possibility that political
injustice could infuse even ostensibly "neutral" factors. Thus, in some
cases, even the most neutral-seeming "objective factors" may be
infected with political or social injustice that makes the resulting
distributional disparities more troubling.

471. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 72; Margalynne Armstrong, Race and
Property Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051, 1059-60 (1998).

Land costs vary for many reasons, including the presence of existing industrial uses. See
MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 160, at 59. Here, I explore only the issue of
differences in land values attributable to race, not the other factors that influence land
value.
472. One could argue that minority neighborhoods have lower property values due not
to racism, but to such problems as higher crime and lower educational achievement. But
the poverty and discrimination that lead to crime and lower educational achievement are
themselves a legacy of segregation and discrimination.
473. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1066 (noting that,
if racism is a factor in lower land values, then including cost considerations in the siting
process "would inject society's prejudice against the poor and minorities into the siting
process").

See generally Foster, Justice From the Ground Up, supra note 35, at 800-01

(noting that siting processes incorporate factors that are determined by underlying
structural inequalities).

474. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 389, at 17-59 (describing development
of segregation); Nancy Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential
Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1996) (describing
discriminatory private and public actions that have led to existing segregation); see supra
notes 70-86 (describing existing segregation).
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The problems of political and social injustice are even more
apparent when one considers the political processes associated with
the land use siting process. While many of the distributional
problems associated with zoning do not implicate political justice
concerns, 475 political justice issues are raised to the extent that current
zoning processes benefit the powerful more than the powerless.
Many of the potential concerns about power disparities in the zoning
process are replicated in the context of individualized siting decisions
and in responses to public participation opportunities. I am by no
means arguing that all such decisions and processes are infected with
political injustice; many may be perfectly fair. But the potential for
community preferences to be met unequally due to political injustice
is present.
And social justice issues are raised by the historical legacy of
segregation, expulsive zoning, and other practices that led to much
less protection of poor and minority communities. Due to the
difficulty of changing land uses once they have been established,
these past social injustices have an enduring impact on current
distributional equity.
Inequities in meeting community preferences are thus caused, to
some extent, by underlying political and social injustices. While the
disparities are of concern regardless of cause, the presence of these
inequities adds an additional basis for concern about the resulting
distributive injustice.
G. Conclusion
The community preferences model suggests that disparities in the
distribution of LULUs might be justified by differences in community
preferences. Since it is not feasible to assess preferences directly, I
have instead examined the likelihood that they are met by the land
use siting process. The "market" in land use does not operate to meet
preferences. The objective factors that govern the private market
only incidentally respond to resident preferences, and often skew land
uses to poor and minority neighborhoods regardless of preference.
Although the political "markets," like zoning and individual siting or
permit decisions, do respond to some resident preferences, they are
not necessarily designed to serve preferences and, to the extent they

475. For example, the nonconforming use doctrine's limits on changing zoning to
match current preferences may be justified by respect for existing property rights. At least
considered on its own terms, it does not present an issue of political justice.
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do so, they do not serve all communities' preferences equally.47 6
Thus, the land use siting process does not lead to distributive justice
under the community preferences model.
VII. ARE POST-SITING MARKET DYNAMICS LIKELY TO SATISFY
COMMUNITY PREFERENCES EQUALLY?

A.

The Argument that Resident PreferencesAre Met Through PostSiting Housing Market Dynamics
The story does not, however, end with the siting process. Even if
the siting process were to frustrate resident preferences, it is possible
that post-siting dynamics in the housing market could rectify
disparities. Residents dissatisfied with a siting decision could move
away; those who wanted to be near a particular land use could move
toward it.477

Professor Blais states that "members of the host

community may express their preferences concerning residential
'
proximity to environmentally sensitive land uses with their feet."478

As noted above, Professor Blais uses the term "environmentally
sensitive land uses" rather than "undesirable land uses" due to their
potential desirability. 79
Professor Blais argues that poor or minority residents may
choose to live close to environmentally sensitive land uses due to the
job opportunities and other benefits such uses provide.48 ° By way of
example, she describes how industrial development in Richmond,
California, attracted residents during the last century.481 In the 1940s,
war-based production, in particular, attracted southern AfricanAmericans seeking employment.482 Although the Richmond example
has been used by environmental justice advocates "to provide
evidence of the injustice of the existing distribution of
476. Given that most of the public choice literature is highly skeptical of the
government's ability to properly maximize preferences, this conclusion is not surprising.
See supra note 238 (discussing skepticism of political markets expressed in public choice
literature).
477. Professor Lynn Blais suggests that, after a siting decision has been made,
"residents of these communities have made decisions either to remain in the community
after the challenged use was sited, or ... to migrate to a community playing host to such a
land use." Blais, supra note 22, at 81.
478. Id. at 126; see also Whitehead & Block, supra note 235, at 84-86 (arguing that
residents demonstrate their interest in purportedly undesirable land uses by choosing to
move toward them).
479. See Blais, supra note 22, at 78 n.8.
480. Id. at 102.
481. Id. at 114-15.
482. Id. at 115.
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'
environmentally sensitive land uses,"483
Professor Blais concludes that

"the fact that most of its residents are minorities appears to be
directly attributable to individual choices to seek employment in a
highly industrialized area."'
A critical issue is whether the housing market functions well
enough to allow people to express their residential preferences in
response to the siting of environmentally sensitive land uses.
Professor Blais recognizes that in some instances defects in the
housing market will impair residents' abilities to express their true
preferences. The poor are limited in their choice of housing by their
ability to pay, 485 and are more likely to "live near environmentally
'
sensitive land uses because that property is less expensive."486
Furthermore, she acknowledges that racial discrimination in the
housing market reduces housing opportunities for minorities in
comparison with non-minorities. 487 The conclusion she draws from
these defects in the market, however, is that they may impair the
ability of minorities and the poor to move to undesirable land uses.
Minorities and the poor may be unable to express their preferences to
live in areas offering employment and other benefits that derive from
industrial land uses.488 She thus suggests the possibility that defects in
the post-siting housing market keep the concentrations of minorities
and the poor near environmentally sensitive land uses artificially low
rather than artificially high. Overall, however, she implies that the
defects in the housing market are relatively insignificant and that
there is sufficient residential mobility to correlate existing residential
patterns with resident preferences.489
B.

Critique of Reliance on Post-SitingHousing Dynamics

This Section will first look at the limited data on post-siting
housing market mobility.490 Because there are relatively few studies
483. See id. (citing Charles Lee, Developing the Vision of Environmental Justice: A
Paradigmfor Achieving Healthy and Sustainable Communities, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 571,
575 (1995), and Jane Kay, California'sEndangered Communities of Color, in UNEQUAL

PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 155, 165-68).
484. Blais, supra note 22, at 115.
485. Id. at 118.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 119-20.
488. Id.

489. See id. at 126-27.
490. The studies on post-siting housing market mobility were designed to determine
whether current disparities were present at the time of siting decisions or, instead, arose
subsequently. In large part, the purpose of these analyses has been to determine whether
distributional inequity is caused by land use siting processes or by post-siting market
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and none of them address the role of preferences, I then evaluate the
housing market to determine the likelihood that it would allow for
post-siting mobility leading to the equal satisfaction of preferences.
Although they have received considerable attention, relatively
few studies on post-siting housing market mobility have been
conducted.4 91
Where done, they often encompass a limited
geographic area. In addition, the subject matter is limited: most

studies have addressed housing mobility following hazardous waste
facility sitings,492just one among many LULUs, and relatively rare

events at that.
Professor Been has conducted a highly elaborate national study

comparing the demographics of communities hosting hazardous waste
facilities at the time of siting with their current demographic makeup. 493 Overall, the evidence from that study did "not support the
argument that market dynamics following the siting of a TSDF [a
hazardous waste facility] change the racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic
characteristics of host neighborhoods."'4 94
Other studies, generally considering smaller geographic areas,
have had mixed results.

Some have shown some increase in the

numbers of minorities and the poor subsequent to the siting of

dynamics. The purpose here, in contrast, is simply to obtain a background understanding
of the data in order to assess preference-motivated mobility.
491. See Pastor et al., supra note 276, at 4 (observing that little research has been done
to determine the extent to which existing concentrations of toxic facilities in minority and
poor communities are a consequence of minorities moving to the area after the initial
siting).
492. See Oakes et al., supra note 278, at 143 (regarding the relative rareness of waste
facility sitings).
493. Been & Gupta, supra note 163.
494. Id. at 29. The mean value of socioeconomic factors did decrease after facilities
were sited, id. at 28, but multivariate analysis controlling for multiple variables did not
correlate economic changes with facility sitings. Id. at 28-29. Changes in AfricanAmerican and Hispanic percentages were not statistically significant, id. at 28, and, under
the multivariate analysis, were not generally correlated with facility sitings. Id. at 29.
The SADRI researchers also evaluated demographic changes after the siting of
hazardous waste facilities from 1970-1990. They found that the percentage of blacks did
increase, but at a rate that was the same or less than in other industrial areas. Oakes et al.,
supra note 278, at 138. The authors therefore conclude that the siting of waste facilities
does not trigger demographic shifts. Id. Their evidence, however, does appear to suggest
that industrial development is likely to increase numbers of blacks, a finding that supports
the market mobility hypothesis. The authors did additional statistical analyses that found
that hazardous waste facility sitings had no impact on subsequent numbers of black or
Hispanics, id. at 145, but it is not clear how this evidence relates to their earlier data. The
authors ultimately conclude that the longitudinal changes they observe are "similar to
those in other more industrial areas," id. at 147, suggesting, again, the possibility that they
have observed increases in the number of minorities in industrial areas.
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hazardous waste facilities or other undesirable land uses.495 Others
have shown decreases in the percentages of poor and minorities.496

For most of the studies, it is not clear, however, whether the changes
in demographics were the result of certain groups moving into the
neighborhoods, other groups moving out, or a combination of the
two. None of the studies address how demographic changes-or their
absence-relate to actual community preferences.
Absent sufficient concrete evidence about demographic
responses to LULU sitings and their relation to community
preferences, this Article reviews the factors that are likely to

influence housing mobility. In addition to assessing the likelihood
that mobility would reflect LULU preferences generally, the Article
addresses whether the housing market is likely to allow residents of
differing economic classes and races to meet preferences equally.
Demographic stability following a land use siting decision, like
that found in Professor Been's national study of housing dynamics
following the siting of hazardous waste facilities,4 97 does not prove

that, on balance, the residents desired the facilities in question.
Residents of the host community may have many reasons to stay,
such as family, a close-knit community, schools, a beloved house or
495. For example, a study of demographic shifts following the siting of hazardous waste
facilities, landfills, and incinerators in the St. Louis area showed an increase in the
percentage of minority residents following siting. See Lambert & Boerner, supra note 153,
at 205. When inactive hazardous waste sites were included in the analysis, the study found
that, between 1970 and 1990, poor and minority concentrations increased as well. Id. at
206-07. The study does not indicate whether the percentage shifts were caused by
increasing numbers of poor and minority residents or by the departure of nonminority and
wealthier residents.
Professor Been's study of the housing dynamics following the siting of landfills
and mini-incinerators in Houston, Texas, found significant increases in the percentages of
poor and minority residents following the sitings. Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275,
at 1403-05.
496. In a study of the demographic dynamics following the siting of four major
southeastern hazardous waste landfills, Professor Been found that the percentage of
African Americans declined "precipitously" in two cases and decreased somewhat, though
not as significantly, in the other two. Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275, at 1399.
Relative poverty, median family income, and median housing value changed only
marginally, with an increase in relative median housing value in two of the four counties.
Id. at 1399-1400.
A study of post-siting market dynamics associated with the siting of high-capacity
toxic facilities in Los Angeles County found that increasing numbers of minorities did not
move into neighborhoods with hazardous facilities after they were sited; instead, a modest
number of minorities moved out. Pastor et al., supra note 276, at 13, 15, 18; see also id., at
4 (describing the Shaikh and Loomis study of post-siting market dynamics associated with
the siting of stationary sources of air pollution in Denver, Colorado, that found "no
evidence of minority move-in").
497. See supra note 494 and accompanying text.
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garden, or a long history in the area, not to mention the realities of
inertia.498 To say that people "vote with their feet" suggests a
mobility in response to an undesirable land use that is unrealistic in
light of the many variables that affect the critical decision about

where to live. That residents choose to stay in an area does not mean
they are indifferent to the environmentally sensitive land use. While
this factor may prevent preferences from being satisfied through the
housing market, it at least applies equally across demographic groups.
Stability following a land use siting decision could also result
from acknowledged defects in residential housing markets, such as
wealth disparities and housing discrimination, rather than residents'
satisfaction with the new land use. These defects do result in
disparities in the market's ability to meet preferences. Those with

fewer financial resources will clearly have fewer options if they desire
to move.

In addition, housing segregation, and associated housing

discrimination, remain pervasive, resulting in fewer options for
minorities seeking a new community.499 Thus, to the extent the
demographics of a poor or minority community remain stable after
the siting of a LULU, it is possible that that stability is a consequence

of being effectively trapped. Since the poor and minorities are more
likely to experience these defects, it will be harder for them to have
their preferences met than other residents.
Professor Blais's conclusion that these defects keep minorities

and the poor from moving to environmentally sensitive land uses may
be true in some cases, but overall seems somewhat strained."° While
theoretically possible, it is important to recognize that discrimination
and the realities of unequal wealth distribution could be leaving
498. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1019 (observing
that individuals will not choose to move away from an undesired LULU if the costs of
relocating, such as real estate transaction costs and psychological costs, are greater than
the negative impact of the LULU).
499. See, e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 39, at 68-69 (discussing discrimination in
the housing market; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 389, at 96-109 (describing studies
showing persistent racial housing discrimination); Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275,
at 1389-90 (describing effect of housing discrimination on the ability of people of color to
live in high quality neighborhoods); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text
(discussing discrimination-based restraints on housing mobility). Cole and Foster also
observe that, even absent overt discrimination, minorities may be reluctant to move into
white neighborhoods in which they are likely to be isolated. COLE & FOSTER, supra note
39, at 68.
500. It is ironic that the post-siting market dynamics analysis that Professor Blais uses
to suggest that defects in the housing market may keep the poor and minorities from
moving to environmentally sensitive land uses has generally been utilized to determine
whether defects in the housing market lead to greater, rather than smaller, concentrations
of the poor and minorities near undesirable land uses.
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minorities and the poor trapped near land uses they would prefer to
avoid. But even in those cases where her contention is true, the
housing market is meeting preferences unequally.
As indicated above, some studies do show evidence of increasing
concentrations of poor and minorities after undesirable land uses are
sited.501' The demographic shifts could be caused by the departure of
wealthy and nonminority residents, who leave behind a higher
concentration of poor and minority residents who are less able to
move than their counterparts. °2 While such shifts show that the
housing market allows some to meet their preferences-those who
leave-the disparate demographic shift may imply that some are able
to do so better than others. Thus, even where there is mobility, it
may not operate to meet preferences equally. 03
It is, however, possible that increasing concentrations of poor
and minorities near new LULUs are a consequence of their
movement toward the land uses.504 That mobility may reflect their
preferences for the land uses, and therefore lead to a greater
satisfaction of distributive justice under the community preferences
model. On the other hand, to the extent the LULU siting reduced
property values, the mobility may reflect the desirability of cheaper
housing or job opportunities, not a preference for the new land uses.
The move may be made in spite of the land use.
Nonetheless, residents who choose to move to LULUs for the
cheaper housing or jobs are receiving a net gain in having their
preferences met from their preexisting circumstances; otherwise, one
would presume that they would not have made the move. In that
sense, then, this form of mobility could be seen as serving the

501. See supra note 495 and accompanying text.
502. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275, at 1389-90 (noting that the siting of
undesirable land uses is likely to lead to a downhill spiral that "will induce those who can
leave the neighborhood-the least poor and those least subject to discrimination-to do
so").
503. This is not to say that minorities are always unable to move. As indicated above,
percentages of African Americans decreased following the siting of hazardous waste
landfills in the south. See supra note 496 (describing the Been study). The data, however,
do not make clear the full story behind the dynamics. Professor Been hypothesizes that
African-American residents may have been displaced by white residents attracted to the
jobs provided by these large facilities. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275, at
1405-06; see also infra note 508 and accompanying text (discussing possible displacement
of minority residents).
504. See Lambert & Boerner, supra note 153, at 206-07 (speculating that post-siting
increases in the proportion of poor and minority residents near industrial and waste sites
in St. Louis were the result of an influx of these groups).
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community preferences model. 05 To the extent the model goes
farther to assert that residents actually desire the land uses around
them, however, then mobility prompted by cheaper housing or jobs,
rather than by the undesirable land use, would not satisfy the model.
However one views it, such mobility is not likely to operate equally.
The cheaper housing or jobs are likely to be particularly desirable for
minorities and the poor, who may have a more difficult time finding
affordable housing or jobs than those with higher incomes who are
not subject to discrimination. 06
In some cases, percentages of poor and minorities have
decreased, rather than increased, after a LULU has been sited. 07
These shifts may reflect the ability of these groups to meet their
preferences by moving away from an undesirable facility. The data
do not make clear the full story behind the dynamics, however.
Professor Been hypothesizes that decreases in African-American
residents after the siting of several landfills in the southeast may
represent their displacement by white residents attracted to the jobs
provided by these large facilities. 08 The incoming white residents
might have their preferences met, but the departing residents may
have theirs frustrated. Thus, this type of mobility may or may not be
a reflection of the departing residents' preferences about the land
uses.

The degree to which the housing market can be trusted to meet
private preferences decreases when one assumes a starting baseline of
disproportionate siting. If environmentally undesirable land uses are
sited disproportionately in poor or minority neighborhoods, then the
housing market is not starting from a neutral baseline. As discussed
above, there has been some tendency, at least historically, to site
undesirable facilities in minority or poor neighborhoods." 9 As
Professor Blais concedes, the initial allocation of legal entitlements
505. See Whitehead & Block, supra note 235, at 86 (arguing that "[tJhe fact that poor
and black people are attracted to the higher paying jobs in the petroleum industry is very
strong evidence that they regard the package of slightly dirtier air and higher wages as
preferable to the slightly cleaner air and lower wages back where they came from"); cf.
Blais, supra note 22, at 120 (suggesting that "residential proximity to environmentally
sensitive land uses offers opportunities foreclosed by illegal and invidious discrimination
[in the housing market]").
506. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275, at 1389-90; Lambert & Boerner,
supra note 153, at 202.
507. See supra note 496 (describing Been study of housing market dynamics following
the siting of four southeastern hazardous waste facilities and Pastor study of housing
market dynamics following the siting of hazardous facilities in Los Angeles).
508. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275, at 1405-06.
509. See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
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can play an important role in the ability of the market to respond to
private preferences. t ° If a person is not near undesirable land uses
and prefers it that way, that person's preference against undesirable
land uses is easy to fulfill. But if a person prefers not to be near
undesirable land uses but finds him or herself nonetheless subject to
them, the ability to act on that preference is much more difficult than
in the situation where no action need be taken. Even if the housing
market were completely fair, the cost of moving, in material,
psychological, and social terms may exceed the benefit to be gained
by distance from the undesirable land use. Where the housing market
imposes constraints based on wealth and race, the cost and difficulty
of moving in order to realize the preference against the undesirable
land use becomes even greater. Where both the market in land uses
and the housing market make it difficult for poor and minorities to
act upon private preferences against proximity to undesirable land
uses, it is difficult to have faith in the housing market as an adequate
mechanism for meeting resident preferences.
It is, of course, possible that people move toward
environmentally sensitive land uses whose benefits they desire. But
the fact that past residents of a community might have gravitated
toward land uses they found desirable does not tell us whether the
land uses still meet the preferences of current residents. Professor
Blais's description of African-American migration to Richmond's
post-war thriving industry is a case in point. She implies that the
disproportionate number of African Americans in Richmond arose
by choice and represents the true expression of private preferences
and the proper functioning of the market. But can we be so sure that
current residents share the enthusiasm of their relatives who came to
the area several generations earlier? Current Richmond residents
have mobilized against the city's industrial pollution through the
West County Toxics Coalition.5"1' That earlier generations were
willing to accept environmental problems in exchange for jobs does
not mean that one can conclude that current residents are satisfied
with current environmental conditions. Moreover, it is not clear that
earlier generations understood the implications of the tradeoffs they
were making. One of the features of the environmental justice
movement is that it has sparked in minority communities a new
awareness of environmental risks. The historic absence of that

510. Blais, supra note 22, at 95-96.
511. See Bullard, supra note 39, at 15, 29, 35-36 (discussing West County Toxics
Coalition's efforts to reduce pollution in Richmond, California).
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awareness should not be read to discount the articulated preferences
against pollution expressed by a newly-informed community.
Thus, the housing market cannot solve inequities that might have
been created by the land use siting process. There is no viable
"market" whose invisible hand matches community preferences with
available land uses. Although the market does have some mobility
that allows some preferences to be met, preferences are met
unequally, thus failing to achieve distributive justice under the
community preferences model.
C.

The Housing Market and PoliticalJustice

This Section has focused on the housing market's failure to allow
different residents to meet their preferences equally. My central
thesis is that this distributional outcome is troubling in its own right.
The concern is amplified, however, when one considers the apparent
causes of the inequity. Just as the social and racial inequalities
impacting land use siting processes make the distributional
consequences of those processes more noteworthy, 12 inequities in
housing markets make the resulting inequalities in the ability to meet
preferences more problematic.
For example, the fact that
discrimination in the housing market may leave minority residents
trapped near LULUs, while their white neighbors are able to
depart," 3 exacerbates concern about an inequity that is independently
troubling. Similarly, the fact that minority residents may be drawn to
live near LULUs, because discrimination and patterns of segregation
leave them with fewer options for affordable housing than others,
renders the resulting distributional disparities
particularly
troubling." 4 The fact that social injustice plays a role in causing
distributional disparities is not irrelevant.
CONCLUSION

This Article makes the case for addressing distributive justice.
Distributive justice is critically important to the everyday lives of
those who experience its injustice. The damage is felt regardless of
whether the cause was intentional discrimination or the vagaries of
the market. While discriminatory processes deserve attention as well,
one should not have to point to a discriminatory process before
512. See supra Section VI.F (discussing the land use siting process and political justice).
513. See supra notes 64, 499 and accompanying text (describing discrimination in
housing markets).
514. See supra note 504 and accompanying text.
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addressing a distributively unjust outcome.
And addressing
discriminatory processes is a long, slow, endeavor. In the meantime,
efforts should also be directed toward improving outcomes.
Distributive injustice is pervasive regardless of how we define
"distributive justice." That injustice is relatively easy to see under the
"equal division" model. Many studies indicate the inequitable
distribution of LULUs in poor and minority neighborhoods. But it is
also true under the "community preferences model," a model that has
been raised to question the presence of distributive injustice and the
need for efforts to combat it. While one could not, practically
speaking, survey the nation to determine every resident's relative
satisfaction of preferences, an analysis of the processes by which land
uses and residents are distributed reveals that equal satisfaction is
highly unlikely.
Objective factors, such as siting criteria established by facility
proponents and government regulators, are generally not designed to
meet community preferences. Moreover, some of these factors skew
LULUs to poor and minority neighborhoods regardless of
preference, suggesting that those neighborhoods are less likely to
have their preferences met than other neighborhoods. While some of
these factors are neutral in nature, others are tainted by potential
social and political injustices that provide additional cause for
concern.
At first glance, political processes, such as zoning and individual
siting decisions, might seem more likely to meet community
preferences, and meet them equally, than objective factors. But lowincome and minority communities are not likely to wield as much
influence as wealthier and nonminority communities, and are
therefore less likely to have their preferences met. Zoning is also
limited in its ability to respond to changing preferences. And a long
history of segregation and discriminatory zoning has a significant ongoing effect on current land use patterns that keeps those patterns
from reflecting preferences equally. Nor are the explicit public
participation provisions included in many environmental and land-use
decision-making processes likely to make a significant difference.
Many of these provisions are designed for the exchange of
information, not to assess and respond to preferences. To the extent
that they do lead decision-makers to be more responsive to
preferences, inequalities in political influence are likely to result in
inequalities in meeting articulated preferences. Thus, the land use
siting process will not necessarily meet community preferences, and,
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to the extent preferences are met, they are not likely to be met
equally.
We have no assurance that the inequities created by the siting
process have been cured by post-siting housing market dynamics that
have redistributed people closer to the land uses they prefer. If
anything, the housing market may have deepened the degree to which
peoples' preferences are unequally met. When economic constraints
and discrimination keep the poor and minorities from having the
same mobility as wealthier and nonminority residents, they are less
able to satisfy their preferences. While injustice will not characterize
every individual case or every community, there is just as serious a
likelihood of pervasive distributive injustice under the community
preferences model as under the equal division model.
Advocates of the community preferences model fear government
efforts to intervene in the siting process because they believe that the
market functions more effectively than paternalistic government
efforts. The government does not know people's preferences, and so
will force people into situations they do not desire and interfere with
their ability to lead their lives as they choose. 15 But the analysis
above indicates that neither the land use siting process "market" nor
the housing market serve to meet community preferences effectively,
much less equally. 16 In light of the market's manifest failure to meet
preferences, and meet them equally, the argument against
government intervention loses force. If preferences are not met, then
the goals of a market system are not met: social welfare is not
maximized because individual preferences are not maximized.
Liberty is not achieved if residents cannot realize preferences. The
system is not efficient because land uses and residents are not well
matched, and because the market is not proving to be an effective
mechanism for providing the requisite matches. The government is
not per se "interfering" with market values if the market is not
achieving those values on its own.
Market advocates have also argued that, if the market has
defects, then the defects themselves should be addressed, rather than
515. See LAMBERT ET AL., supra note 87, at 15-17 (arguing that government efforts to
control siting interfere with communities' ability to choose facilities they may want); see
also supra notes 233-34, 240 and accompanying text (describing arguments in favor of
market approaches and against government intervention).
516. See Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, EnvironmentalJustice, and the
Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1298-99 (1997) (observing, in the
environmental justice context, the inequity in free economic markets, which favor those
with money, knowledge, and skills over others).
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attempting to interfere with the market to overcome the effects of the
defects. For example, if discrimination in the housing market keeps
minorities from having the same mobility as whites, then
discrimination should be addressed, rather than attempting to control
land use siting processes.517
As elaborated above, however,
ameliorating the deep and complex legacy of discrimination is a longterm and enormous undertaking that is unlikely to be resolved
anytime soon."' While all efforts should be made to do so, it is
appropriate for the government to address directly the consequences
of this on-going legacy by improving the equity of land use
distributions.
Thus, regardless of which model of distributive justice one
adopts, and regardless of one's belief in the values a market system
promotes, broad-scale governmental initiatives to improve equity are
appropriate. There are, of course, risks inherent in any such effort.
One confronts the possibility of "public failure" as well as "market
failure."5'19 And government efforts must be designed with the
realities of existing institutions and markets in mind. 2 ° But in light of
pervasive inequities, there is little to be gained by doing nothing. A
misguided faith in the market should not stand in the way of
initiatives to improve distributive equity.
This Article defines and establishes the importance of
distributive justice and demonstrates the pervasiveness of distributive
injustice regardless of how it is defined. This Article is designed to
counter complacency that might arise if one were to adopt the
community preferences model and then assume that the siting process
or the housing market meet preferences adequately.

517. See, e.g., Blais, supra note 22, at 120 (arguing that, if minority residents find
themselves pushed toward living near environmentally sensitive land uses due to housing
discrimination, then "the appropriate remedy would be to continue the crusade against the
discrimination" rather than control land use siting).
518. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
519. See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 248.
520. For example, some have questioned whether remedies to the siting process would
improve distributive justice in light of post-siting housing dynamics that could lead to an
increase in the concentration of poor and minorities residents regardless of the initial
siting demographics. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 275, at 1386 (suggesting
that, if existing concentrations of poor and minorities around LULUs were caused by postsiting housing dynamics, then it is unclear "whether even an ideal siting system that
ensured a perfectly fair initial distribution of LULUs would result in any long-term benefit
to the poor or to people of color"). While this concern is worth bearing in mind, the
absence of such a trend in several of the post-siting market dynamic studies, see supra
notes 493-96 and accompanying text, suggests that increasing the fairness of initial siting
decisions would likely have a positive impact on distributive justice.
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To move forward in addressing distributive justice, much work
remains to be done. Serious consideration needs to be given to
whether one should adopt the equal division model, the community
preferences model, or a combination of the two. Whichever model is
chosen, serious definitional challenges are posed. 21 Deciding upon
and defining the right model are, or course, only the initial steps.
Concrete mechanisms for achieving distributive justice require
analysis and development. There are existing initiatives to consider,

like EPA's interpretation of Title VI, 22 or New York City regulations

requiring all boroughs to accept their "fair share" of LULUs,52 3 or

unsuccessful legislative efforts proposed in the early

1990s. 5 24

In

addition, some of the existing processes that fail to achieve

distributive justice might be modified so as to do better. New factors
could be included as objective criteria, zoning processes could be
improved, public participation procedures could be more equitable
and effective.

And, although this Article argues that distributive

justice is a serious issue deserving serious concern, those siting
LULUs have legitimate needs, and good land use planning and
environmental permitting must consider values in addition to equity.

Any proposals for improving distributive justice will have to consider
the role of distributive justice relative to such other values and
concerns. This Article demonstrates why these future steps are ones
worth taking.

521. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (discussing definitional challenges
posed by the equal division model); supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text (discussing
definitional challenges posed by the community preferences model).
522. See supra note 19 (discussing EPA's recent interpretation of Title VI, which may
impact state agencies' ability to issue permits if the permits would lead to a disparate
impact).
523. See Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?, supra note 19, at 1005 (describing
"'fair share' criteria" adopted by New York City in 1990 designed to make sure that every
borough within the city, and each neighborhood within each borough, "bear its fair share
of undesirable land uses").
524. See supra note 19 (discussing the Environmental Justice Act of 1992, which would
have limited siting toxic chemical facilities in the nation's most contaminated areas, and
the Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993, which would have protected poor or
minority communities that were already environmentally disadvantaged from hazardous
or solid waste facilities).

